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Introdution
In industrialized ountries, the single most important soure of inome for most people is
inome earned in the labor market. It is used to nane, among other things, all kinds of
onsumption ranging from everyday expenditures for food, lothes, and servies like hair-uts
to long-lasting onsumption goods like ars or TVs. Unertainty about future individual labor
inome raises worries that a urrent standard of living has to be adjusted in the future to
respond to new inome situations. It is ommon to most people that suh risky expetations
harm their well-being. Consequently, if they had the hoie they would prefer to live in a world
where they fae no inome risk but earn just average inome. This risk aversion leads people
to seek insurane to insulate onsumption, i.e. their standard of living, from inome risk. But
in general, insurane markets for individual inome risk are missing or at least not perfet in
the sense that not every ontingeny an be insured. If insurane markets are in this way
inomplete, then agents seek for other ways to ahieve onsumption smoothing.
The questions of how households adjust their onsumption-saving behavior in the presene
of inome risk and of how muh insurane they an still ahieve in a world with inomplete
insurane markets have been a fruitful eld of eonomi researh for deades. In my dissertation,
I build on existing results and extend a workhorse model to empirially relevant, yet unexplored,
eonomi environments to learn more about these important questions.
Obviously, the eets of inome risk on individual deisions depend on the properties and
harateristis of inome risk. Transitory utuations in inome might be easily dealt with
by agents without muh harm to their welfare. Agents an put aside some money in good
times to be prepared for a rainy day. To do so, a simple risk-free asset sues. This way
households are able to smooth their onsumption and insulate onsumption from inome risk
on their own, without sophistiated nanial instruments or insurane ontrats. In eonomis,
this self-insurane behavior is well-understood and generally known as buer stok saving. But
what happens if inome risk is not transitory but permanent? This question has attrated
inreasing attention over the last years for two reasons: (i) The empirial literature on labor
inome risk has provided broad support for permanent omponents in individual inome risk,
and (ii) the intuitively appealying idea of buer stok saving does no longer apply in ases with
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permanent inome risk.
In hapters 1 and 2 of my dissertation, I deal with the optimal onsumption-saving behavior in
the presene of permanent inome risk. I do this, rst from a theoretial perspetive and then
by studying the quantitative onsequenes of the theory. In these hapters, inome risk is rep-
resented by exogenous utuations in inome. Chapter 3 departs from the onsumption-saving
problem and onstitutes a starting point to understand better the soures and harateristis
of inome risk. In this hapter, whih is joint work with Philip Jung, we study job losses and
reation of new jobs in the labor market. Although the analysis remains at this stage at an
aggregate level, we hope to develop, starting from there, a better understanding of the soures
and harateristis of individual inome risk. The next paragraphs outline the hapters of my
dissertation and desribe the main results.
In hapter 1, I provide a new model to study the onsumption-saving deision in the presene
of permanent inome risk. It is an extension of the lassial Aiyagari model. Aiyagari style
eonomies are a workhorse model of quantitative researh. For this eonomy, I prove the
existene of a reursive ompetitive equilibrium and show that there exist equilibria where
borrowing onstraints are never binding. This allows me to establish a non-trivial lower bound
on the equilibrium interest rate. To solve the individual onsumption-saving problem, I present
a new approah that uses latties of onsumption funtions to deal with the non-ompat state
spae and the unbounded utility funtion of the problem. The approah uses only the rst
order onditions of the problem (Euler equations). The proof is onstrutive and it serves as a
theoretial foundation for the onvergene of a poliy funtion iteration proedure.
Chapter 2 uses the model presented in hapter 1 for a quantitative analysis. The paper builds
on the existing results that in models with transitory inome shoks and trade in a riskless asset
the welfare loss of missing insurane markets is small, and that with permanent inome shoks
and no trade in assets the welfare losses an beome substantial. I onsider an empirially
relevant ase in between the two extreme ases with permanent inome shoks but trade in
a riskless asset. I show that welfare losses from missing insurane markets in this model are
still substantial. Furthermore, I show that one an losely align the welfare eets in a model
without asset trade to the welfare eets in a model with asset trade by saling the volatility
of inome unertainty. I derive a saling fator that oinides with the labor inome share of
total inome and provide a losed form approximation formula to desribe the welfare osts of
permanent inome shoks in the presene of market inompleteness and self-insurane. From
these ndings, I onlude that asset trade provides an eetive hannel for self-insurane also
in models with permanent inome shoks.
In hapter 3, that is joint work with Philip Jung, we doument that the ring rate volatility
in Germany is 2.5 times as high as in the U.S. and ontributes 60 − 70% to the aggregate
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unemployment volatility, the opposite of what is found for the US. We show that wage rigidities
are not at the root of these large dierenes. To explain the ross-ountry dierenes, we develop
a labor market searh model with endogenous rings, quits on the job, and math heterogeneity.
We alibrate the model for Germany and the US jointly to study the institutional dierenes
that generate the dierenes in business yle behavior. We show that the model predits
the observed time-series pattern of important labor market variables for both ountries well.
We show that institutional dierenes generating lower average hiring and ring rates amplify
the response of the eonomy to aggregate shoks. At the same time, they are responsible for
substantial dierenes in the persistene of the unemployment rate, explaining the sluggish
response to shoks in Germany ompared to the US.
The three hapters of the thesis are self-ontained and an be read separately. All hapters are
followed by an appendix with additional material.
3
Chapter 1
Reursive equilibria in an Aiyagari style
eonomy with permanent inome shoks
1.1 Introdution
Over the last two deades, a large literature has studied the eets of inome unertainty on
individual behavior in heterogeneous agents inomplete markets eonomies, a model lass that
is widely known as Aiyagari style models.
1
While applied researhers have extensively studied
this lass of models numerially, theoretial results on the existene, haraterization, and om-
putation of equilibria are rare. This paper makes three theoretial ontributions with important
eonomi impliations. We prove the existene of reursive ompetitive equilibria (RCE) for
an Aiyagari style model where inome shoks are permanent. The proof is onstrutive and
ontains a onvergene proof for a popular omputational algorithm based on the rst-order
onditions of the agent's problem (poliy funtion iteration). Regarding the haraterization, we
prove the existene of equilibria with non-binding borrowing onstraints and with a non-trivial
lower bound on the equilibrium interest rate. The haraterization of the equilibrium alloation
allows us to derive further important impliations for the optimal onsumption-saving deision
of agents in equilibrium.
Applied researhers studying Aiyagari style eonomies have foused on nding RCE numerially
trusting on their existene. In line with these studies, Due et al. (1994) and Miao (2006) have
provided existene proofs for RCE where the state spae is a ompat set. The elements of the
equilibrium desription, like the optimal poliy funtion or the distribution over individuals on
the state spae, are then funtions (distributions) on a ompat domain (support). Although the
assumption of a ompat state spae seems to be a rather tehnial issue, it imposes important
1
See for example Aiyagari (1994), Huggett (1993), Telmer (1993) or the textbook by Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2000)
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eonomi restritions on individual inome proesses. For example, it rules out the possibility
that the inome proess ontains a unit root. However, the unit-root speiation has beome
quite popular in the empirial literature on inome risk beause various empirial studies have
provided evidene that individual inome risk ontains transitory and permanent (unit root)
omponents.
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Therefore, the analysis of a model with a non-ompat state spae does not
only address a theoretial gap but it also provides the foundation to study the impliations of
permanent inome shoks on the onsumption-saving deision in Aiyagari style eonomies.
The equilibrium existene proof omprises three steps. The rst step is to show the existene of
an optimal solution to the agents' problem. The seminal textbook by Stokey and Luas (1989)
establishes the value funtion approah, the ontration property of the Bellman equation, and
the priniple of optimality as the standard tools to prove the existene of a solution for this
kind of problem. In this paper, we depart from this approah by relying only on rst order
onditions of the agents' problem (Euler equations) to prove the existene of an optimal poliy
funtion.
3
Similar approahes have been taken in Deaton and Laroque (1992), Coleman (1991),
and Rabault (2002). All three papers deal with funtions on a metri spae and in the ase of
Deaton and Laroque (1992) and Coleman (1991) apply only to problems with a ompat state
spae and bounded utility.
4
Instead of dealing with funtions in a metri spae, we use a lattie
of onsumption funtions and apply Tarski's xed point theorem to prove the existene of a
reursive poliy funtion. This allows us to deal with the non-ompatness of the state spae
and unboundedness of the utility funtion. Sine the proof is onstrutive it establishes the
onvergene of the poliy funtion iteration algorithm for onsumption-saving problems, and
thereby provides a theoretial justiation for its widespread use. To our knowledge, this proof
has been missing from the literature.
5
In the seond step of the existene proof, we show that a unique stationary distribution ex-
ists, and in step three we derive the existene of a market learing interest rate. As it turns
out, the presene of prudene, i.e. stritly onvex marginal utility, is ruial in order to get
preautionary savings in an equilibrium with permanent inome shoks. The reason is that
borrowing onstraints are potentially non-binding. This omplements ndings in Huggett and
Ospina (2001), who have shown that in models with mean-reverting shoks, prudene of agents
is not needed to get preautionary savings beause borrowing onstraints are always binding
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For example Carroll and Samwik (1997), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), and Blundell, Preston, and Pistaferri
(2008).
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Although the present paper fouses on the ase of permanent inome shoks, this step of the proof is
presented for a general lass of onsumption-saving problems with Markovian inome proesses.
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Coleman (1991) analyzes a representative agent model. This hanges the operator on the Euler equation.
5
The approah in Deaton and Laroque (1992) and Coleman (1991) overs only the ase of a ompat state
spae. Furthermore, the operator in Coleman applies only to a representative agent eonomy. The approah by
Rendahl (2007) assumes bounded utility and still relies on the onvergene of the value funtion iteration.
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for some agents.
In fat, the existene of equilibria with non-binding borrowing onstraints follows as a orollary
to the existene proof. This result is of partiular interest beause it opposes the nding in
standard inomplete markets models, where there is an intimate link between the existene of
equilibria and binding borrowing onstraints. Hene, it shows that the non-existene result for
RCE with non-binding borrowing onstraints on a ompat state spae (Krebs (2004)) does not
extend to the ase of a non-ompat state spae. The two soures of market inompleteness,
namely missing insurane markets for idiosynrati risk and borrowing onstraints, an now be
disentangled. This suggests that the existene of preautionary savings in Huggett and Ospina
(2001) is indeed driven by the market imperfetion indued by the borrowing onstraint rather
than by inomplete insurane markets, although the two soures of market inompleteness are
intimately linked in models with mean-reverting shoks.
The present paper is not the rst to study the impliations of permanent inome shoks.
Constantinides and Due (1996) and Krebs (2007) are two examples that do this in a general
equilibrium setup. The predition for the onsumption-saving deision from these papers is,
however, highly stylized. The struture of the endowment proess in these models allows the
onstrution of no trade equilibria where all agents onsume their endowment of the urrent
period.
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In ontrast to these models, we onsider a prodution eonomy. The onsumption-
investment good is produed using apital and labor as inputs to a neolassial prodution
funtion. Consequently, in equilibrium some agents have to hold positive assets, for whih
they reeive a deterministi inome in return. This rules out autarki equilibria as they are
onstruted in the earlier papers.
Turning to our last result, we show that non-binding borrowing onstraints imply a non-trivial
lower bound on the equilibrium interest rate. This lower bound oinides with the equilibrium
interest rate in no trade eonomies as in Krebs (2007). The reason for the higher interest rate
in our model stems from the fat that in a prodution eonomy agents must hold on average
assets in positive net supply.
7
The lower bound allows us to relate our results to existing partial
equilibrium studies that examine onsumption-saving deisions with permanent inome shoks,
like Deaton (1991) and Carroll (2004). In these studies, the authors restrit the interest rates
to values that are below the lower bound that we establish. This provides an explanation for
why they nd borrowing onstraints to be always binding.
8
These models predit, therefore,
6
Heathote et al. (2009) build on this model setup to sustain analyti tratability in a model with permanent
shoks but they allow for insurane of a ertain fration of inome shoks.
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In Krebs (2007), the bond is in zero net supply.
8
Carroll (2004) allows for zero inome shoks and for transitory shoks. These additional shoks indue
savings in his model. If we drop these additional shoks, the model redues to the Deaton (1991) ase, and we
will nd again that borrowing onstraints are always binding.
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long-run onsumption dynamis that are similar to those of models with autarki equilibria
like in Constantinides and Due (1996) and Krebs (2007), where onsumption traks inome
one-to-one.
9
In ontrast, the model in this paper features asset trade in equilibrium, so that
inome shoks will not aet onsumption one-to-one.
The rest of the paper is strutured as follows: Setion 1.2 presents the model. The existene of
an optimal solution to the individual's problem is established in setion 1.3. This setion is more
general and applies to a large lass of Markovian inome proesses. In setion 1.4, we prove
the existene of a stationary distribution, and in setion 1.5, we prove that a RCE exists. The
disussion on borrowing onstraints and the impliations for the onsumption-saving deision
follows in setion 1.6. Setion 1.7 onludes. All proofs an be found in the appendix.
1.2 The model
We take time to be disrete and the periods are labeled by an index t ∈ N. The eonomy is
populated by a ontinuum of mass 1 of ex ante idential agents.10 Every agent has an innite
planning horizon, but faes a onstant probability of death in every period. An agent who
dies is replaed by a newborn agent. The initial endowment in assets and labor produtivity
{a0, z0} is drawn from a possibly degenerate distribution λ(a, z, r). At the beginning of her
life every agent hooses a reursive poliy funtion that determines her behavior over time.
We normalize the time endowment of every agent in every period to unity and assume an
inelasit labor supply of this unit of time. The only hoie the agent has to make in the model
is a onsumption-saving deision. We assume that the preferenes of agents over reursively
generated onsumption plans an be represented by the expeted disounted sum of onstant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility funtions.
Assumption 1. The period utility funtion is of the CRRA type
u(c) =
{
log(c) γ = 1
c1−γ
1−γ
otherwise
(1.1)
We denote the produtivity state in period t by zt.
11
The shoks to labor produtivity are
9
However, the model by Carroll (2004) generates a reation that is less than one-to-one if all soures of
inome risk (transitory and zero inome shok) as speied in the model are employed.
10
We are aware of the tehnial issues regarding the measurability problem for models with a ontinuum of
agents and i.i.d. inome shoks. But we refer the interested reader to Green (1994) for detailed disussion of
the appropriate onstrution of the set of agents to preserve measurability for all subset of agents. From now
on we apply the law of large numbers in this paper without further disussion.
11
Throughout, we do not use subsripts for individuals beause they only inrease the notational burden and
are not neessary for the proofs.
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permanent, and we allow for a wide range of distributions for the innovation term. To apture
the fat that an agent who died is replaed by a newborn agent, we use the following augmented
labor produtivity proess
zt+1 =
{
ztεt+1 ηt+1 = 1
z0 otherwise
(1.2)
εt+1 denotes the shok to labor produtivity that is realized at the beginning of period t+1, and
ηt+1 denotes a survival shok. For simpliity we assume that ηt+1 has a binomial distribution.
A realization ηt+1 = 1 means that an agent survives the transition from period t to t + 1. We
also allow for transitory i.i.d. inome shoks. We denote the transitory inome shok in period
t by ζt. We make the following assumptions on the random variables
Assumption 2. The distributions of ε, ζ and η satisfy
(i) ∄e ∈ supp(ε) : Prob(e) = 1 (vi) E [ζ ] = 1
(ii) Prob(ε > 0) = 1 (vii) Prob(ζ > 0) = 1
(iii) Prob(η = 0) = θ > 0 (viii) E [ζtεs] = E [ζt]E [εs] ∀s, t ≥ 0
(iv) E [ε] = 1 (ix) E [ζ1−γ] = M <∞
(v) βE [ε1−γ ] < 1
1.2.1 Agent's problem
We assume that the objetive of the agent is to maximize her expeted disounted lifetime
utility from onsumption. The objetive funtion is
E
[
∞∑
t=0
((1− θ)β˜)t u(ct)
∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
(1.3)
where β˜ is the time disount fator and (1 − θ) is the probability of surviving from period t
to t + 1. Hene, expetations are only taken with respet to the realization of the stohasti
produtivity proess {εt+1}∞t=0 and the sequene of transitory inome shoks {ζt+1}
∞
t=0. By
Ft we denote the information set of the agent in period t. The set of admissible onsumption
hoies is restrited by the fat that every plan must satisfy the intertemporal budget onstraint
ct + at+1 = (1 + r)at + wtztζt (1.4)
together with a no Ponzi ondition. The ondition we impose to rule out Ponzi shemes is an
ad ho debt onstraint at+1 ≥ 0 for all periods t > 0. We disuss the impat of this borrowing
onstraint in setion 1.6.
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The state spae S for this problem is the Cartesian produt of possible asset holdings and
produtivity states. The information set Ft for every period ontains the urrent state of the
agent {at, zt} and all pries.
When we ollet all ingredients to the agent's deision problem, we an write it as an optimal
ontrol problem under unertainty
max
{ct,at+1}
E
[
∞∑
t=0
((1− θ)β˜)t u(ct)
∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
s.t. ct + at+1 = (1 + r)at + wtztζt ∀t
zt+1 = ztεt+1 ∀t
{at+1, ct} ∈ [0,∞)× R+ ∀t
{a0, z0} ⊂ F0
(1.5)
To simplify notation, we replae (1− θ)β˜ by an impliit disount rate β
β := (1− θ)β˜
Assumption 3. θ and β˜ are suh that β < 1.
1.2.2 Firm's problem
Prodution in the model takes plae in a perfetly ompetetive prodution setor. We model
the prodution side of the eonomy as a representative rm produing at marginal osts. We
assume that prodution takes plae using a standard neolassial prodution funtion.
Assumption 4.
Yt = F (Kt, Lt) = Ltf(kt) (1.6)
F (0, Lt) = F (Kt, 0) = 0
and f ′(kt) > 0,f
′′(kt) < 0.
where Lt denotes labor in produtivity units, i.e. labor supply times produtivity aggregated
over all individuals. We onstrut the produtivity proess below suh that aggregate eetive
labor supply is Lt ≡ 1 in all periods. From the rst order onditions there exists a one-to-one
mapping from wages to interest rates
w = f(f
′−1(r + δ))− (r + δ)f
′−1(r + δ) (1.7)
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We make the following assumption for the depreiation rate and the disount fator.
Assumption 5. At k¯ dened by
δk¯ = f(k¯)
it holds that (
β(1 + f ′(k¯)− δ)1−γ
) 1
γ < 1
The assumption imposes joint restritions on the preferenes of individuals and the prodution
tehnology. This tehnial assumption is only needed to make sure that for every possible
aggregate apital stok there exists a stritly positive lower bound to the onsumption funtion.
It an be easily veried that for a risk aversion parameter γ ≤ 1, whih inludes the important
ase of log utility, the assumption does not impose any additional restritions on the hoie for
model parameters.
1.2.3 Bequests and the probability of death
The reason to assume a onstant probability of death is to guarantee the existene of a stationary
distribution. To make the bequest sheme resoure feasible, we require that in equilibrium
bequests must be equal to asset holdings of agents who die.
Assumption 6. The initial endowments {a0, z0} of agents are drawn from some distribution
λ(a, z, r) that is ontinuous in r and satises∫
zλ(da, dz, r) = 1∫
aλ(da, dz, r) = f ′−1(r + δ)
The assumptions on the means ensure that the average labor produtivity in the population
is always one and that the assets alloated to the newborn generation equal on average the
bequests of the old generation in equilibrium.
1.2.4 Equilibrium
We dene a reursive ompetitive equilibrium (RCE) for this eonomy as a set of reursively
generated asset hoies {a∗t+1} and onsumption hoies {c
∗
t}, a apital and labor demand K
d
and Ld of the prodution setor together with equilibrium pries r∗ and w∗ and a stationary
equilibrium distribution µ(a, z) over asset and produtivity levels of agents suh that
10
1. For every agent there is the sequene of reursively generated asset hoies {a∗t+1}
∞
t=0 and
onsumption hoies {c∗t}
∞
t=0 that solve the agent's optimization problem in (1.5) given
equilibrium pries w∗ and r∗.
2. The rm's demand for apital Kd and labor Ld maximizes rm's prots given equilibrium
pries w∗ and r∗.
3. Equilibrium pries are suh that∫
a∗tµ(da, dz) = K
∗ = Kd ∀t∫
ztµ(da, dz) = L
∗ = Ld ∀t
1.3 Individual problem
In this setion, we onsider a more general onsumption-saving problem where we allow for
a larger lass of Markovian labor produtivity proesses and looser ad ho debt onstraints.
However, we still require that
Prob(wztζt − rD > 0) = 1
The generalized onsumption-saving problem is
max
ct,at+1
E
[
∞∑
t=0
βt
c1−γt
1− γ
∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
s.t. ct + at+1 = (1 + r)at + wztζt
zt+1 = f(zt, εt+1)
at+1 ≥ −D
ct ≥ 0
{a0, z0} ⊂ F0
(1.8)
where f(zt, εt+1) is the (Markovian) law of motion for {zt}∞t=0. We reformulate the problem
using ash-at-hand. We dene
xt := (1 + r)at + wztζt +D
11
and get
max
ct
E
[
∞∑
t=0
βt
c1−γt
1− γ
∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
s.t. xt+1 = (1 + r)(xt − ct) + wzt+1ζt+1 − rD
zt+1 = f(zt, εt+1)
xt ≥ ct
ct ≥ 0
{x0, z0} ⊂ F0
(1.9)
1.3.1 Charaterization of the optimal solution
We know that every optimal solution to (1.9) must satisfy the rst order onditions.
c−γt + κt = β(1 + r)E
[
c−γt+1
∣∣Ft] ∀t (1.10)
κt(xt − ct) = 0 ∀t (1.11)
where κt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the debt onstraint. In a RCE the optimal on-
sumption plan must obey a reursive struture. Therefore, we restrit attention to optimal
solutions that have a reursive struture of the form
ct = c(xt, zt)
where the dependene on zt is neessary if the onditional distribution of inome next period
depends on the urrent state
12
.
One we have restrited the optimal solution to obey a reursive struture, the problem of
nding a solution to the rst order onditions an be formulated as nding a xed point to the
following equation
c(x, z) = min
{
x, (β(1 + r))−
1
γ (E
[
(c(x′, z′))−γ
]
)−
1
γ
}
(1.12)
where the min-operator aptures the omplementary slakness ondition in (1.11). This ap-
proah has been proposed by Deaton and Laroque (1992) and has been applied to onsumption-
12
It has been shown for example in Deaton (1991) that this dependene an be removed in the ase of
permanent inome shoks.
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saving problems in Deaton (1991) and Rabault (2002)
13
. In the following, we establish the
existene of a xed point c(x, z) to the modied Euler equation in (1.12). To establish the
existene of a xed point, we restrit the interest rate to a set
[
f ′(k¯)− δ, β−1 − 1
]
. As we show
below, this is suient to establish the existene of a RCE.
1.3.2 Existene of an optimal solution
We have formulated the searh for an optimal solution to the agents' problem as a xed point
problem of the modied Euler equation. To prove the existene of a xed point to this equation,
we onstrut a lattie of onsumption funtions and an operator that is a selfmap on this set
of funtions. We then apply a version of Tarski's xed point theorem to establish the existene
of a xed point to this operator in a onstrutive way. All denitions an be found in the
appendix.
In the rst step, we onstrut a set of andidate onsumption funtions for the optimal solution
to the onsumption-saving problem. We restrit attention to the following set of onsumption
funtions
C0 := {c : X × Z → R+|
∀x1, x2 ∈ X : x1 > x2 ⇒ c(x1, z) ≥ c(x2, z) ∧ x1 − x2 ≥ c(x1, z)− c(x2, z)}
Hene, we only onsider onsumption funtions that are inreasing and Lipshitz ontinuous
(with Lipshitz onstant L = 1) in their rst argument. For this lass of funtions, we apply
the usual pointwise ordering
c1(x, z) ≥ c2(x, z) ∀(x, z) ∈ X × Z ⇒ c1 ≥ c2
In the appendix, we show (lemma 10) that we an restrit the set of andidate solutions further
by imposing an upper and a lower bound (cu and cl) on the set of onsumption funtions. The
reason is that the operator that we will onstrut below is inward pointing
14
at the bounds.
The restrited set of andidate solutions in whih we are looking for a solution is the set C
C := {c ∈ C0 : c
l ≤ c ≤ cu}
13
Both authors iterate on the optimal marginal utility funtion whereas we iterate on the optimal onsumption
poliy diretly.
14
We all the operator T inward pointing if for the upper bound x¯ it holds that T x¯ ≤ x¯ and respetively for
the lower bound x it holds that Tx ≥ x.
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The next step is to show that this set C together with the ordering just dened forms a
omplete lattie. To this end, we need to show that the supremum and the inmum for
arbitrary sets always exist. In the appendix, we prove that we get the supremum (inmum) of
two onsumption funtions as the upper (lower) envelope. Hene, we obtain the supremum c¯
(inmum c) by taking the pointwise maximum (minimum).
c¯(x, z) = max{c1(x, z), c2(x, z)} ∀(x, z) ∈ X × Z
c(x, z) = min{c1(x, z), c2(x, z)} ∀(x, z) ∈ X × Z
Equivalently, we get the supremum c¯∞ (inmum c∞) of a possibly innite subset of onsumption
funtions C ′ ⊂ C as the upper (lower) envelope.
c¯∞(x, z) = sup
c∈C′
{c(x, z)} ∀(x, z) ∈ X × Z
c∞(x, z) = inf
c∈C′
{c(x, z)} ∀(x, z) ∈ X × Z
Sine the set C has an upper bound cu and a lower bound cl the supremum and the inmum
always exist, and it holds that c¯∞ ≤ cu and c∞ ≥ cl. It follows that (C,≤) is a omplete lattie.
In the next step, we onstrut an operator on this set of funtions. The operator T maps an
element ci ∈ C to an element ci+1
ci+1 = Tci
by the following operation
∀(x, z) : ci+1(x, z) = λ where λ solves
λ = min
{
x, (β(1 + r))−
1
γ
(
E
[
(ci ((1 + r)(x− λ) + wz
′ζ ′ − rD, z′))−γ
])− 1
γ
}
and we dene the following funtion
Gi(x, z, λ) := min
{
x,
(
β(1 + r)E
[
(ci ((1 + r)(x− λ) + wz
′ζ ′ − rD, z′))−γ
])− 1
γ
}
− λ (1.13)
suh that we an represent the operator as ci+1 = Tci with ci+1(x, z) = λ i G(x, z, λ) = 0 for
all (x, z).
In the appendix, we prove that the funtion G(x, z, λ) is (i) inreasing and ontinuous in x, (ii)
stritly dereasing and ontinuous in λ, and (iii) for xed (x, z) there is a unique solution λ∗
that solves G(x, z, λ∗) = 0. It follows, that the operator maps every element ci ∈ C to a unique
element ci+1. We prove that the operator has the properties of being (i) monotone inreasing
14
and (ii) a selfmap, i.e. T : C → C. Furthermore, we prove that imposing an upper bound
and a lower bound on the possible set of onsumption funtions is valid beause the operator is
inward pointing at these bounds. Thus, we have onstruted a monotone inreasing operator
that is a selfmap on a omplete lattie. This is already suient to prove the existene of a
xed point to the modifed Euler equation in (1.12) using the xed point theorem by Tarski
(1955).
Tarski 1. Every monotone inreasing mapping T : X → X on a omplete lattie X has a
smallest and a greatest xed point.
As the theorem does not require a ontration property of the operator it also laks the unique-
ness result of a ontrating operator. The proof is not onstrutive and establishes only the
existene of a xed point. However, onstrutiveness is ertainly a desirable property. A on-
strutive version of Tarski's theorem exists for ontinuous operators. The ontinuity of the
operator T an be proven by exploiting the properties of the lattie of onsumption funtions.
This fat allows us to apply the onstrutive version of Tarski's xed point theorem
15
.
Tarski 2. For xu := sup(X), xl := inf(X) and a ontinuous inreasing mapping T : X → X
on a omplete lattie X we get that lim
n→∞
T nxu and lim
n→∞
T nxl onverge to the largest resp. lowest
xed point x¯ resp. x of T : X → X.
This onstrutive version of the iteration proedure proves the onvergene of the standard
numerial approah of poliy funtion iteration. The poliy funtion iteration algorithm starts
with an initial guess for the poliy funtion and applies the operator T repeatedly to this guess.
If cu is taken as initial guess, then iterating on the operator T will attain a xed point to the
modied Euler equation.
Sine the rst order onditions are only neessary for an optimal solution, we still have to hek
if the transversality ondition is satised at our andidate solution. In the appendix, we show
that under the maintained assumptions the transversality ondition for the ase of permanent
inome shoks is satised. We also state additional onditions for the ase of general Markovian
inome proesses and borrowing onstraints with D > 0. We an summarize the results of this
setion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under the maintained assumptions there exists for every interest rate r ∈[
f ′(k¯)− δ, β−1 − 1
]
an optimal reursive poliy funtion to the agents' problem. It an be found
as lim
n→∞
T ncu.
15
The onstrutive version of the theorem results from Kleene's (1952) rst reursion theorem. See Cousot
and Cousot (1979) for disussion and further referenes.
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1.4 Stationary distribution
For the existene of a stationary distribution, we again restrit attention to the ase of perma-
nent inome shoks with a onstant probability of death.
16
The joint stohasti proess for asset holdings and produtivity is
[
at+1
zt+1
]
=
[
ηt+1((1 + r)at + wzt − c
∗(xt, zt)) + (1− ηt+1)a0
ηt+1ztεt+1 + (1− ηt+1)z0
]
where c∗(xt, zt) denotes the optimal poliy given r and w, and a0 and z0 are draws from λ(a, z, r).
In the appendix, we prove that a unique stationary probability distribution for the proess
always exists. The idea of the proof is to exploit the renewal struture indued by the onstant
probability of death. With a positive probability of death the expeted life-time of an agent
is nite. Every time an agent dies there is a draw from a xed distribution λ and the proess
starts from the support of λ. This implies that all sets with positive λ-mass must also have
positive µ-mass. These two features of the stohasti proess imply that the proess is reurrent
and irreduible suh that a unique stationary distribution exists.
17
We also establish the ontinuity in the interest rate of the stationary distribution on the interval[
f ′(k¯)− δ, β−1 − 1
]
. The proof relies on a result by Le Van and Stahurski (2007).
We summarize the results of the urrent setion in the follwoing proposition
Proposition 2. Under the maintained assumptions there exists for every interest rate
r ∈
[
f ′(k¯)− δ, β−1 − 1
]
a unique stationary distribution µr that is ontinuous in r on[
f ′(k¯)− δ, β−1 − 1
]
.
Indeed, the stationary distribution in this model is a mixture over distributions of agents of
dierent 'age ohorts', where an age ohort at time T ontains all agents that have survived
for t periods from T − t to T . If we introdue an operator P that maps the distribution of
agents' asset holdings and produtivity levels of one ohort to their next period's distribution
onditional on survival, then the stationary distribution an be shown to be an innite mixture
over initial distributions
µr =
∞∑
t=0
(1− θ)tP tλ(a, z, r)
Remark 1. The operator P maps asset holdings and produtivity from the urrent period's
distribution to next periods distribution onditional on survival, it depends therefore on the
optimal onsumption poliy beause the onsumption poliy aets the transition of assets.
16
All proofs also apply to the more general ase of a Markovian proess, if there is a positive probability of
death, and an optimal reursive onsumption poliy exists.
17
Further details and an extensive study of stability of Markovian proesses an be found in the textbook by
Meyn and Tweedie (1993).
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1.5 Equilibrium
In the previous setions, we have established the existene of an optimal reursive solution to the
agents' problem and the existene of a stationary distribution for a wide range of interest rates.
To statisfy the equilibrium onditions of a RCE in setion 1.2.4, we have to nd a stationary
distribution µr∗ suh that all markets lear. The labor market is leared by onstrution, and
in the appendix, we show that the goods market lears for at least one interest rate in the set of
interest rates for whih an optimal solution to the agents' problem and a stationary distribution
exist. The idea of the proof is to show that there is an interest rate low enough suh that asset
demand exeeds asset supply and an interest rate high enough suh that the onverse is true.
Sine asset demand and asset supply are ontinuous in the interest rate, there must be at least
one interest rate in between where asset markets lear. This proves the existene of a RCE for
this model.
18
We summarize the results of this setion again in a proposition.
Proposition 3. Under the maintained assumptions a reursive ompetitive equilibrium always
exists.
When we establish the existene of an interest rate for whih there is aggregate exess supply
of apital, we nd that for suiently high interest rates and only permanent inome shoks
borrowing onstraints are not binding. For this ase, we need that onsumers are prudent,
i.e. have a positive third derivative of the utility funtion, to rule out equilibria without
positive preautionary savings. This ase provides an example where the argument by Huggett
and Ospina (2001) for the existene of preautionary savings does not apply. Their result
of the irrelevane of prudene relies on the fat that borrowing onstraints must be binding
in equilibrium. However, as we show below, there are equilibria with inomplete markets
and idiosynrati inome risk where borrowing onstraints are non-binding and preautionary
savings arise only due to prudene of onsumers.
19
1.6 Borrowing onstraints
We have established the existene of a RCE in a model with permanent and transitory inome
shoks. In this setion, we remove transitory inome risk. This allows us to prove some
18
Sine a proof for the monotoniity of asset supply in the interest rate is laking, we an not establish
uniqueness of the equilibrium.
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The same bound for the interest rate at whih borrowing onstraints would be non-binding has been
established in Rabault (2002) who studies the onsumption-saving deision in a partial equilibrium framework.
However, he puts it as an open question whether non-binding borrowing onstraints an be sustained indenitely
if marginal utility at the optimal solution is bounded.
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interesting properties of the equilibrium in this model. Espeially, we prove that borrowing
onstraints must be non-binding. The following proposition summarizes this result
Proposition 4. Assume only permanent inome shoks are present. If a reursive ompetitive
equilibrium exists, then borrowing onstraints must be non-binding.
To establish this result, it is important to reognize that the state spae an be redued to a
single ratio variable
20
: ash-at-hand to permanent labor inome. This variable is dened as
x˜t :=
xt
wzt
= (1 + r)
at
wzt
+ 1
The redution of the state spae implies that the deision whether to save or not beomes
independent of the urrent inome level. However, the amount saved will still depend on the
urrent level. This harateristi property
21
allows us to develop an intuitive understanding
why borrowing onstraints are non-binding.
Consider the ase where asset holdings are zero (x˜t = 1). At this point, the deision whether
to save or not is the same for all agents. Suppose now that agents with no asset holdings
deided not to save, to sustain a positive aggregate apital stok in equilibrium, some agents
with already higher ash-at-hand to permanent labor inome ratios must then deide to save.
However, as we prove in the appendix, this behavior is not optimal in equilibrium. Hene, an
optimal poliy that is ompatible with an equilibrium must be a poliy where agents with zero
assets do save, and borrowing onstraints are non-binding. This intuitive explanation leads
us to assoiate the result of non-binding borrowing onstraints rather with the existene of
permanent inome shoks than with the non-ompatness of the state spae although the two
properties are inherently related.
Exploiting the same property also provides a good starting point to develop an intuitive under-
standing for the optimal onsumption-saving deision. First reall the ase of mean-reverting
shoks. In this situation, agents save inome when they expet a future deline in inome,
and they spend additional funds if available when they expet a future growth in inome.
Hene, in situations with low inome and low assets the borrowing onstraint will be binding,
and the savings deision depends ruially on the level of the urrent inome state relative to the
long-run mean of inome. Intuitively, in a situation with mean-reverting shoks agents smooth
inome around the long-run mean by aumulating and deumulating assets. This behavior is
generally known as buer-stok saving. Optimal behavior with permanent inome shoks must
dier from this ase beause a long-run mean no longer exists. The urrent inome is now
20
This result is well-known and an be found in Deaton (1991). We establish the result in the appendix
(lemma 16).
21
The state spae redution requires both permanent inome shoks and CRRA utility.
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the best preditor for future inome, and a poliy that aims at smoothing inome around this
inome level results either in a Ponzi sheme or in aumulating an innite amount of assets.
The optimal poliy does therefore not smooth around an inome level but aims at balaning
the risk exposure of total inome. If agents have a low ash-at-hand to permanent labor inome,
they fae relatively muh inome risk beause labor inome onstitutes a large fration of total
inome, and as a result, they want to aumulate additional assets to redue overall inome
risk. If agents have high ash-at-hand to permanent labor inome, they fae relatively little
overall inome risk and given the return on assets and their impatiene, they are willing to
redue their asset holdings. This intuition implies that there is one target insurane ratio in the
state spae where agents do not want to rebalane their overall risk exposure further. Indeed,
we prove the existene of a unique target insurane ratio.
22
Corollary 1. Assume only permanent inome shoks are present. If a reursive ompetitive
equilibrium exists, then there is a unique
¯˜x (target insurane ratio) suh that the optimal poliy
is at = at+1.
The orollary formally denes the target insurane ratio as the state in the redued state spae
where the optimal deision of the agent is to keep assets onstant between periods.
23
The
uniqueness of the target insurane ratio implies that the dynamis indued by the optimal
onsumption saving deision drive apart from stohasti utuations the agents' ash-at-
hand ratio towards the target insurane ratio. This aligns niely with the intuition provided
above that agents aim at balaning their risk exposure rather than sustaining a onstant inome
level.
As a further orollary to the result of non-binding borrowing onstraints, we an establish a
non-trivial interval for the equilibrium interest rate
24
.
Corollary 2. If a RCE with non-binding borrowing onstraints exists, then the equilibrium
interest rate r lies in the interval [r, r¯] :=
(
(βE[ε−γ])−1 − 1; β−1 − 1
)
The lower bound interest rate r separates three ranges for the interest rate that have all been
independently studied in dierent strands of the literature with quite dierent impliations for
the onsumption-saving deision.
22
The proof an be found in the appendix.
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It is important to notie, that this does not oinide with the target insurane rate as dened in Carroll
(2004) whih is
E[x˜t+1|Ft] = x˜t
To see this, plug c˜t =
r
1+r x˜t +
1
1+r in the law of motion for the ratio variable, this yields
E[x˜t+1|Ft] = E[ε−1](x˜t − 1) + 1 6= x˜t
24
The proof an be found in the appendix.
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One strand of the literature has studied eonomies where the interest rate is exatly at the
lower bound r. These are the endowment eonomies as studied for example in Krebs (2007).
In this model, assets are in zero net supply and the interest rate is hosen to balane the desire
to aumulate and deumulate assets for all agents and there will be no trade in equilibrium.
In this situation, the target insurane ratio is exatly at one (
¯˜x = 1). This situation is not
ompatible with an equilibrium in a prodution eonomy where apital is an essential input in
the prodution tehnology. Intuitively, the higher interest rate in the prodution eonomy an
then be explained by the fat that agents need an additional inentive to aumulate assets.
The interest rates below the lower bound, i.e. r < r, have been extensively studied in partial
equilibrium models developed by Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997, 2004). Deaton (1991)
onjetures that agents always run down assets to zero, beome borrowing onstrained, and
stay borrowing onstrained forever. We prove that his interest rate is never an equilibrium
interest rate, one we impose equilibrium restritions on pries. The bound on the interest rate
in the models by Deaton and Carroll naturally arises in the proof for the existene of an optimal
poliy funtion. It an, however, be shown that this ondition an be slightly relaxed without
loosing existene of the optimal solution if the lower bound on the optimal onsumption funtion
c (lemma 10) is taken into aount. We exploit this property to prove that the transversality
ondition is always satised.
1.7 Conlusions
In this paper, we prove the existene of a reursive ompetitive equilibrium (RCE) for an
Aiyagari style eonomy with permanent inome shoks and a perpetual youth struture. The
proofs presented in the literature for the existene of an equilibrium do not apply to this
eonomy beause they require a ompat state spae. To prove that there exists an optimal
reursive solution to the agent's problem in our eonomy, we present an approah based only on
rst order onditions (Euler equation) and use latties of onsumption funtions together with
Tarski's xed point theorem. This allows us to deal with the non-ompat state spae and an
unbounded utility funtion. We present the approah for a general setting of Markovian inome
proesses and show that it an be applied for a large lass of onsumption-saving problems.
The fat that the proof is onstrutive serves as a theoretial foundation for the onvergene
of a poliy funtion iteration algorithm that is popular in the quantitative literature.
In the seond part of the paper, we prove that if there exists an equilibrium where only per-
manent inome shoks are present, then borrowing onstraints must always be non-binding.
This shows that the non-existene result of equilibria with non-binding borrowing onstraints
on ompat state spaes by Krebs (2004) does not extend to the ase of a non-ompat state
20
spae. Importantly, this result is driven by the fat that inome shoks are permanent rather
than by the fat that the state spae is non-ompat.
From this result, we an establish the existene of a unique target insurane ratio and a non-
trivial lower bound on the equilibrium interest rate. If we ompare this lower bound to the
interest rates in existing studies, we nd that the interest rates in these studies are not om-
patible with the equilibrium interest rates in our model.
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Appendix
A.1 Proofs and denitions for the existene of an optimal
solution
A.1.1 Mathematial preliminaries
The denitions are taken mostly from Zeidler (1986).
Denition 1. 1. A set M is alled ordered i M is nonempty and for ertain pairs (x, y) ∈
M ×M there is a relation x ≤ y whih satises
(a) x ≤ x for all x ∈M
(b) if x ≤ y and y ≤ x then x = y
() if x ≤ y and y ≤ z then x ≤ z
The notation x < y means that x ≤ y and x 6= y
2. Let N ⊆M and let M be ordered. The set N is alled a hain (of M) i N is nonempty
and for all x, y ∈ N , one of the two onditions x ≤ y and y ≤ x holds.
3. Let N ⊆ M again. The element x ∈ N is alled greatest or smallest in N i y ≤ x or
x ≤ y, respetively, for all y ∈ N . The element x ∈ N is alled a maximal element of N
i there is no y ∈ N suh that x < y.
4. The ordered set M is alled well ordered i every nonempty subset of M has a smallest
element.
Denition 2. Let y ∈M and N ⊆M . Then y is alled the supremum (smallest upper bound)
of N i y is an upper bound of N , i.e. x ≤ y for all x ∈ N , and y ≤ u for all upper bounds u
of N . We write y = sup(N). Similarly, inf(N) is dened to be the greatest lower bound.
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Denition 3. By a lattie we mean an ordered set M with the property that inf({x, y}) and
sup({x, y}) exist for all x, y ∈ M . A lattie is alled omplete i inf(N) and sup(N) exist for
all nonempty subsets N of M .
Denition 4. An operator T is alled ontinuous i for every hain S
sup T (S) = T (sup(S))
and
inf T (S) = T (inf(S))
Denition 5. An operator T is alled monotone inreasing if for x ≥ y it holds that Tx ≥ Ty.
A.1.2 Set of onsumption funtions as omplete lattie
Dene
c¯(x, z) := max{c1(x, z), c2(x, z)} ∀(x, z) ∈ X × Z
c(x, z) := min{c1(x, z), c2(x, z)} ∀(x, z) ∈ X × Z
Lemma 1. For every two onsumption funtions c1, c2 ∈ C, it holds that c = inf{c1, c2} and
c¯ = sup{c1, c2}. Furthermore, it holds that c, c¯ ∈ C.
Proof. Suppose not. Suppose there is a cˆ suh that cˆ ≥ c1 and cˆ ≥ c2 but cˆ < c¯. This yields
immediately a ontradition beause c¯(x, z) = max{c1(x, z), c2(x, z)} and it holds that either
cˆ  c1 or cˆ  c2 or cˆ ≤ c1 or cˆ ≤ c2. The argument for c is equivalent.
We have c1, c2 ∈ C, and therefore, it holds that c¯ ∈ C beause c¯ is the pieewise ontinuous
omposition of parts of c1 and c2.
Dene
c¯∞(x, z) := sup
c∈C′
{c(x, z)} ∀(x, z) ∈ X × Z
c∞(x, z) := inf
c∈C′
{c(x, z)} ∀(x, z) ∈ X × Z
Lemma 2. For every subset of onsumption funtions C ′ ⊂ C, it holds that c∞ = inf(C ′) and
c¯∞ = sup(C ′). Furthermore, it holds that c∞, c¯∞ ∈ C.
Proof. Suppose not. Suppose there exists a cˆ < c¯∞ suh that c ≤ cˆ for all c ∈ C ′. This
implies that there exist (x, s) suh that cˆ(x, z) < c¯∞(x, z). By denition, it holds that
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c¯∞(x, z) = sup
c∈C′
{c(x, z)}, hene, cˆ(x, z) ≥ c(x, s) implies that cˆ(x, z) ≥ sup
c∈C′
{c(x, z)} whih
yields a ontradition beause
sup
c∈C′
{c(x, z)} = c¯∞(x, z) > cˆ(x, z) ≥ sup
c∈C′
{c(x, z)}
It follows immediately from the fat that all c ∈ C ′ are Lipshitz ontinuous that c¯∞(x, z) is
also Lipshitz ontinuous suh that c¯∞ ∈ C holds. An equivalent argument applies for the
inmum.
Remark 2. The fat that c¯∞ ∈ C holds follows diretly from the Lipshitz property beause for
all (x1, z) and (x2, z) with x1 ≤ x2 it holds that
c¯∞(x2, z) = sup
c∈C′
{c(x2, z)}
≤ sup
c∈C′
{c(x1, z) + x2 − x1}
= sup
c∈C′
{c(x1, z)}+ x2 − x1
= c¯∞(x1, z) + x2 − x1
and the same argument applies to the inmum.
Lemma 3. (C,≥) is a omplete lattie.
Proof. From lemma 1 it follows that (C,≥) is a lattie, and from lemma 2 follows that it is
omplete.
A.1.3 Properties of G(x, z, λ)
Lemma 4. Gi(x, z, λ) is
(a) inreasing and ontinuous in x
(b) stritly dereasing and ontinuous in λ
Proof. We onsider the two arguments of the min-operator rst separately
1. Suppose Gi(x, z, λ) = x− λ, (a) and (b) are obviously satised.
2. Suppose
Gi(x, z, λ) =
(
β(1 + r)E
[
(ci ((1 + r)(x− λ) + wz
′ζ ′ − rD, s′))
−γ
])− 1
γ
− λ (A.14)
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Sine u′(·) is a stritly dereasing funtion, its inverse is stritly dereasing as well. By
assumption, ci(·, z) is inreasing and ontinuous in x. It follows that (A.14) must be
inreasing in x. The ontinuity of ci(·, z) together with the ontinuity of u′(·) and its
inverse imply that (A.14) satises (a) beause ci ≥ cl > 0. We apply the same arguments
for (b) and λ ≤ x, and we get that (A.14) satises (b).
Finally, we have to show that the min-operator preserves the properties of Gi(·, z, ·). The
min-operator forms the lower envelope of two ontinuous and inreasing respetively stritly
dereasing funtions in x and λ. It preserves, therefore, the monotoniity and ontinuity of
these funtions. Hene, Gi(·, z, ·) satises (a) and (b).
Lemma 5. For every (x, z), G(x, z, λ) = 0 has a unique solution λ.
Proof. It follows from the properties of u′(·) that for λ = 0, G(x, z, λ) ≥ 0 and for λ → x, it
follows from lemma 4 that G(x, z, λ) is stritly dereasing with G(x, z, λ) ≤ 0 if λ = x. Hene,
the solution G(x, z, λ) = 0 must be unique.
A.1.4 Properties of T
Lemma 6. The operator T is monotone inreasing.
Proof. Take c1i > c
2
i . It follows from the fat that u
′(·) and its inverse are stritly dereasing
funtions that
min
{
x,
(
β(1 + r)E
[(
c1i ((1 + r)(x− λ) + wz
′ζ ′ − rD, z′)
)−γ])− 1γ}
≥
min
{
x,
(
β(1 + r)E
[(
c2i ((1 + r)(x− λ) + wz
′ζ ′ − rD, z′)
)−γ])− 1γ}
From lemma 4, we know that Gi(x, z, ·) is dereasing in λ. Sine it holds that G1i (x, z, ·) ≥
G2i (x, z, ·), it follows that for all (x, z) we get that λ
1 ≥ λ2.
Lemma 7. The operator T maps elements of C to ontinuous and inreasing funtions.
Proof. Again, we proeed in two steps. First, we show that if ci(·, z) is ontinuous and inreas-
ing, then ci+1(·, z) will be inreasing, and in a seond step, we show that it is also ontinuous.
1. (inreasing)
(a) If λ = x, this is obvious.
(b) If λ =
(
β(1 + r)E
[
(ci((1 + r)(x− λ) + wz′ζ ′ − rD, z′))
−γ])− 1γ
pik x1 > x2. Lemma
4 implies that Gi(x1, z, λ) ≥ Gi(x2, z, λ) and it follows that λ1 ≥ λ2 beause
Gi(x1, z, ·) is stritly dereasing.
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From steps (1a) and (1b) it follows that ci+1(·, z) must be an inreasing funtion.
2. (ontinuous) The ontinuity of the optimal solution follows diretly from the impliit
funtion theorem (Kumagai (1980))
25
. To see this, note that Gi(·, z, ·) is a ontinuous
map Gi : X ⊂ R × R+ → R. From lemma 5, we know that for all (x0, z) there exists a
unique solution Gi(x0, z, λ0) = 0, and from Kumagai (1980), it follows that ci+1(·, z) is
ontinuous in a neighborhood of x0 if and only if there are open neighborhoods B ⊂ X
and A ⊂ R+ of x0 and λ0, respetively, and
∀x0 ∈ B : Gi(x0, z, ·) : A→ R
is loally one-to-one (injetive). From lemma 4, we know that G(x, z, ·) is stritly de-
reasing, and therefore, it is loally one-to-one. Hene, ci+1(x, z) will be ontinuous in
x.
Lemma 8. If x1 > x2 and G(x2, z, λ2) = 0 with x2 > λ2, then for G(x1, z, λ1) = 0 it holds that
x1 > λ1.
Proof. Suppose not. It follows from lemma 4 that
λ1 = x1
≤
(
β(1 + r)E
[
(ci(wz
′ζ ′ − rD, z′))−γ
])− 1
γ
≤
(
β(1 + r)E
[
(ci((1 + r)(x2 − λ2) + wz
′ζ ′ − rD, z′))−γ
])− 1
γ
= λ2
< x2
This yields a ontradition, and hene, it holds that if x1 > x2 and x2 > λ2, then also x1 >
λ1.
Lemma 9. The operator T is a self-map. It maps Lipshitz ontinuous, inreasing funtions
ci(·, z) to Lipshitz ontinuous, inreasing funtions ci+1(·, z) with Lipshitz onstant L = 1,
i.e.
ci(x1, z)− ci(x2, z) ≤ x1 − x2 ∀x1, x2 ∈ X
Proof. From lemma 7, we know that T maps ontinuous and inreasing funtions to ontinuous
and inreasing funtions. Consider the ase where x1 > x2. We know from lemma 7 that
λ1 ≥ λ2. We onsider now all possible ombinations
25
Kumagai proves a theorem for the ase of non-dierentiable funtion.
26
I. λ1 = x1 and λ2 = x2 ⇒ x1 − x2 = λ1 − λ2.
II. λ1 < x1 and λ2 = x2 ⇒ x1 − x2 > λ1 − λ2.
III. λ1 = x1 and λ2 < x2. Not possible, see lemma 8.
IV. λ1 < x1 and λ2 < x2.
(a) λ1 = λ2 ⇒ x1 − x2 > λ1 − λ2
(b) λ1 > λ2 : (Proof by ontradition) Suppose that x1 − x2 < λ1 − λ2. This implies
x1 − λ1 < x2 − λ2.
λ1 =
(
β(1 + r)E
[
(ci((1 + r)(x1 − λ1) + wz
′ζ ′ − rD, z′))−γ
])− 1
γ
≤
(
β(1 + r)E
[
(ci((1 + r)(x2 − λ2) + wz
′ζ ′ − rD, z′))
−γ
])− 1
γ
= λ2
but λ1 ≤ λ2 yields a ontradition, beause we started with the assumption that
λ1 > λ2.
Hene, it must be true that
x1 − λ1 ≥ x2 − λ2 ⇐⇒ x1 − x2 ≥ λ1 − λ2
and the proof is omplete.
Lemma 10. For every r suh that β(1 + r) ≤ 1 and 1 − (β(1 + r)1−γ)
1
γ > 0 there exists a
supersolution cu and a subsolution cl to the operator T .
1. For cu(x, s) = x, it holds that Tcu ≤ cu.
2. For cl(x, s) = ιx with ι := 1− (β(1 + r)1−γ)
1
γ
, it holds that Tcl > cl.
Proof. 1. By onstrution, we get that c1 = Tc
u ≤ x. Sine c1(x, s) = λ ≤ x where λ solves
λ = min
{
x,
(
β(1 + r)E
[
(cu ((1 + r)(x− λ) + wz′ζ ′, z′))
−γ
])− 1
γ
}
and it follows that Tcu ≤ cu
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2. Take cl(x, z) = ιx and suppose that Gl(x, z, λ) = 0 for λ ≤ ιx for some x. This implies
that
ιx ≥ (β(1 + r))−
1
γ(
E
[(
cl ((1 + r)(x− ιx) + wz′ζ ′ − rD, z′)
)−γ])− 1γ
ιx ≥ (β(1 + r))−
1
γ
(
E
[
(ι ((1 + r)(1− ι)x+ wz′ζ ′ − rD, z′))
−γ
])− 1
γ
x > (β(1 + r))−
1
γ
(
E
[
((1 + r)(1− ι)x)−γ
])− 1
γ
1 > (β(1 + r))−
1
γ (1 + r)(1− ι)
(1− ι) > (1− ι)
whih yields a ontradition. Hene, it must be true that λ > ιx for all (x, z), and
therefore, it holds that Tcl > cl.
Lemma 11. The operator T : C → C is ontinuous.
Proof. For nite hains the proof is obvious. For innite hains, take a hain CS ⊂ C. Dene
c¯∞ = sup(CS). Denote the image set of CS by CS
′
=
{
c′ ∈ C : c′ = Tc ∀c ∈ CS
}
and c¯′ =
sup(CS
′
). For all (x, z) ∈ X × Z, we have c′i(x, z) = λ
∗
i where λ
∗
i solves Gi(x, z, λ) = 0. Again,
c¯′ is dened pointwise as c¯′(x, z) = sup λ∗ =: λ¯∗. Sine T is monotone inreasing and CS is
a hain, it holds that λ∗i ≥ λ
∗
j if ci ≥ cj. It follows from the denition of a hain that for all
ci, cj ∈ CS we either have ci ≥ cj or ci ≤ cj. Now x (x, z, λ¯∞) where λ¯∞ = T c¯∞(x, z). Put
ci ∈ CS in inreasing order and dene ∆i := Gi(x, z, λ¯∞). The {∆i} sequene is inreasing and
bounded beause λ¯∞ solve G(x, z, λ¯∞) = 0 for c¯∞. Sine we have c¯∞ = sup(CS), it follows
from the proof of lemma 2 that for every ci there exists a ci+1 ∈ CS suh that c¯∞ ≥ ci+1 ≥ ci
beause otherwise c¯∞ an not be the supremum of CS. It follows that sup(∆i) = 0. Hene,
Gi(x, z, λ¯
∞) → 0 holds, and this implies that λ∗i → λ¯
∞
beause λ∗i solves Gi(x, z, λ) = 0 and
Gi(x, z, ·) is ontinuous in λ. Hene, we get λ¯∗ = λ¯∞ for all (x, z) suh that T c¯∞ = sup (Tc)
holds. The equivalent argument applies to the inmum and the elements of the hain put
in dereasing order. It follows that aording to denition 4, T : C → C is a ontinuous
operator.
A.1.5 Transversality ondition
The transversality ondition reads
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lim
t→∞
βtE
[
c−γt (1 + r)at
]
= 0 (A.15)
In the following, we need the denition for ash-at-hand xt = (1 + r)at + wztζt + D and the
result from lemma 10 that c∗(xt, zt) > ιxt for all (xt, zt).
lim
t→∞
βtE
[
c−γt (1 + r)at
]
= lim
t→∞
βtE
[(
ct
xt
xt
)−γ
((1 + r)at + wztζt +D − wztζt −D)
]
= lim
t→∞
βtE
[(
ct
xt
)−γ
x−γt (xt − wztζt −D)
]
≤ lim
t→∞
βtE
[
ι−γ(x1−γt − x
−γ
t wztζt − x
−γ
t D)
]
≤ lim
t→∞
βtE
[
ι−γ(x1−γt )
]
Consider rst the ase of log utility (γ = 1)
lim
t→∞
βtE
[
ι−1x0t
]
= lim
t→∞
βtι−1 = 0
For the γ > 1 ase, we get
lim
t→∞
βtE
[
ι−γx1−γt
]
≤ lim
t→∞
βtE
[
ι−γ(wztζt − rD)
1−γ
]
We make the following additional assumption for the general ase
Assumption 7. If γ ≥ 1, then it holds that
lim
t→∞
βtE
[
(wztζt − rD)
1−γ
]
= 0
From assumption 7, it follows that
lim
t→∞
βtE
[
c−γt (1 + r)at
]
≤ 0
For the ase D = 0, assumption 7 ondition simplies to
lim
t→∞
βtE
[
(wztζt)
1−γ
]
= 0
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and we get for the ase of permanent inome shoks the suient ondition
βE
[
ε1−γ
]
< 1
This ondition is satised by assumption 2.
Finally, onsider the γ < 1 ase
lim
t→∞
βtE
[
ι−γ(x1−γt )
]
≤ lim
t→∞
βtE
[
ι−γ(1 + (1− γ)(xt − 1))
]
≤ lim
t→∞
(
βt(ι−γ − (1− γ)) + βtE
[
ι−γxt
])
We an determine an upper bound on E[xt]
E[xt] = E [(1 + r)at + wztζt +D]
= E [(1 + r)at] + E [wztζt] +D
≤ E [(1 + r)a¯t] + E [wztζt] +D
where a¯t is dened as follows
a¯1 = (1 + r)a0 + wz0ζ0 − ι((1 + r)a0 + wz0ζ0)
a¯1 = (1− ι)((1 + r)a0 + wz0ζ0)
a¯2 = ((1− ι)(1 + r))
2a0 + (1− ι)
2(1 + r)wz0ζ0 + (1− ι)wz1ζ1
a¯3 = ((1− ι)(1 + r))
3a0 + (1− ι)
3(1 + r)2wz0ζ0 + (1− ι)
2(1 + r)wz1ζ1 + (1− ι)wz2ζ2
.
.
.
a¯t = ((1− ι)(1 + r))
ta0 + (1− ι)
t−1∑
s=0
((1− ι)(1 + r))swzt−1−sζt−1−s
We have β(1 + r) ≤ 1, and therefore, we get
a¯t ≤ a0 +
1
1 + r
t−1∑
s=0
wzt−1−sζt−1−s
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and
E[xt] ≤ E
[
t∑
s=0
wzt−sζt−s
]
+D + a0(1 + r)
= x0 + E
[
t−1∑
s=0
wzt−sζt−s
]
= x0 + E
[
t−1∑
s=0
wzt−s
]
where the last equality holds beause of assumption 2.
For the general ase we have to make an additional assumption
Assumption 8. If γ < 1, then it holds that
lim
t→∞
βtE
[
t−1∑
s=0
wzt−s
]
= 0
For the ase of permanent inome shoks, the expression simplies to
lim
t→∞
βtwz0
t−1∑
s=0
(E[ε])t−s = 0
and is satised beause of assumption 2.
Hene, if for the general ase 7 resp. 8 holds, then there exists an upper bound for the transver-
sality ondition
lim
t→∞
βtE
[
c−γt (1 + r)at
]
≤ 0
For the ase of permanent shoks assumption 2 is suient for the existene of the upper bound.
To establish a lower bound, note that if D = 0, then the lower bound is trivially at zero. For
the general ase of D > 0 we need an additional assumption.
Assumption 9. If D > 0, then it holds that
lim
t→∞
βtE
[
(wztζt − rD)
−γ
]
= 0
We have established an upper bound and an lower bound for the transversality ondition
0 ≤ lim
t→∞
βtE
[
c−γt (1 + r)at
]
≤ 0 =⇒ lim
t→∞
βtE
[
c−γt (1 + r)at
]
= 0
and we an onlude that the transversality ondition is satised. Hene, the xed point to the
modied Euler equation is an optimal solution to the agents' problem in (1.9).
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A.2 Proofs and denitions for the existene of a stationary
distribution
A.2.1 Mathematial preliminaries
The denitions are taken mostly from Meyn and Tweedie (1993). Let the state spae for the
stohasti proess of labor produtivity and asset holdings be S and the Borel σ-algebra on
S be B(S). The stohasti proess {at, zt}∞t=0 is denoted by Φ and the state in period t by
Φt = {at, zt}.
Denition 6. The return time probability from state Φ0 to a set A ∈ B(S) is dened as
L({a0, z0}, A) := Prob(Φt ever enters A|{a0, z0})
Denition 7. We all a Markov hain ϕ-irreduible if there exists a measure ϕ on B(S) suh
that, whenever ϕ(A) > 0, we have L({a, z}, A) > 0 for all {a, z} ∈ S
Denition 8. The Markov hain is alled ψ-irreduible if it is ϕ-irreduible for some ϕ and
the measure ψ is a maximal irreduibility measure (ψ ≻ ϕ).
From the denitions and proposition 4.2.2 in Meyn and Tweedie (1993) we get immediately that
if the Markov hain is ϕ-irreduible, it is also ψ-irreduible. Next, we introdue the onepts
of reurrene and transiene.
Denition 9. The set A is alled reurrent if E [1(Φt ∈ A)|(a, z)] =∞ for all (a, z) ∈ A. The
set A is alled uniformly transient if there exists a M <∞ suh that E [1(Φt ∈ A)|(a, z)] ≤M
for all (a, z) ∈ A.
These onepts an be extended to hains in the following way
Denition 10. If every state is reurrent, the hain is reurrent, and if every state is transient,
the hain is transient.
Theorem 1. Under the maintained assumptions there exists for every r with β(1 + r) ≤ 1 a
unique stationary probability distribution µr.
Proof. By onstrution, Φ is λ-irreduible, and every set in the support of λ is reurrent,
hene, Φ is a reurrent hain (f. theorem 8.1.2 Meyn and Tweedie (1993)). It follows from
theorem 10.0.1 in Meyn and Tweedie (1993) that Φ has a unique stationary measure. It holds
furthermore that the expeted hitting time for every set in the support of λ is nite, and
therefore, the stationary measure an be normalized to be a probability measure.
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It is important to notie that the intial endowments of agents are only resoure feasible in
equilibrium. If goods markets do not lear, then also the mean over assets of the exogenously
xed distribution does not oinide with the mean asset holdings of the agents' that died.
Remark 3. The proof for the existene and uniqueness of a stationary distribution does not
require that initial endowments {a0, z0} are unorrelated with {at, zt}. It only requires that the
onditional distribution for {a0, z0} has the same support as λ(a, z, r) and that the unondi-
tional distribution over {a0, z0} is λ(a, z, r). Hene, we an allow for orrelation in assets and
produtivity levels of agents that leave and their suessors.
Lemma 12. The stationary distribution is ontinuous in the interest rate on the interval
(f ′(k¯)− δ, β−1 − 1).
Proof. See proof of theorem 1 in Le Van and Stahurski (2007). The assumptions an be easily
veried. Assumption 1 holds beause the optimal onsumption hoie is ontinuous in the
interest rate, the individual hoie is independent from the ross-setional distribution, and
the initial distribution is ontinuous in the interest rate. Assumption 2 is satised26 beause
we have for every r in (f ′(k¯) − δ, β−1 − 1) a unique stationary distribution (theorem 1) suh
that we an diretly evaluate at the limit. The bound for the stationary moments follow
immediately from the positive probability of death (our assumption 2) and the lower bound
on onsumption (lemma 10). Finally, assumption 3 follows by a similar argument using that a
highest sustainable apital stok exists (our assumption 5) and that the variane of produtivity
is bounded. We have already shown that the stationary distribution is unique (theorem 1), and
hene, the stationary distribution is ontinuous in the interest rate (see remark 1 in Le Van
and Stahurski).
A.3 Proof for the existene of a RCE
In this setion, we establish the existene of an equilibrium interest rate in the interval (f ′(k¯)−
δ, β−1 − 1) suh that all markets lear. We need the following lemmata.
Lemma 13. If only permanent shoks are present, D = 0, and r is suh that β(1+r)E [ε−γ] ≥ 1,
then borrowing onstraints are non-binding.
Proof. The borrowing onstraints are non-binding if for all (x, z) it holds that G(x, z, x) < 0.
If only permanent inome shoks are present, then it an be easily heked that the inequality
always holds if
1 > β(1 + r)E
[
ε−γ
]
26
Using as Lyapunov funtion V (a, z) = a+ (z − E[z])2 = a+ (z − 1)2.
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Hene, we get that for all r that satisfy this inequality, borrowing onstraints must be non-
binding.
Lemma 14. For β(1 + r) = 1 aggregate asset supply is larger than aggregate asset demand.
Proof. It follows from theorem 1 that a stationary distribution exists. Aggregate asset supply
Ks is the sum of asset supply of newborn agents Knew and the asset holdings of agents that
survived from the last period Kold, we get
Ks = θKnew + (1− θ)Kold
The asset supply of the newborn generation Knew is determined by the initial distribution
λ(a, z, r). The asset supply of the surviving generation Kold has been determined by a sequene
of optimal onsumption hoies. The onsumption hoie is haraterized by the rst order
onditions of the agent's problem. We have to distinguish two ases.
(1) If borrowing onstraints are binding for some agents, it follows from the rst-order onditions
(see Huggett and Ospina (2001)) that for β(1 + r) = 1 there is expeted onsumption grwoth
in the ross-setion onditional on survival
1 > Eµ
[(
c∗t+1
c∗t
)−γ]
⇒ Eµ [c∗t ] < Eµ
[
c∗t+1
]
where the µ subsript denotes the fat that the expetations are taken with respet to the
stationary distribution µ.
(2) If lemma 13 applies, then borrowing onstraints are non-binding. The Euler equation holds
as an equality, and the argument by Huggett and Ospina (2001) does not apply.
1 = E
[(
c∗t+1
c∗t
)−γ]
There is only one riskless asset. Hene, ct+1 = ct is not an optimal hoie for all realizations of
εt+1. Hene, Jensen's inequality for stritly onvex funtions
27
applies, we get
1 = E
[(
c∗t+1
c∗t
)−γ]
>
(
E
[
c∗t+1
c∗t
])−γ
⇒ 1 < E
[
c∗t+1
c∗t
]
⇒ Eµ [c∗t ] < Eµ
[
c∗t+1
]
and again we get onditional on survival onsumption growth in the ross-setion.
28
27
Note that marginal utility is stritly onvex if and only if
∂3u(x)
∂x3
> 0.
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The same argument applies, if borrowing onstraints were binding. The argument by Huggett and Ospina
(2001) ould therefore be replaed by this argument but to highlight the importane of prudene in the model
with permanent shoks we deided to present the proof in two steps.
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Sine expeted labor inome is onstant, onsumption growth an only be naned by au-
mulating on average higher assets. If assets grow for all surviving agents between periods, it
follows that Kold > Knew beause the average apital of all generations at the beginning of the
life has been Knew. As a onsequene, we get Ks > Knew = Kd.
Lemma 15. There exists an interest rate low enough suh that aggregate asset demand is larger
than aggregate asset supply.
Proof. Suppose not. First determine the highest sustainable apital stok given zero onsump-
tion
k¯ = (1− δ)k¯ + f(k¯)
Fix the interest rate at the implied interest rate
r = f ′(k¯)− δ
and alloate k¯ arbitrarily in the population. Draw initial produtivity levels from the stationary
marginal distribution of produtivity levels. To sustain the apital stok, all agents must
onsume ct = 0 but this is never optimal. Hene, aggregate onsumption must be positive and
apital supply must be smaller than apital demand, but this yields a ontradition.
Theorem 2. Under the maintained assumptions a reursive ompetitive equilibrium (RCE)
exists.
Proof. We have already shown that an optimal solution to the agents optimization problem
and a stationary distribution exist. The stationary distribution is ontinuous in the interest
rate. Lemmata 14 and 15 together with the fat that asset demand is downward sloped
29
imply
that there must exist at least one interest rate suh that the goods market lears. The labor
market lears by onstrution. Hene, a reursive ompetitive equilibrium exists.
A.4 Proof of non-binding borrowing onstraints
Lemma 16. If all inome shoks are permanent or transitory and i.i.d., then the optimal poliy
only depends on a single variable.
29
This follows immediately from assumption 4.
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Proof. (i) Start with c0(x, z) = c
u(x, z) = x.
λ = min
{
x, (β(1 + r))−
1
γ
(
E
[
((1 + r)(x− λ) + wz′η)−γ
])− 1
γ
}
λ
wz
= min

 xwz , (β(1 + r))− 1γ
(
E
[(
(1 + r)
(x− λ)
wz
+ εη
)−γ])− 1γ

λ˜ = min

x˜, (β(1 + r))− 1γ
(
E
[
ε−γ
(
(1 + r)
ε
(x˜− λ˜) + η
)−γ])− 1γ

where we dene for all variables x˜ := x
wz
. It follows that c˜0(x˜) = x˜, beause x˜
′ =
(1+r)
ε
(x˜− λ˜) + η and c˜1(x˜) = λ˜ for all x˜.
(ii) Suppose ci(x, z) = wzc˜i(x˜), it follows that
λ = min

x, (β(1 + r))− 1γ
(
E
[(
c˜i
(
(1 + r)
ε
(x˜−
λ
wz
) + η
)
wzε
)−γ])− 1γ

λ˜ = min

x˜, (β(1 + r))− 1γ
(
E
[(
c˜i
(
(1 + r)
ε
(x˜− λ˜) + η
)
ε
)−γ])− 1γ

it follows that c˜i+1(x˜) = λ˜ will also only be a funtion of x˜.
For this poliy we use the result from Carroll and Kimball (1996) that the optimal onsumption
funtion c(x˜) is onave30. Using this result, we prove that for the ase where only permanent
shoks are present borrowing onstraints must be non-binding.
Theorem 3. Assume only permanent inome shoks are present. If a stationary reursive
equilibrium exists, then borrowing onstraints must be non-binding.
Proof. The optimal reursive poliy funtion of a RCE satises c∗ > cl (Lemma 10). From
Carroll and Kimball (1996) and Carroll (2004) it follows that c˜(x˜) is onave. This implies that
ι as dened in Lemma 10 is also a lower bound to the slope of the optimal poliy funtion in
ratio form c˜(x˜). If an equilibrium exists, there must exist states where agents spend less than
there urrent inome, and states where they spend more than their urrent inome. Current
30
The result an also be used on the redued state spae as it is shown in Carroll (2004). The argument
by Carroll and Kimball (1996) involves iteration on the Bellman equation but applies here as well beause the
sequenes of onsumption funtions of the two approahes are equivalent. This an be easily veried beause
Gi(x, z, λ) = 0 is the neessary ondition for updating the value funtion using the Bellman equation.
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inome in the redued state spae is
r
1 + r
x˜+
1
1 + r
and it an be easily shown that
r
1+r
≤ ι in equilibrium beause β(1 + r) ≤ 1
ι = 1− (1 + r)−1 (β(1 + r))
1
γ ≥ 1−
1
1 + r
=
r
1 + r
If borrowing onstraints are binding, then it holds for some x˜ that c˜(x˜) = x˜ and the ontinuity
and the slope restrition for c˜(x˜) imply c˜(x˜) > r
1+r
x˜+ 1
1+r
for all x˜. However, a situation where
agents always spend more than their urrent inome is not ompatible with the existene of an
equilibrium. This ontradition proves that borrowing onstraints must always be non-binding
in a RCE of this model.
Corollary 1. Assume only permanent inome shoks are present. If a reursive ompetitive
equilibrium exists, then there is a unique
¯˜x ( target insurane rate) exists suh that the optimal
poliy yields at = at+1.
Proof. In equilibrium the optimal poliy of the agent must suh that optimal onsumption is
for some state smaller and for some states larger than urrent inome. It follows diretly from
the ontinuity and onavity of the optimal poliy funtion together with the lower bound cl on
the optimal poliy that there must be a unique intersetion of the optimal poliy with urrent
inome. This intersetion haraterizes
¯˜x.
Corollary 2. Given the assumptions of theorem 3, the equilibrium interest rate r lies in the
interval
(
(βE[ε−γ])−1 − 1; β−1 − 1
)
Proof. The upper bound follows from lemma 14. The lower bound an be derived from the fat
that borrowing onstraints are always non-binding. The Euler equation for the redued state
spae variables and zero assets implies that if borrowing onstraints are non-binding, then
1 < β(1 + r)E
[
ε−γ
]
⇐⇒ r >
(
βE[ε−γ]
)−1
− 1
37
Chapter 2
Welfare analysis with permanent inome
shoks
2.1 Introdution
An important nding from the large literature on the individual onsumption-saving problem is
that a small buer stok in a riskless asset already sues to ahieve almost perfet onsumption
insurane when inome risk is transitory and insurane markets are missing. As a onsequene,
welfare losses due to missing insurane markets are small.
1
On the other hand, it has been
shown that welfare losses of market inompleteness an be substantial one inome shoks are
permanent.
2
However, results for permanent inome shoks are obtained in models where the
struture of the eonomy delivers a highly stylized optimal poliy rule with no asset trade, and
hene, no onsumption smoothing in equilibrium. In these models, onsumption traks inome
one-to-one and self-insurane whih is highly eetive for transitory risk is shut down.
This paper ontributes to the literature by examining a model with permanent inome shoks
and asset trade in equilibrium. This ase onstitutes an empirially relevant extension to
existing models beause it ontains, on the one hand, permanent inome shoks that have
reeived broad support in the empirial literature
3
, and, on the other hand, it features non-
degenerate asset trade is present in reality. Furthermore, the model ombines the main driver for
welfare losses namely permanent inome shoks with an ative hannel for self-insurane
namely equilibrium asset trade.
1
See for example Telmer (1993), Heaton and Luas (1996), and for a theoretial argument Levine and Zame
(2001). Kubler and Shmedders (2001) provide alternative alibrations to hallenge the argument by Levine
and Zame (2001).
2
This result originates from a lass of models based on Constantindes and Due (1996) and Krebs (2007).
3
For example Carroll and Samwik (1997), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), and Blundell, Preston, and Pistaferri
(2008).
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The framework for the analysis is one of the workhorse models in quantitative researh. It is an
Aiyagari style
4
eonomy with two modiations : (1) individual inome shoks are permanent
and (2) there is a perpetual youth struture. For this model, we show that asset trade in a
realistially alibrated eonomy signiantly redues the welfare osts of market inompleteness.
We argue that the smaller welfare osts result from eetively lower inome risk. This risk
redution is indued by the optimal onsumption-saving behavior (self-insurane). We propose
an approximate stylized onsumption rule that aptures the key properties of the optimal
onsumption-saving deision, and show how the risk redution an be aptured by a simple
saling fator. This allows us to derive a losed form approximation of the welfare osts of
market inompleteness in an otherwise analytially intratable model. The result shows that
models without asset trade overstate the welfare loss of market inompleteness, but as we argue,
their stylized onsumption rules and losed form welfare formulas still apply in a more realisti
model with equilibrium asset trade.
The quantitative analysis starts by solving for the optimal onsumption poliy and the equi-
librium alloation. We show that the optimal poliy is almost linear and propose an intu-
itive approximation to the poliy funtion that highlights the basi properties of the optimal
onsumption-saving deision. In the welfare analysis, we aount for endowment eets that
arise from hanges in the aggregate apital stok by taking the transition to the new steady
state into aount. This beomes important when we study the eetiveness of self-insurane
beause it allows us to abstrat from inome eets. Furthermore, borrowing onstraints are
non-binding in equilibrium, and we an attribute the welfare loss exlusively to hanges in
inome risk.
We quantify the eetiveness of self-insurane by omparing the welfare eets in our model
with asset trade to an endowment eonomy without equilibrium asset trade. In the latter
eonomy, agents onsume only their urrent endowment, onsumption responds one-to-one to
shoks, and no self-insurane takes plae. This results in welfare osts of market inompleteness
that will, eteris paribus, be larger. We propose an intuitive saling fator to the volatility of the
endowment proess that measures and aounts for the self-insurane eet of asset trade. The
saling fator oinides with the individual labor inome share and aounts for other soures
than labor inome that nane onsumption and are unaeted by individual labor inome risk.
We show that after applying this saling fator the welfare onsequenes of the two eonomies
align very losely. Sine the endowment eonomy is analytially tratable, we an derive a
simple losed form expression to approximate the welfare eets of market inompleteness
and verify its good performane. This result shows that we an asses the welfare osts of
4
We use the term Aiyagari style for a heterogeneous agents, inomplete markets eonomy with a neolassial
prodution setor (Aiyagari (1994)).
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uninsurable permanent inome risk in an eonomy with self-insurane using a simple analyti
welfare formula.
In a nal step, we hek the model's quantitative preditions for other measures of the on-
sumption response to inome shoks that have been proposed in the literature.
We are not the rst who study the possibilities of self-insurane against permanent inome
shoks within a onsumption-saving model. Heathote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008, 2009)
examine self-insurane with permanent inome shoks, but fous on self-insurane possibilities
that arise due to a labor-leisure hoie.
5
They develop an analytially tratable model frame-
work with a labor-leisure deision, perfet risk-sharing within groups, but imperfet risk-sharing
between groups. The onstrution of the equilibrium alloation and the analytial tratability
is losely related to the work by Constantinides and Due (1996). The analyti tratability
omes at the ost that the self-insurane hannel of asset trade is again shut down in their
model. Heathote et al. nd welfare eets from inomplete risk-sharing that are muh larger
than the welfare osts of business yles. They argue, therefore, that the welfare gains from
progressive taxation and wage ompression are muh larger than the eets from a poliy that
aims at smoothing out business yle utuations.
Kaplan and Violante (2009) study a life-yle partial equilibrium model to assess whether
the empirial estimates by Blundell et al. (2008) for partial insurane an be explained by
self-insurane. Their model generates too little self-insurane and a life-yle prole that is
inonsistent with the empirial ndings. They note that the reason for this nding is the
life-yle motive in the onsumption-saving deision that mainly drives the apital aumula-
tion deision. The perpetual youth struture in our model allows us to fous exlusively on
the interation between inome risk and the onsumption-saving deision. We derive welfare
impliations of the partial insurane result, whereas Kaplan and Violante fous only on the
onsumption response.
Carroll (2009) studies the onsumption response to permanent shoks in a partial equilibrium
model. He nds an average marginal onsumption response
6
to permanent shoks that is less
than one-to-one. Jappelli et al. (2008) study the same partial equilibrium model and ompare
it to empirial estimates from Italian panel data. They onlude that the model an only poorly
be reoniled with their empirial ndings for the onsumption response to permanent inome
shoks.
The partial equilibrium parameterization in Carroll (2009) and Jappelli et al. (2008) is om-
5
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007) also use a model with permanent inome shoks. However, they
have an overlapping generations struture with a xed life time. Hene, a strong life-yle savings motive arises
in their model that governs most of the optimal behavior. In their model it is, therefore, hard to disentangle
the eet of permanent inome shoks.
6
Carroll alulates the average marginal propensity to onsume out of permanent inome.
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plementary to the alibration in our paper beause we impose general equilibrium restritions.
As shown in hapter 1, the partial equilibrium parameterization in these studies is inonsistent
with general equilibrium restritions.
Finally, in a highly inuential paper Blundell, Preston, and Pistaferri (2008) perform an em-
pirial analysis on a merged inome and onsumption panel data set. They nd a onsumption
response to permanent inome shoks that is substantially smaller than one-to-one.
The rest of the paper is strutured as follows. Setion 2.2 presents the model, the alibration,
and the equilibrium together with the optimal poliy and the approximation to the optimal
poliy. Setion 2.3 ontains the analysis of the welfare osts of market inompleteness and
derives the losed form approximation formula to assess the welfare eets of market inom-
pleteness. Setion 2.4 disusses the onsumption response to permanent inome shoks. Setion
2.5 onludes. The appendix ontains a model where also transitory shoks are present and an
extensive sensitivity analysis of the results.
2.2 Model
We use the Aiyagari style framework proposed in hapter 1 to study the welfare osts of market
inompleteness when inome shoks are permanent.
2.2.1 Setup
There is a ontinuum of ex ante idential agents who experiene permanent shoks to their labor
produtivity. Labor inome is determined as the produt of the realized labor produtivity
and the wage rate. We abstrat from a labor-leisure hoie and a partiipation deision of
workers. We assume that shoks to labor produtivity are i.i.d. over time and individuals.
There is no aggregate unertainty. Every agent hooses a reursive onsumption plan at the
beginning of her life-time. As agents fae a onstant probability θ of dying eah period, life-time
is stohasti. If an agent died, she is immediately replaed by a newborn agent. The intitial
distribution of newborn agents is exogenously xed. Regarding produtivity, it aptures fators
that determine initial labor market heterogeneity and that are outside the model. Regarding
assets, it redistributes the aidental bequests of the preeding generation that died. Agents
take their initial endowment as given. The objetive funtion of an agent is her disounted
expeted life-time utility and the onsumption good serves as the unit of aount for this
eonomy.
We denote the level of labor produtivity of an agent in period t by zt.
7
We assume that labor
7
We omit an index for individuals throughout beause it only inreases the notational burden.
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produtivity follows a random walk in logs.
log(zt+1) = log(zt) + log(εt+1) log(εt+1)
iid
∼ N
(
−
σ2
2
, σ2
)
The innovation term is normally distributed with mean −σ
2
2
and variane σ2. This onstrution
guarantees that there is no drift in the labor inome proess over time, i.e. E[εt+1] = 1. Sine
we are interested in the welfare osts assoiated with permanent inome shoks, we abstrat
from transitory risk in the main part of the paper. In the appendix, we study an eonomy with
permanent and transitory inome risk.
The utility funtion is of the onstant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type. The objetive
funtion for the agent is
E
[
∞∑
t=0
((1− θ)β˜)t
c1−γt
1− γ
∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
where β˜ is the individual time disount fator, (1 − θ) denotes the onstant probability of
surviving from period t to t+1, and F0 denotes the information ltration of the agent in period
t = 0.8 The agent faes the standard intertemporal budget onstraint
ct + at+1 = (1 + r)at + wtzt
and to rule out Ponzi shemes, we impose an ad ho debt onstraint at+1 ≥ 0 for all t.
9
When we ollet all ingredients to the agent's deision problem, we an write it as
max
{ct,at+1}
E
[
∞∑
t=0
((1− θ)β˜)t
c1−γt
1− γ
∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
s.t. ct + at+1 = (1 + r)at + wtzt
log(zt+1) = log(zt) + log(εt+1), log(εt+1)
iid
∼ N
(
−
σ2
2
, σ2
)
{at+1, ct} ∈ [0,∞)×R+ ∀t
{a0, z0} ⊂ F0
(2.1)
8
The expetation operator only refers to labor inome unertainty.
9
In hapter 1, we prove that this onstraint will be never binding in equilibrium. We verify this result here
omputationally.
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To simplify notation, we replae (1− θ)β˜ by an impliit disount rate β
β := (1− θ)β˜
Prodution takes plae in a perfetly ompetitive prodution setor represented by a single rm
that produes at marginal osts using a Cobb-Douglas prodution funtion
Yt = K
α
t L
1−α
t (2.2)
where Lt denotes labor in produtivity units, i.e. labor supply times produtivity aggregated
over all individuals. The stationary wage rate w and the (net) interest rate r are then
r = α
(
L
K
)1−α
− δ
w = (1− α)
(
K
L
)α
where δ is the depreiation rate for apital employed in prodution.
2.2.2 Equilibrium
We dene a reursive ompetitive equilibrium (RCE) for this eonomy as a set of reursively
generated asset hoies {a∗t+1} and onsumption hoies {c
∗
t}, a apital and labor demand K
d
and Ld of the prodution setor together with equilibrium pries r∗ and w∗ and a stationary
equilibrium distribution µ(a, z) over asset and produtivity levels of agents suh that
1. For every agent there are sequenes of reursively generated asset hoies {a∗t+1}
∞
t=0 and
onsumption hoies {c∗t}
∞
t=0 that solve the agent's optimization problem in (2.1) given
equilibrium pries w∗ and r∗.
2. The rm's demand for apital Kd and labor Ld maximizes rm's prots given equilibrium
pries w∗ and r∗.
3. Equilibrium pries are suh that∫
a∗tµ(da, dz) = K
∗ = Kd ∀t∫
ztµ(da, dz) = L
∗ = Ld ∀t
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2.2.3 State spae redution
Following the approah by Deaton (1991) and Carroll (2004), we solve the optimization problem
on a redued one-dimensional state spae. We use this setion to introdue the notation and
present the Euler equation for the problem with a redued state spae.
With non-binding borrowing onstraints the rst order neessary ondition for an optimal
solution to the problem in (2.1) is
c−γt = β(1 + r)E
[
c−γt+1
∣∣Ft]
We dene a ash-at-hand variable xt := (1 + r)at + wzt and a lass of ratio variables that
we denote by a ∼ on top of it. These variables denote the original variable normalized by
permanent labor inome
10
, e.g. x˜t :=
xt
wzt
. Applying this denition, we an derive
11
c˜−γt = β(1 + r)E
[
ε−γt+1c˜
−γ
t+1|Ft
]
and the orresponding stohasti law of motion is
x˜t+1 =
(1 + r)
εt+1
(x˜t − c˜t) + 1
2.2.4 Calibration
A time period is taken to be one year. The onstant probability of death θ is hosen to math
the average years a worker is in the labor market. It should therefore be interpreted as the
probability of leaving the labor market rather than physial death. The struture of the model
an then be thought of as a labor market with several ohorts where agents drop out of ohorts
randomly and a new ohort of workers enters the labor market in every period. We target
a working life of 35 years, this implies θ = 0.028571, and orresponds to the working life in
Kaplan and Violante (2009). The oeient of relative risk aversion is hosen to be γ = 1.
This hoie orresponds to log utility, and is within the range used in the literature. Krebs
(2007) onsiders values for γ between 1 and 4, Kubler and Shmedders (2001) use values in the
range from 0.5 to 2.5, Carroll (1997, 2009) hooses γ = 2, and Krusell and Smith (1997) also
use log utility. We hoose σ = 0.1 for the standard deviation of permanent inome risk in the
benhmark model. The same value is used in Krebs (2007), Carroll (1997, 2009) and Kaplan
10
Current labor inome is due to the property that inome follows a random walk without drift the best
preditor for future labor inome, and therefore, we all it permanent labor inome.
11
This state spae redution only works beause inome growth is i.i.d.. It does not work with persistent but
non-permament inome shoks.
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and Violante (2009). We provide a sensitivity analysis with respet to inome risk and risk
aversion in the appendix.
For the prodution parameters we follow Cooley and Presott (1995).
12
We set the apital
share in prodution to α = 0.4 and alibrate the time disount fator and the depreiation rate
to math a apital-to-output ratio of 3.32 and an investment-to-output ratio of 0.2523. This
implies a depreiation rate of δ = 0.076.
For the initial distribution, we follow Kaplan and Violante (2009) who set the initial dispersion
of produtivity to σz0 = 0.3873 to math inome dispersion at age 60.
13
In the benhmark
eonomy, we hoose a oeient of variation for assets σa0 = 0.3873 and impose a orrelation of
ρ(a0, z0) = 1.0 for the initial endowment draws
14
. The orrelation of initial wealth and inome
implies a onstant ratio of wealth-to-inome for newborn agents. It is also onsistent with
a zero orrelation of inome and the wealth-to-inome ratio, whih orresponds to the SCF
data reported by Kaplan and Violante (2009) who nd a orrelation of 0.02 between inome
and the wealth-to-inome ratio. We perform a sensitivity analysis with respet to the initial
distribution parameters in the appendix.
15
The baseline parametrization together with the
alibrated parameters an be found in table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Parametrization and alibration
Parameter value target/desription
α 0.4 Capital's share in output
θ 0.02857 Expeted lifetime 35 years
γ 1 Risk aversion
ρ 1 Correlation of initial wealth and inome
σz0 0.3873 Initial residual dispersion of inome
σa0 0.3873 Initial residual dispersion of wealth
σ 0.1 Standard deviation of permanent in-
ome shok
β˜ 0.9799 Capital-to-output ratio (3.32)
δ 0.076 Investment-to-output ratio (0.2523)
12
Cooley and Presott (1995) expliitly aount in their alibration for the fat that the model does neither
inlude government spending, nor trade, or onsumer durables.
13
Our alibration approah requires to hoose the initial dispersion σz0 and the probability of death θ jointly.
14
This hoie results in a Gini oeient of 0.22 for assets of newborn agents.
15
We do not target the dispersion of wealth in the eonomy, but it is important to emphasize that the hoie
of the initial distribution is not innouous for higher order moments of the stationary distribution. This is
shown in the appendix. Krusell and Smith (1997) have ritized the model for this reason beause it generates
only a very small ross-setional variation in the stationary asset distribution. We show that this feature is a
onsequene of the degenerate initial distribution and that the ross-setional variation for the asset distribution
an be signiantly inreased if we allow for a non-degenerate initial distribution.
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2.2.5 Equilibrium alloation
The equilibrium of this model has no solution in losed form, and we have to solve for the
optimal onsumption poliy and the implied equilibrium alloation numerially. We implement
the numerial algorithm along the steps of the equilibrium existene proof of hapter 1.
16
We plot the optimal poliy for the benhmark parameterization together with urrent inome
transformed to the redued state spae
17
in gure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Optimal onsumption poliy
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Notes: Optimal onsumption is expressed relative to permanent inome (c˜(x˜)). The state variable x˜ is the ash
at hand to permanent labor inome ratio.
The rst thing to reognize is that the optimal poliy funtion is almost linear. Furthermore,
optimal onsumption is below urrent inome for low ash-at-hand to permanent labor inome
ratios. Espeially for at = 0, the agent onsumes less than urrent inome, and hene, the bor-
rowing onstraint is not binding. This veries the theoretial result of hapter 1 that borrowing
onstraints must be non-binding in equilibrium.
For high ash-at-hand to permanent labor inome ratios the onsumption poliy is above urrent
inome, and there is one state in the state spae, that we label
¯˜x, where agents just onsume
their urrent inome. This state is the target insurane ratio of agents. Chapter 1 proves the
existene and uniqueness of this target insurane ratio. The ratio is dened as the point in
the state spae where assets stay onstant at = at+1.
18
Again, we verify omputationally the
existene and uniqueness. Importantly, we see that, apart from stohasti utuations, the
poliy funtion implies saving dynamis that drive asset holdings towards the target insurane
16
Details an be found in the omputational appendix.
17
Notie that x˜ = 1 orresponds to the lowest point in the state spae beause a = 0 implies x˜ = 1.
18
Carroll (2004) introdues a slightly dierent denition, where he denes the target rate as the x˜ suh that
E [x˜] = x˜ holds. As noted in hapter 1 this implies a dierent target ratio.
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ratio, i.e. aumulate additional assets below the target ratio and deumulate assets above the
target ratio.
Linear approximation of the optimal poliy
The almost linearity of the poliy funtion lends itself to a linear approximation. To do so, we
use that at
¯˜x the optimal poliy satises
c˜(¯˜x) =
r
1 + r
¯˜x+
1
1 + r
suh that the agent only onsumes her urrent inome and assets stay onstant.
19
We expand
the poliy linearly around this point in the following way
c˜(x˜) =
r
1 + r
x˜+
1
1 + r
+ ξ(x˜− ¯˜x)
For an appropriately hosen parameter ξ this yields a very aurate approximation to the
optimal poliy.
20
We use this linear approximation below to provide some intuition for our
results.
Stationary distribution
Regarding the stationary distribution of the model, Krusell and Smith (1997) have argued
that the model generates a wealth distribution that is almost degenerate to one point. We
do an extensive sensitivity hek with respet to the speiation of the initial distribution
and it seems that their result stems from their hoie of the initial distribution. Following
Constantinides and Due (1996) they set all newborn agents to mean produtivity and mean
asset holdings of the eonomy, i.e. they use a degenerate initial distribution. Sine, numerially,
the target insurane ratio oinides almost exatly with mean endowments in the redued state
spae, the distribution for assets will stay quite lose to the initial distribution. If we allow
for initial heterogeneity in endowments, the stationary distribution features a signiant ross-
setional dispersion of asset levels.
21
For the benhmark eonomy, we get a Gini oeient for
wealth that is 0.24, for labor inome that is 0.37, and for onsumption that is 0.33. If we take
the log variane as measure of dispersion, we get a value for labor inome that is 0.52 and for
19
It an be easily veried that
ra+wz
wz
= r1+r x˜+
1
1+r using the denitions introdued above.
20
We tried dierent parametri speiations for ξ and it turned out that ξ = γ+1
γ
σ2
2 works quite well. See
appendix for further details.
21
However, the model still suers from the same shortomings as the model with mean-reverting shoks that
it an not explain the high degree of wealth inequality observed in data. An extended model that generates
among other things more ross-setional dispersion is part of an ongoing researh projet.
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onsumption that is 0.36. Hene, the model is able to generate a onsumption inequality that is
smaller than labor inome inequality.
22
In the appendix, we provide a sensitivity analysis for the
stationary distribution with respet to risk aversion, inome risk, and the initial distribution. It
demonstrates that the degenerate wealth distribution is an artifat of the hoie of a degenerate
initial distribution.
2.3 Welfare analysis
In this setion, we determine the welfare osts of market inompleteness. We perform the
hypothetial experiment of shutting down inome risk to determine the equivalent variation
in onsumption that agents would be willing to give up to live under ertainty rather than
faing inome risk. For this experiment, we take the transition phase to the new deterministi
eonomy expliitly into aount.
2.3.1 Welfare osts of market inompleteness
It is a standard omputational exerise to derive the transition dynamis from the situation
with a positive preautionary savings to the steady state of the deterministi eonomy without
preautionary savings.
23
Given the transition path, we an derive expeted life-time utility of
an agent living through the transition who is initially endowed with asset holdings a and labor
produtivity z. We denote the expeted life-time utility by v(a, z). The model with unertainty
is solved using standard numerial methods on a redued state spae. We denote the expeted
life-time utility in the stohasti eonomy by v˜(a, z). We determine the welfare ost of market
inompleteness as the equivalent variation ∆ in onsumption of the agent living through the
transition phase.
24
Straightforward alulations yield the following expressions for ∆
∆ = 1− exp((1− β)(v˜(a, z)− v(a, z)))
for the log-utility ase and
∆ = 1−
(
v˜(a, z)
v(a, z)
) 1
1−γ
for the γ 6= 1 ase.
22
The numbers here are not diretly omparable to Krueger and Perri (2005) who study the relation between
inome and onsumption inequality over time beause their sample seletion in the empirial analysis redues
the level of inequality signiantly. Results that aount for their sample seletion are available upon request.
23
All details an be found in the omputational appendix.
24
In our analysis ∆ is always a share of the onsumption stream in the terminal eonomy.
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In the following disussion, we fous mainly on the average agent in the eonomy, i.e. someone
who holds mean assets and is endowed with mean produtivity, but we also derive several
welfare ost measures for the ross-setion of agents. As it turns out, the fous on the mean
agent is justied beause the results for the ross-setion are very lose.
When we alulate the welfare osts of market inompleteness for the mean agent, we get
∆ = 5.90%. This welfare loss is substantial and it is by far larger than the numbers found for
transitory (modestly persistent) inome risk.
25
Hene, although equilibrium asset trade allows
for onsumption smoothing the welfare osts of market inompleteness are still large for the
average agent. For the ross-setion of agents, we alulate the mean equivalent variation, the
mean equivalent variation for newborn agents, the equivalent variation of soial welfare, and
the equivalent variation of soial welfare for newborn agents. We report these average measures
together with the number for the mean agent in the benhmark eonomy in table 2.2. The
results show that the equivalent variation for the mean agent is lose to the measures in the
ross-setion, and that the ross-setional measures are lose to eah other given the overall
size of the welfare eets.
Table 2.2: Welfare osts of market inompleteness in the benhmark eonomy
Welfare measure Equivalent variation
Equivalent variation for the mean agent 5.90%
Mean equivalent variation 5.83%
Mean equivalent variation for newborn agents 5.90%
Equivalent variation of soial welfare 5.83%
Equivalent variation of soial welfare for newborn agents 5.90%
Notes: Welfare eets are given in terms of the equivalent variation in onsumption of the deterministi eonomy.
The welfare eets take the transition path to the deterministi steady state into aount.
This shows that the fous on the mean agent is justied beause it provides a good measure
for the welfare eets in the ross-setion of all agents and in partiular for newborn agents.
In the appendix, we provide an extensive sensitivity analysis with respet to parameters of the
initial distribution, inome risk, and risk aversion.
2.3.2 Endowment eet
In the stohasti eonomy, the agent aumulates an higher apital stok ompared to a situ-
ation under ertainty. This is in general referred to as preautionary savings. In a prodution
eonomy this implies for a given labor input more output. In a situation where inome risk
has been removed the agent no longer wants to sustain the high apital stok and the eonomy
25
As we show in the appendix, inluding transitory shoks with standard deviation ση = 0.2 inrease the
welfare osts to ∆ = 5.95%. The welfare eet assoiated with transitory inome risk is therefore negligible.
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Figure 2.2: Consumption transition paths
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Notes: Consumption paths are for mean inome in the stationary equilibrium with idiosynrati inome risk
and along the transition path where inome risk has been shut down.
onverges to a steady state with lower apital stok, and hene, less output. However, during
the transition phase the agents an nane additional onsumption by running down the apital
stok. Next, we quantify the welfare eets of this endowment eet. To do so, we ompare the
mean onsumption stream in the stohasti eonomy to mean onsumption along the transition
path. We denote the onsumption stream in the stohasti eonomy by {c˜t}∞t=0 and the on-
sumption stream that is onsumed along the transition path by {ct}∞t=0. {ct}
∞
t=0 is obtained as
the optimal poliy along the transition path starting from mean assets and mean produtivity.
The {c˜t}∞t=0 sequene is an artiial onstrut. It is a series of onstant onsumption where
onsumption equals inome obtained if endowed with average apital and average produtivity
in the equilibrium of the stohasti endowment eonomy
c˜t := rk¯ + wz¯ ∀t
r and w are the interest rate and the wage rate in the stationary equilibrium of the stohasti
eonomy and k¯ and z¯ are the mean apital stok and the mean eetive labor endowment in the
stationary equilibrium of the stohasti eonomy. The two paths for the benhmark eonomy
an be seen in gure 2.2.
When we alulate the disounted utility of the two sequenes, we an derive the equivalent
variation in onsumption that an be assoiated with the endowment eet. We solve for∆endow
that satises
∞∑
t=0
βtu(c˜t(1−∆
endow)) =
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
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For the benhmark eonomy, we get ∆endow = 0.07%. This eet is negligible ompared to the
overall welfare eet, and therefore, we abstrat from endowment eets in the welfare analysis.
Furthermore, we have doumented that borrowing onstraints are never binding in equilibrium,
so that no additional welfare osts arise due to missing borrowing possibilities. We assoiate,
therefore, the welfare osts in the previous setion entirely to missing insurane markets for
idiosynrati inome risk.
2.3.3 Endowment eonomy without equilibrium asset trade
To derive the welfare osts in a model without asset trade, we onsider an endowment eonomy
with permanent inome shoks along the lines of Krebs (2007). This eonomy is partiular
in terms of its equilibrium alloation beause agents hoose optimally not to trade any assets
and agents onsume only the urrent realization of their stohasti endowment stream.
26
This
eonomy is analytially tratable and the value funtion an be derived in losed form.
27
For a
deterministi endowment eonomy the expeted life-time utility of an agent an also be derived
easily.
28
Based on the losed form expressions for the value funtions, we get a losed form
expressions for the equivalent variation. For the log utility ase, we get
∆ = 1− exp
(
−
σ2
2
β
1− β
)
26
See Constantinides and Due (1996) and Krebs (2007) for examples of suh endowment eonomies. The
same idea is used in Heathote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008, 2009) to shut down asset trade between groups.
27
For γ = 1 the expeted life-time utility of a newborn agent using the distributional assumptions made above
is
v˜(z) =
log(wz)
1− β
−
βσ2
2(1− β)2
and for the ase of γ 6= 1, it is
v˜(z) =
(wz)1−γ
(1− γ)
(
1− βexp
(
− 12 (1− γ)σ
2γ
))
where w is a saling fator of the endowment proess that is only introdued to highlight the equivalene to the
labor inome proess of the prodution eonomy. See Krebs (2007) for details.
28
We get
v(z) =
log(wz)
1− β
and
v(z) =
(wz)1−γ
(1− γ)(1− β)
for the log utility ase and respetively for the γ 6= 1 ase.
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and for the ase of γ 6= 1, we get
∆ = 1−
(
1− β
1− β exp
(
−γ(1− γ)σ
2
2
)
) 1
1−γ
Straightforward linearization of the welfare formula yields welfare osts in the fashion of the
Luas (1987) approximation
29
∆
.
=
β
1− β
γ
σ2
2
It an be seen from this formula that the welfare eets of permanent shoks an grow arbitrarily
large. Krebs (2007) disusses this point in detail and provides an extensive disussion on the
relation between permanent inome shoks and the osts of business yles.
2.3.4 Volatility adjustment
In the disussion of the optimal onsumption-saving deision we saw that agents optimally
aumulate assets to get to the target insurane ratio. At the target ratio, agents keep assets
onstant and onsume only their urrent inome. In this situation, a share of their inome
is derived from apital and this share is not subjet to inome shoks. Hene, agents ahieve
onsumption smoothing by naning part of onsumption from other soures than labor in-
ome.
30
If we want to aount for this eet, we have to sale inome risk appropriately. To
derive a saling fator, we dene yEt := wzt and y
P
t := wzt+ rat, and determine the onditional
oeient of variation for yEt+1 and y
P
t+1 given the urrent state. For the endowment eonomy,
we get
√
var[yEt+1|y
E
t ]
E[yEt+1|y
E
t ]
=
√
var[wzt+1|zt]
yEt
=
√
var[εt+1]
= σ
For the prodution eonomy, we make the simplifying assumption that asset holdings stay
onstant over time, i.e. at = at+1, orresponding to the idea that the agent lives at the target
29
Luas derived γ σ
2
2 as the welfare osts of business yles for a representative agent with i.i.d. transitory
shoks to onsumption.
30
Remember that in the alibration for the apital inome share we followed Cooley and Presott (1995) who
expliitly aount for onsumer durables and government servies.
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insurane ratio. √
var[yPt+1|y
P
t ]
E[yPt+1|y
P
t ]
=
√
var[wzt+1 + rat+1|zt, at]
yPt
=
wzt
√
var[εt+1]
wzt + rat
=
wzt
wzt + rat
σ
and we see that the appropriate saling fator 1− ζ to get equal oeients of variation for the
two inome streams is the labor inome share in individual inome
1− ζ =
wzt
wzt + rat
When we plug in mean values for zt and at and use the equilibrium relations for r and w, the
saling fator beomes
1− ζ =
(1− α)kα
kα − δk
and if we had δ = 0, we would get
1− ζ = 1− α
Hene, at the mean, to get the same volatility in the endowment eonomy and in the prodution
eonomy without depreiation, we have to sale the volatility aording to the labor inome
share in output. For the benhmark eonomy with δ > 0, the saling fator at the mean
beomes
1− ζ =
1− α
1− δk
kα
=
1− α
1− φ
where φ denotes the investment-to-output ratio in equilibrium.
At this point, it is important to distinguish the labor share in inome and the labor share in
output beause depreiation drives a wedge between the two shares. The saling fator 1−φ in
the denominator aounts for the fat that apital inome for the agent is net of depreiation.
The aggregate apital share in output α is the gross share that goes as apital inome, however,
due to depreiation the net inome share at the individual level is smaller and the investment
adjusted inome share aounts for this fat. With this expression for the saling fator at
hand, we nally note that both α and φ are known in the urrent model, beause both are
alibration targets, so that we know the appropriate saling fator for the mean agent without
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having to solve the model numerially.
2.3.5 Welfare formula
We have shown that one we take the transition phase to the deterministi steady state into
aount, we an abstrat from welfare osts due to endowment eets. Furthermore, beause
borrowing onstraints are non-binding, no welfare losses arise due to missing borrowing possi-
bilities. Welfare osts are therefore only aused by hanges in inome risk. The welfare osts
in the endowment eonomy disussed in the last setion are only based on onsumption resp.
inome risk, hene, the welfare formula lends itself to be applied here if we appropriately a-
ount for the redued onsumption risk. This is done by augmenting the welfare formula by
the saling fator 1− ζ to aount for the redued onsumption risk
∆˜ = (1− ζ)2
β
1− β
γ
σ2
2
If we apply this formula for our benhmark parameterization, we get ∆˜ = 6.37%. If we use the
(exat) non-linear formula, we get ∆˜ = 6.17%.31 The numerial approximation of the welfare
eets that involves solving the whole model together with the transition dynamis has been
∆ = 5.90%. This shows that for the mean agent, we get an aurate predition for the welfare
eets of market inompleteness. Furthermore, we have shown that the ross-setional eets
are lose to the eets for the mean agent, the formula gives therefore also a good predition
for the welfare eets in the eonomy as a whole.
32
This result shows that a simple bak of the envelope alulation allows us to assess the welfare
osts of market inompleteness in a model with permanent inome shoks. The result shows
further that we an still use a stylized onsumption rule, i.e. a rule where agents onsume
only their urrent inome, to assess the welfare osts of market inompleteness if we take into
aount the redued onsumption response to inome shoks. In the appendix, we provide
an extensive sensitivity analysis with respet to risk aversion, individual inome risk, and the
initial distribution to verify the good performane of the welfare approximation formula.
2.3.6 Soial welfare
To see why the approximation formula for the mean agent also yields good preditions for the
ross setion, we take a loser look at the onsumption-saving dynamis. For the derivation of
31
This shows that the linearization slightly overstates the welfare eets due to onavity.
32
In the next setion, we explain why we get the good approximation of welfare eets also for the ross-setion
of agents.
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the approximation formula, we use a apital inome share that is onstant over time. Intuitively,
this is a good approximation at the target insurane ratio beause the poliy funtion yields
ontration of the ash-at-hand ratio to this point. To see whether this approximation is only
a loally valid approximation, we approximate the speed of onvergene to the target insurane
rate using the linear approximation of the poliy funtion and abstrat from stohasti eets,
i.e. we set εt+1 = 1 for all t. After rearranging terms we get
∣∣∣∣ x˜t+1 − x˜tx˜t − ¯˜x
∣∣∣∣ = |−ξ(1 + r)| ≈ ξ (2.3)
Numerially, the linear approximation of the poliy funtion yields a quite aurate t if we set
ξ = γ+1
γ
σ2
2
. If we plug this into the formula for the speed of onvergene in (2.3) and hoose the
parameterization for the benhmark model (σ = 0.1 and γ = 1), we get as speed of onvergene
ξ ≈ 0.01. This means that only one preent of the remaining distane to the target insurane
ratio is removed in eah period, hene, a quite slow rate of onvergene towards the target
insurane ratio. For example, it would need approximately 69 periods to go half the way to the
target insurane ratio from any initial ash-at-hand ratio and in the alibrated average life-time
of 35 periods only about 30% of the distane to the target insurane ratio is removed. Hene,
for initial ash-at-hand ratios that are in some sense not too far from the target insurane
ratio the ash-at-hand ratio will not move muh. It might, however, hange signiantly one
we start far away from the target insurane ratio. For these ases, we should expet a worse
predition of the approximation formula, and indeed, this is the ase as an be seen from gure
2.3. However, the approximation error is symmetri around the target ratio. suh that the
errors anel out in the ross-setion and we still get a good performane of the approximation
formula for the mean equivalent variation in table 2.4. Furthermore, it is important to reall
that the distribution of the ratio variable an be quite onentrated, as it is the ase in our
benhmark alibration, but the model an still feature a large disperion of inome and wealth
levels in the ross-setion.
2.3.7 Changes in inome risk
The welfare experiment always onsiders the ase of a omplete shut-down of inome risk.
However, we might also be interested in a partial shut-down or inreases of inome risk. In
this setion, we quantify the welfare osts of an inrease in permanent inome risk. This is
partiular important beause the empirial literature on inome risk provides broad evidene
for an inrease in permanent risk during the 70s up until the mid 80s of the 20th entury.
We onsider an inrease of the standard deviation from σ1 = 0.10 to σ2 = 0.135. This inrease
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Figure 2.3: Analyti approximation and numerially determined welfare eets
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Notes: Welfare eets given as equivalent variation in onsumption of the deterministi eonomy inluding the
transition path. The analyti approximation uses the formula derived in the main text. The numerially derived
welfare eets are determined using the numerially determined value funtions.
an be roughly taken as the empirially doumented inrease in inome risk.
33
We alibrate the
initial eonomy to math our alibration targets in table 2.1. We solve for the two stationary
equilibria together with the transition path. We get a welfare loss of the inrease in permanent
inome risk of ∆ = 5.05% for the mean agent. We use the proposed formula that is linear in
permanent inome risk to do a bak of the envelope alulation to assess the welfare eets. We
use the apital inome share of the initial alibrated eonomy and get an approximate welfare
loss of about 5.24% whih gives us an aurate prediiton of the welfare loss assoiated with
the inrease in inome risk. This shows that the simple welfare formula also delivers a reliable
approximation of the welfare osts of market inompleteness in ases of a gradual inrease in
inome risk.
This result suggests that the proposed formula is to the extend model independent that it only
depends on the inrease in onsumption risk aused by an inrease in permanent inome risk.
It might therefore also be applied to situations where the hannel of insurane for inome risk is
not expliitly modelled but only the extend of the transmission from permanent inome risk to
onsumption risk is known. In the urrent model, the onsumption response is approximately
equal to the labor inome share and welfare eets an be derived without solving the model
numerially. We disuss the onsumption response to permanent inome shoks in the next
setion and ompare it to ndings from other studies.
33
See for example Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). We normalize the average of the time period 1970− 1974 to
0.10 and ompared it to the average for the time period 1985 − 1989 where we apply the same normalization
fator.
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2.4 Consumption response to inome shoks
Reently, empirial researhers have studied the orrelation between permanent inome shoks
and the onsumption-saving deision (See Blundell et al. (2008), Jappelli et al. (2008)).
Kaplan and Violante (2009) and Carroll (2009) have studied the quantitative preditions in
partial equilibrium models where permanent inome risk is alibrated to the estimates from the
empirial literature. This paper is to our knowledge the rst paper that studies the quantitative
preditions in a general equilibrium framework. Imposing general equilibrium restritions has
important quantitative impliations for the onsumption-saving deision as disussed in hapter
1. In this setion, we study the insurane oeient (Blundell et al. (2008)) and the marginal
propensity to onsume out of permanent inome as two ommonly used measures to quantify
the onsumption response to an unexpeted permanent inome shok.
2.4.1 Insurane oeient
The insurane oeient as proposed by Blundell et al. (2008) measures the o-movement of
onsumption growth and inome growth. We use their denition
ϕ := 1−
Cov(∆ct, εt)
V ar(εt)
where ∆ct is the onsumption growth rate and εt is the inome growth rate. Kaplan and
Violante (2009) alulate the insurane oeient in an OLG model with permanent inome
risk. They onlude that the model does not align with the empirial estimates for the insurane
oeient reported in Blundell et al. (2008). We alulate the insurane oeient for our
benhmark eonomy and get a mean insurane oeient of 0.28. The empirial point estimate
by Blundell et al. (2008) is 0.36 but refers to non-durable onsumption. This shows that self-
insurane an explain a substantial amount of insurane against permanent inome shoks but
it still gives leeway to other hannels to explain the empirial estimates.
34
To see how the insurane oeient relates to our measure of self-insurane, the apital inome
34
The general equilibrium approah together with the alibration of the apital-to-output ratio imposes im-
portant disipline on this quantitative exerise. If we do a partial equilibrium experiment, where we keep all
parameters like in the benhmark model and vary only the interest rate, we unover a strong sensitivity of
the quantitative results. For r = 4.5763% the insurane oeient in the ross-setion is 0.37 whereas for
r = 3.0263% the insurane oeient is 0.00. This strong reation is mitigated if a life-yle motive governs the
onsumption-saving deision. The seond ase orresponds to the ases studied in Deaton (1991) where agents
run down assets to zero and stay borrowing onstrained forever.
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share, we rewrite the insurane oeient as follows
ϕ = 1−
Cov(∆ct, εt)
V ar(εt)
(1− ϕ)σ2ε = Cov(∆ct, εt)
(1− ϕ)σ2ε = ρ(∆ct, εt)σ∆ctσε
(1− ϕ)
ρ(∆ct, εt)
σε = σ∆ct
We see that the insurane oeient has to be adjusted by the orrelation oeient of inome
and onsumption growth to get the appropriate saling fator to go from the standard deviation
of inome growth to the standard deviation of onsumption growth.
35
For the apital inome
share we use αˆ = ra
ra+wz
and get the following non-linear relation between the apital inome
share and the ash-at-hand to permanent labor inome ratio
αˆ =
r(x˜t − 1)
rx˜+ 1
We ombine the linear approximation to the optimal poliy funtion and the law of motion for
the ash-at-hand ratio, this yields
c˜t+1 =
r(x˜t − c˜t)
εt+1
+ 1 + ξ
(
1 + r
εt+1
(x˜t − c˜t)
)
+ ξεt+1(1− ¯˜x)
and we an derive the onsumption growth rate as
∆ct = εt+1
c˜t+1
c˜t
= r(x˜tc˜
−1
t − 1) + ξ((1 + r)(x˜tc˜
−1
t − 1)) + ε(c˜
−1
t − (x˜tc˜
−1
t − 1))
From this expression for the onsumption growth rate, we an derive the relationship between
the apital inome share and the insurane oeient
ϕ = 1−
Cov(∆ct, εt)
V ar(εt)
= 1−
1− ξ(¯˜x− 1)
(1− αˆ)−1 + ξ(x˜t − ¯˜x)
=
αˆ + (1− αˆ)ξ(x˜t − 1)
1 + (1− αˆ)ξ(x˜t − ¯˜x)
We see that the insurane oeient is always larger than the apital inome share. The
dierene is governed by the fator ξ that aptures the adjustment towards the target insurane
35
If the onsumption poliy funtion were linear, then the orrelation would be one and the insurane oe-
ient alone would yield the saling fator.
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ratio. The numerial results allow us to alulate the respetive statistis for the mean agent.
These an be found in table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Consumption insurane measures
ϕ 0.244
ρ(∆ct, εt) 0.99999
(1−ϕ)
ρ(∆ct,εt)
0.756
1− αˆ 0.802
Notes: The insurane oeient ϕ is determined at the mean endowments and the numerially approximated
poliy funtion is used. The saling fator for inome risk in the third row determines the share of inome risk
that translates into onsumption risk as derived in the main text. The labor share is determined for the mean
agent and is used in the analyti approximation for the welfare eets to measure the transmission of inome
risk to onsumption risk.
We see that the insurane oeient at the mean is smaller than the mean insurane oeient
(0.28) suggesting a onvex relationship over the (redued) state spae, and we see further, that
the orrelation between inome growth and onsumption growth is very lose to 1 suggesting an
almost linear poliy funtion.
36
If we predit the welfare eets using the apital inome share
on the one hand and the insurane oeient on the other hand, we get the approximations of
the welfare eets given in table 2.4.
We slighty overestimate the welfare eet if use the saling fator based on the apital inome
share, and we underestimate the welfare eet if we use the saling fator based on the insurane
oeient. However, the apital inome share has the advantage that it an be easily derived
from the alibration targets, whereas the poliy funtion is needed to derive the insurane
oeient for the mean agent beause it does not oinide with the mean insurane oeient
obtained in empirial studies.
It is furthermore important to reognize that, as we show in the sensitivity analysis, the insur-
ane oeient is inreasing in inome risk, however, the welfare osts of market inompleteness
36
The orrelation has been omputed using a linear approximation of the poliy funtion suh that the reported
orrelation is an upper bound, however, we tried other interpolation shemes and the orrelation always stayed
above 0.99999.
Table 2.4: Welfare eets using dierent saling fators
Inome share Insurane oeient No approximation
mean agent (nonlinear) 6.17% 5.49% 5.90%
approximation error 0.27% 0.41% −
mean agent (linearized) 6.37% 5.65% 5.90%
approximation error 0.47% 0.25% −
Notes: Approximation of the welfare eets using the analyti approximation formula and dierent saling
fators to go from the variane of inome risk to the variane of onsumption risk risk.
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Figure 2.4: Marginal propensity to onsume
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Notes: The marginal propensity to onsume (∂c(a,z)
∂z
) out of permanent inome. Asset levels are xed and
permanent inome hanges marginally. The numerially approximated poliy funtion is used.
inrease at the same time. The insurane oeient alone an therefore not be used to assess
the welfare osts of market inompleteness but an even be misleading.
2.4.2 Marginal propensity to onsume
Finally, we look at the marginal propensity to onsume out of permanent inome as an addi-
tional measure for the onsumption response to inome shoks. We derive it as the derivative
of the optimal poliy funtion with respet to permanent inome. The derivative is determined
numerially using the optimal poliy funtion.
37
In gure 2.4, we plot the derivative for a xed
produtivity level and dierent asset levels.
We see that the marginal propensity is below one for low asset values and it is above one for
high asset values. The minimum is at zero asset holdings and it is roughly equal to 0.94. This
means that a permanent inrease in inome results in an inrease of onsumption that is about
94% of the inrease in inome. This shows that for a given produtivity level and low asset
holdings agents are willing to undertake a signiant saving eort in reation to a marginal
inrease in permanent inome. The asset aumulation inreases the onsumption response
up to a one-to-one relationship and we see that for high asset values it is even larger than
one-for-one. This happens as soon as the agent is above the target insurane ratio and she
wants to deumulate asset holdings. Carroll (2009) alulates the average marginal propensity
to onsume for permanent inome and nds values between 0.75 and 0.92 depending on the
37
We keep asset holdings onstant and hange produtivity marginally.
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alibration. His model is a partial equilibrium model and ontains also transitory shoks. To
get to the marginal propensity to onsume out of permanent inome, he takes the average over
the realizations of the transitory shok. Our results that are derived under general equilibrium
restritions suggest a higher marginal reation to inome shoks.
2.5 Conlusions
In this paper, we show that asset trade in a model with permanent inome shoks an ause a
substantial redution in the welfare osts of market inompleteness. Although, welfare osts are
large, self-insurane through asset trade provides an eetive hannel to insulate onsumption
risk from labor inome risk. We alulate for an Aiyagari-style eonomy with permanent inome
shoks the optimal onsumption-saving poliy and the equilibrium alloation. Based on these
results, we propose a stylized onsumption rule that aptures the key dynamis of the asset
aumulation deision. From this intuitive approximation of the poliy funtion, we derive
a saling fator to individual inome risk that, on the one hand, provides a measure for the
eetiveness of self-insurane, and on the other hand, allows us to approximate the welfare
osts of market inompleteness in losed form. The saling fator oinides with the labor
share in total inome and aounts for the fat that apital inome is not exposed to labor
inome shoks. Models that do not aount for this hannel of self-insurane, respetively,
other soures of inome to nane onsumption are very likely to overstate the welfare osts
assoiated with inome risk and missing insurane markets.
We show that our approximation formula for the welfare eets also works for a partial inrease
in inome risk. To this end, we provide a little quantitative example where we quantify the
welfare loss of the empirially doumented inrease in labor market risk starting in the 1980s.
Finally, we disuss the model's predition for other partial insurane measures that have been
proposed in the literature.
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Appendix
B.1 Welfare onsequenes of transitory inome risk
In this setion, we examine the eet of additional transitory i.i.d. shoks. The agent reeives
in every period an i.i.d. transitory shok ηt with E [ηt] = 1 for all t. The budget onstraint of
the agent beomes
ct = (1 + r)at + wztηt − at+1
and the law of motion on the redued state spae is
x˜t+1 =
(1 + r)
εt+1
(x˜t − c˜t) + ηt
i.e. we only normalize by permanent inome wzt. We hoose ση = 0.2, a number that is
onsistent with Kaplan and Violante (2009) who hoose 0.22. In ontrast to the results in the
main part of the paper borrowing onstraints beome now binding for ombinations of low asset
holdings and bad transitory shoks. This an be seen in gure B.5 where we plot the optimal
poliy funtion on the redued state spae.
If we solve for the stationary equilibrium and the transition to the deterministi steady state,
we get welfare osts of market inompleteness for the average agent that are ∆ = 5.95%
and the average equivalent variation in the ross-setion is 5.89%. This result shows that the
welfare eet of uninsurable transitory shoks is negligible ompared to the eet of uninsurable
permanent inome shoks, beause adding transitory risk inreases welfare osts only by 0.05%
whereas the eet of the permanent shoks is 5.90%. These osts are larger by two orders of
magnitude. This veries that agents an almost perfetly self-insure against transitory i.i.d.
shoks. A fat that is also reeted in the insurane oeient for transitory shoks that is
0.96, whereas for permanent shoks it is 0.28.
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Figure B.5: Optimal onsumption with transitory risk
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Notes: Optimal onsumption in the ase where also transitory inome shoks are present. Optimal onsumption
is expressed relative to permanent inome (c˜(x˜)). The state variable x˜ is the ash at hand to permanent labor
inome ratio.
B.2 Sensitivity analysis
We perform a sensitivity analysis of the welfare eets and the model's ross-setional inequality
along three dimensions: inome risk (σε), risk aversion (γ), and the parameters of the initial
distribution (σz0, σa0, ρ).
B.2.1 Inome risk
Table B.5: Sensitivity of welfare eets with respet to inome risk
σ ∆ ∆¯ ϕ ∆ˆ ∆˜
0.05 1.71% 1.70% 0.22 1.75% 1.73%
0.075 3.61% 3.58% 0.25 3.77% 3.70%
0.10 5.90% 5.83% 0.28 6.37% 6.17%
0.125 8.40% 8.26% 0.32 9.40% 8.97%
0.15 10.95% 10.73% 0.35 12.74% 11.96%
Notes: Welfare eets and insurane oeient for deviations in inome risk from the benhmark eonomy (in
bold). ∆ is the equivalent variation for the mean agent, ∆¯ is the average equivalent variation, ϕ is the average
insurane oeient, ∆ˆ is the approximated equivalent variation using the linearized formula, and ∆˜ is the
approximated equivalent variation using the non-linear formula.
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Table B.6: Sensitivity of inequality measures with respet to inome risk
Gini log variane
σ assets inome onsumption inome onsumption
0.05 0.22 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.21
0.075 0.22 0.31 0.28 0.35 0.27
0.1 0.24 0.37 0.33 0.52 0.36
0.125 0.26 0.42 0.37 0.75 0.47
0.15 0.29 0.47 0.41 1.05 0.61
Notes: Changes in inequality measures after deviations in inome risk from the benhmark eonomy (in bold).
B.2.2 Risk aversion
Table B.7: Sensitivity of welfare eets with respet to risk aversion
γ ∆ ∆¯ ϕ ∆ˆ ∆˜
1 5.90% 5.83% 0.28 6.37% 6.17%
2 9.70% 9.72% 0.30 10.41% 10.44%
3 12.27% 12.37% 0.31 12.40% 13.42%
Notes: Welfare eets and insurane oeient for deviations in risk aversion from the benhmark eonomy (in
bold). ∆ is the equivalent variation for the mean agent, ∆¯ is the average equivalent variation, ϕ is the average
insurane oeient, ∆ˆ is the approximated equivalent variation using the linearized formula, and ∆˜ is the
approximated equivalent variation using the non-linear formula.
Table B.8: Sensitivity of inequality measures with respet to risk aversion
Gini log variane
γ assets inome onsumption inome onsumption
1 0.24 0.37 0.33 0.52 0.36
2 0.25 0.36∗ 0.32 0.52 0.37
3 0.25 0.36∗ 0.33 0.51∗ 0.37
Notes: Changes in inequality measures after deviations in risk aversion from the benhmark eonomy (in bold).
The values with a star are lower resp. higher due to simulation noise, theoretially, they should oinide with
the values for the benhmark eonomy.
B.2.3 Initial distribution
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Table B.9: Sensitivity of welfare eets with respet to the initial distribution
σz0 σa0 ρ ∆ ∆¯ ϕ ∆ˆ ∆˜
0.3873 0.3873 1.0 5.90% 5.83% 0.28 6.37% 6.17%
0.3873 0.3873 0.0 5.90% 5.84% 0.29 6.36% 6.17%
0.3873 0.0 0.0 5.91% 5.81% 0.29 6.37% 6.17%
0.3873 0.5477 1.0 5.90% 5.87% 0.27 6.37% 6.17%
0.0 0.0 − 5.90% 5.83% 0.28 6.37% 6.17%
0.3873 0.3873 0.5 5.91% 5.84% 0.29 6.37% 6.17%
Notes: Welfare eets and insurane oeient for deviations in the initial distribution from the benhmark
eonomy (in bold). ∆ is the equivalent variation for the mean agent, ∆¯ is the average equivalent variation, ϕ is
the average insurane oeient, ∆ˆ is the approximated equivalent variation using the linearized formula, and
∆˜ is the approximated equivalent variation using the non-linear formula.
Table B.10: Sensitivity of inequality measures with respet to the initial distribution
Gini log variane
σz0 σa0 ρ assets inome onsumption inome onsumption
0.3873 0.3873 1.0 0.24 0.37 0.33 0.52 0.36
0.3873 0.3873 0.0 0.21 0.36∗ 0.30 0.51∗ 0.30
0.3873 0.0 0.0 0.10 0.37 0.30 0.52 0.29
0.3873 0.5477 1.0 0.30 0.37 0.34 0.52 0.39
0.0 0.0 − 0.08 0.30 0.24 0.37 0.21
0.3873 0.3873 0.5 0.22 0.37 0.31 0.52 0.33
Notes: Inequality measures for deviations in the initial distribution from the benhmark eonomy (in bold).
The values with a star are lower due to simulation noise, theoretially, they should oinide with the values for
the benhmark eonomy.
B.3 Linear poliy funtion
In the main part of the paper, we proposed the following linear approximation to the optimal
poliy funtion
c˜(x˜) =
r
1 + r
x˜+
1
1 + r
+
γ + 1
γ
σ2
2
(x˜− ¯˜x)
to hek how well this approximation desribes the optimal poliy funtion, we plot the relative
euler error in onsumption that is a standard measure to assess the goodness of an approximated
poliy funtion. Figure B.6 shows the plot. The maximum is at x˜ = 1, i.e. a = 0, but it is
still smaller than 8 ∗ 10−4 what we onsider to be still an appropriate approximation38. If we
alulate the average error in the ross-setion from the linear approximation, we get 3 ∗ 10−5
whih shows that the larger approximation error at the boundary does only aet few agents.
38
The approximation error beomes also larger in the upper part of the state spae. For x˜ = 500, it is 4∗10−3.
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Figure B.6: Euler error of the linear approximation
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Notes: Relative euler error of the linear approximation to the optimal poliy funtion as desribed in the main
text.
B.4 Computational appendix
B.4.1 Agent's problem
To solve for the optimal onsumption poliy of the agent, we implement a slightly modied
poliy funtion iteration ompared to the algorithm in hapter 1. The approah signiatly
inreases omputational speed but laks a theoretial footing unlike the poliy funtion iteration
approah for whih hapter 1 establishes onvergene.
Sine the stohasti labor inome proess is non-stationary, we an not approximate it by a
nite state Markov hain using standard proedures. Hene, we use Gauss-Hermite quadrature
to evaluate the expetations. We hoose 7 integration nodes for the permanent as well as for
the transitory shoks to get an appropriate degree of auray in the integration proedure.
To approximate the poliy funtion, we set up an equally spaed grid on the one dimensional
state spae. We try dierent number of grid points and nd that 5000 seems to be a well-suited
hoie to ahieve a high degree of auray. We hoose the grid points in the range [η, 500],
where η is the smallest of the quadrature nodes for the transitory shok in the produtivity
spae. If there are no transitory shoks, then there is a natural lower bound of the state spae
at 1. The upper bound of the state spae is hosen in an ad-ho fashion, but we try a wide
range of values and nd that the value is suiently large to not aet the equilibrium outome
for all parameter onstellations onsidered. Sine we nd that the poliy funtion is almost
linear, we use linear interpolation to evaluate the poliy funtion in-between the grid points.
The stopping riterion for the onvergene of the poliy funtion is set to εC := 1.0e− 4. The
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problem is solved for a given aggregate apital-to-labor ratio implying r and w.
Here is an outline of the algorithm
1. Dene a set of N equally spaed grid points on [x˜min, x˜max] and make an initial guess for
the poliy funtion cˆ0(xˆi) at every grid point xˆi for i = 1, . . . , N .
2. Derive the permanent {εˆj}Sj=1 and transitory {ηˆj}
S
j=1 shoks from the Gauss-Hermite
integration nodes.
3. For every xˆi alulate the right hand side of the Euler equation and apply the inverse
marginal utility funtion, to get an update on the poliy funtion at this node.
cˆt+1(xˆi) = min
[
xˆi,
(
β(1− θ)(1 + r)E
[
ε−γ(cˆt(xˆ
′
i))
−γ
])− 1
γ
]
where we use that for εˆs and ηˆh
xˆ′i = ηˆh +
1 + r
εˆs
(xˆt − c˜t)
and the expetation operator is evaluated as
E
[
ε−γ(c˜t(x˜
′))−γ
]
=
S∑
s=1
S∑
h=1
εˆ−γs (c˜t(xˆ
′
i))
−γωε,sωη,h
where ωε,s and ωη,h denote the appropriate Gauss-Hermite integration weights.
4. Chek onvergene ‖c˜t+1(x˜)− c˜t(x˜)‖2 < εC, with a stopping riterion εC suiently small.
Stop if poliy funtion has onverged, otherwise keep iterating.
Instead of the modied iterating approah, we ould also use a numerial rootnder to solve
the Euler equation for c˜t given xˆt. This orresponds to the approah as outlined in hapter 1.
We run this approah, too, and nd that it is as aurate as the modied approah but muh
slower in appliation.
B.4.2 Finding equilibrium pries
The algorithm for nding equilibrium pries is taken from Aiyagari (1994). The algorithm is a
simple bisetion approah to market learing.
The onsumer's problem is solved for given pries. Using the optimal poliy funtion and the
law of motion for the produtivity state we simulate the model. This is done for a large set of
onsumers and periods. We hoose here 50000 individuals and 5000 time periods. From this
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simulation we derive the apital supply at given pries. This is done by averaging over the last
3000 periods in the simulation. We derive the aggregate labor supply, too, to get the aggregate
apital-to-labor ratio. Considering the apital-to-labor ratio and averaging over 3000 periods
is aimed at reduing simulation noise.
The demand urve an be derived from the rm's rst order onditions analytially. If the sup-
ply at urrent pries exeeds the demand, the interest rate is lowered, otherwise it is inreased.
This is done using a bisetion approah.
The bisetion is initialized with r0,max =
1
β
− 1 and r0,min at some arbitrary level suh that we
an be sure that this is below the equilibrium value. Chapter 1 derives a lower bound for the
ase without transitory risk.
After the bisetion step we start over and solve the agent's problem again given updated pries.
We iterate on this proedure until onvergene, i.e. apital demand and supply oinide.
Outline of the algorithm:
1. Initialize the asset and produtivity distribution. a0 and z0, where a0 and z0 are N
dimensional vetors. N being the number of individuals in the ross setion. We label all
individuals by an index i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , N .
2. Draw transitory and permanent shoks from the appropriate distributions
39
. Draw the
survival shok from a standard uniform distribution τ ∼ U [0, 1].
3. Dervive for all i next period's values. If τ > θ then at+1,i = at,i(1 + r) + ηt,iw exp(zt,i)−
c˜(x˜t,i)w exp(zt,i) and zt+1,i = zt,i+ εt+1,i, otherwise at+1,i is drawn aording to the imple-
mented bequest sheme and zt+1,i = 0.
4. For t ≥ 2000 alulate K¯ = 1
N
N∑
i=1
at,i and L¯ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
exp(zt,i).
5. Form the (time) average over the
K¯
L¯
and ompare it to the apital-to-labor demand implied
by the urrent interest rate. If
K¯
L¯
exeeds the implied demand then redue the interest
rate, otherwise inrease the interest rate. This is done using the bisetion proedure.
6. Chek onvergene of the interest rate. If it has not onverged, solve the onsumer's
problem with the new interest rate and simulate again.
B.4.3 Calulate the transition dynamis
We x the transition phase to take plae over T periods. We hoose for our alulations T = 150.
For the nal period T we impose that the eonomy has reahed its steady state.
39
We simulate the produtivity in the log produtivity spae.
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We initialize the algorithm by guessing a transition path from r0 to rT . From this we derive
the implied transition for the wage using the equilibrium relationship for the wage and the
interest rate. Given these prie sequene, we solve by using bakward iteration for the sequene
of optimal poliy funtions {ct(x)}Tt=0 along the transition.
Using the optimal poliy, we simulate a large ross-setion of agents along the transition path
starting from the stationary distribution of the initial eonomy. To redue simulation noise
we repliate the initial ross-setion 10 times suh that we simulate 500, 000 agents along the
transition path.
From the simulation we derive a sequene of aggregate apital supplies {Kt}Tt=0 for the given
the prie sequene {rt, wt}Tt=0,s. The s denotes the number of updates on this prie sequene,
it is therefore zero after the initialization. This sequene of aggregate apital {Kt}Tt=0 implies
a new sequene of pries {rt, wt}Tt=0,s′. We update our guess for the prie sequene along the
transition by forming a onvex ombination with ombination weight a of the prie sequenes40
s and s′
{rt, wt}
T−1
t=1,s+1 = a{rt, wt}
T−1
t=1,s + (1− a){rt, wt}
T−1
t=1,s′
Note that we only update the guess for the transition period, i.e. t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1. After
updating the prie sequene, we hek onvergene of the prie sequene, i.e.
‖{rt, wt}
T
t=0,s+1 − {rt, wt}
T
t=0,s‖2 < εr,w
where εr,w is an appropriately hosen onvergene riterion. If the prie sequene has not
yet onverged, we solve the agent's problem using the new prie sequene and iterate on this
proedure until onvergene ours.
B.4.4 Auray
For the numeri poliy funtions our main onern is the auray of the results. Sine we use
a very dense grid over the state spae for the approximation of the optimal poliy funtion, we
an ahieve a highly aurate approximation of the true poliy funtion, where the auray is
measured by the relative error on the Euler equation as introdued in Judd (1992)
41
. For ratio
variables the relative error is
e = 1− c˜−1t
(
β(1 + r)E
[
ε−γt+1c˜
−γ
t+1
])− 1
γ
40
In our alulations we use a very onservative updating rule with a = 0.99. We thank Alexander Ludwig
for helping us with this problem.
41
We report take the absolute value of the error for all statistis.
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We hoose the state spae for the ash-at-hand to labor inome ratio to be [1.0, 500.0]. The
errors we report apply to an 5% extended state spae at the upper end, so that x˜max = 525.
We do so to show that the quality of the approximation does not drop rapidely when we have
to do extrapolations during the alulations. For the benhmark eonomy we get the minimum
1.93e − 11, the median 1.91e − 10, the mean 1.45e − 08, and the maximum relative error
1.82e− 06.
We use the relative error beause of its nie interpretation. The error an be interpreted as the
relative error that ours in the onsumption deision of an agent due to the fat that she relies
on an approximate poliy instead of the true poliy funtion. An error of 0.01 means that she
does an error of 1e for every 100e spent. The errors here are always below 1.82e − 06, i.e.
the agent makes at most an error of 1.82e for every 1, 000, 000e spent. This shows that we
have found a quite aurate approximation to the true poliy funtion. Espeially, beause the
mean and the median are smaller by two orders of magnitude.
Furthermore, sine we onsider the omplete state spae, we an onlude that in equilibrium
there are no binding borrowing onstraints, beause if onstraints are binding the Euler equation
holds as a strit inequality.
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Chapter 3
Labor market rigidity and the
transmission of business yle shoks
with Philip Jung
3.1 Introdution
Compared to the US the German labor market is haraterized by substantially lower average
hiring and ring rates
1
. Institutional dierenes, in partiular the employment protetion
legislation and the inuene of unions in the wage setting proess, have been pointed out
as ausal for the lower transition rates. Moreover, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2009) study
empirially the ontribution of hirings and rings to unemployment volatility and argue that
in ountries like Frane with striter employment protetion legislation 'it is not surprising
that the employment-unemployment transition ontributes less to ylial volatility' (pp.11).
Similarly, though on theoretial grounds, Veraierto (2008) shows that within a model of job
realloation ring taxes 'lower the response of the eonomy to aggregate produtivity hanges'
(pp.3).
This paper studies empirially and theoretially whether low average hiring and ring rates
an indeed be assoiated with a lower ontribution of rings to unemployment volatility and
a lower response of the unemployment rate to business yle shoks. We doument that the
evidene for Germany and the US suggests the opposite relationship, namely that a more rigid
labor market is assoiated with more utuations over the business yle rather than less. In
Germany, ring rates are ompared to the US lower by a fator of 4 and hiring rates by a fator
1
We use the term hiring for unemployment-to-employment transitions and the term ring for employment-
to-unemployment transitions.
71
of 5, but the unemployment rate is 1.2 times, the ring rate 2.5 times, and the hiring rate as
volatile as the respetive US ounterparts. These volatility dierenes translate for Germany
into a 30% stronger reation of unemployment rates to business yle shoks of the same size
and rings that ontribute 60−70% to unemployment volatlity whereas for the US the opposite
is true and hirings aount for 60− 70%. A similar nding holds for earnings, where we show
that, if anything, German earnings are more exible than US earnings, and wage rigidity an
therefore not aount for the observed dierenes.
To explain these empirial fats, we develop an extended version of the standard searh and
mathing model featuring endogenous rings, searh on the job, and math heterogeneity. In
this model, we show analytially that lower hiring and ring rates are in general inversely
related to business yle volatility. This means that labor market poliies that indue a deline
in transition rates inrease unemployment volatility, yield a higher ontribution of rings to
unemployment volatility, and moreover, indue a substantial inrease in the persistene of
shoks. A alibrated version of our model generates a reation of the unemployment rate to a
business yle shok that is ve years after the shok still two times larger in Germany than in
the US. This pattern is onsistent with the empirial observation after the large oil prie shoks
in the eighties.
Thereby, our results add theoretial insights to the empirial disussion on 'shoks vs. institu-
tions' in Blanhard and Wolfers (2000). Our model shows how institutional dierene leading
to low transition rates do not only amplify the transmission of shoks but also inrease the per-
sistene of the reation. It is exatly this interplay that makes rigid labor markets so vulnerable
to business yle shoks.
On empirial grounds, the paper lls a gap on the ontribution of the 'ins' and 'outs' in Eu-
rope and provides a detailed analysis of labor market ows and earning dynamis for Germany.
2
We show that the stylized labor market fats as stated in Shimer (2005) for the US an also
be found for Germany. However, two ruial dierenes arise. On the one hand, we observe
substantially lower transition rates, but on the other hand, a substantially higher ring rate
volatility. Extending the methodology of Fujita and Ramey (2007) to a three state deom-
position adding ows from non-employment, we show that in Germany rings are twie as
important in explaining unemployment utuations than hirings.
A seond empirial ontribution of this paper is to unover an important dimension of labor
market heterogeneity. We show that the bulk of worker ows results from low tenured and
2
There are two other studies on worker ows in Germany. Bahmann (2005) uses a dierent onept to
measure worker ows and fouses on the dynamis of annual transition rates. Some seleted results are on-
sistent with our ndings. Gartner et al. (2009) onsider quarterly transition rates and do not ontrol for
non-employment, tenure, and earnings. The aggregation to quarterly transition rates makes their results not
omparable to our ndings.
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badly paid mathes. Good mathes, i.e. mathes that are long lasting and relatively better
paid, are assoiated with lower ring and quitting rates. This math heterogeneity provides an
empirial motivation for both searh on the job and endogenous rings in labor market models.
To omplete the piture, we also look at dierenes in worker ows aross eduation groups
and sex.
Besides the employment protetion legislation, unions or, more generally, the wage setting
mehanism has been identied as a prime andidate in explaining the unemployment volatility
puzzle originally reognized by Shimer (2005), Hall (2005) and Costain and Reiter (2005).
3
As a third empirial ontribution we show that rigidity of this kind is likely not at the root
of the ross-ountry dierenes, onrming results in Pissarides (2009) who nds that the o-
movement of wages with the business yle might even be higher in Europe than in the US. We
provide strong support for this laim for Germany. We apply dierent approahes proposed in
the literature to ontrol for omposition bias in wage dynamis but our robust nding aross
all methods is that German earnings are not rigid and have an elastiity between 0.6 − 0.8
with respet to produtivity for all types of workers.
4
A similar nding for the US has been
established by Haefke et al. (2007).
The theoretial ontribution of the paper is to aount for the above stylized fats within
the ontext of an extended version of the standard searh and mathing model, featuring
endogenous rings, as suggested in den Haan et al. (2000), searh on the job, as reently
explored in Fujita and Ramey (2007), as well as heterogeneity aross mathes, as disussed in
Menzio and Shi (2009). Our model allows us to provide a simple losed form solution up to a
rst order approximation for speial ases.
We show that endogenous rings have ompared to exogenous rings no impat on the hiring
rate volatility and an therefore not resolve the basi volatility puzzle. However, the endogene-
ity of rings is ruial to explain the empirially observed large ontribution of rings in the
unemployment volatility. Adding searh on the job does quantitatively not help in explaining
a signiant fration of the unemployment volatility.
5
Yet, it helps to reonile the model and
the data by mathing the Beveridge urve onrming numerial results in Ramey (2008). In
ontrast to the results in Pries (2008), we nd that type dierenes and the assoiated ompo-
sition eets aross workers have only a weak impat on aggregate volatilities. However, the
3
Resolutions typially rely on arguments that make wages reat only weakly to aggregate onditions induing
a strong surplus for rms to hire in booms. The proposed hanges to the benhmark Nash bargaining solution
were to hange the bargaining set as in Hall (2008), induing ounterylial bargaining power (Shimer (2005)),
using optimal ontrats with risk averse agents (Rudanko (2009)), or using staggered wage ontrats (Gertler
and Trigari (2005)).
4
Peng and Siebert (2007) using GSOEP data, though limited by the sample size, also provide evidene that
wages appear to be fairly exible in Germany.
5
At least for Germany, though we nd a mildly larger impat for the US.
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introdution of heterogeneity aross job types generates positive inentives to searh, aounts
for observed type dierenes in average ring rates, and delivers a large average surplus of a
math. Type dierenes paired with searh on the job address therefore at least partly the
ritique raised to the small surplus alibration of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
We show using a Kalman ltering strategy that one the model is alibrated at the right
maroeonomi elastiities, it predits the entire time-series pattern of labor market dynamis
very well. We perform an impulse-response analysis of the model and nd that the implied
persistene to shoks turns out to be dramatially dierent aross ountries. Five years after a
shok hit the eonomy, the deviation of the unemployment rate from its long-run trend will still
be twie as large in Germany as in the US. The large dierenes in the persistene of shoks
do not stem from dierenes in the wage elastiity but an be traed to the dierent reation
of rings over the yle. While a single institution alone annot be held responsible for all
ross-ountry dierenes our ndings suggest that in partiular dierenes in the bargaining
power and the hiring and ring osts aross ountries an explain the observed dierenes in the
ring rate volatility, the low average transition rates, and the high unemployment persistene.
We proeed in 4 steps. Setion 3.2 desribes the data and douments stylized fats about labor
market transitions, deomposes the unemployment volatility, examines the eet of tenure, and
studies the ylial behavior of earnings. Setion 3.3 desribes and solves an augmented searh
and mathing model. In setion 3.4, we provide a alibration for our model that jointly mathes
Germany and the US and perform the impulse-response analysis. Setion 3.5 onludes. The
appendix provides more detailed information on dierent subgroups males, females, eduation
or other observable features of the data.
3.2 Data desription and aggregate dynamis
Our dataset is the IAB employment panel that is a 2% representative subsample taken from
the German soial seurity and unemployment reords for the period from 1975 − 2004. The
sample ontains employees that are overed by the ompulsory German soial seurity system,
it exludes self-employed and ivil servants ('Beamte'). Still, it overs about 80% of Germany's
labor fore. Sine the East German labor market was subjet to additional regulations and
restruturing after the reuniation, we exlude all persons with employment spells in East
Germany from our sample.
6
We observe the entire employment history of eah worker on a
daily basis. The inome reported at one spell is the average daily inome of an individual during
the employment spell. We do not observe hours worked but observe whether the person is full-
6
We do a rst step sample seletion where we remove very few individuals with missing observations. Details
an be found in the appendix.
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time, part-time, or from 1999 on in marginal employment.7 We impute earnings above the
soial seurity threshold following Gartner (2005), adjust for the hange in inome reporting in
1983 following Fitzenberger (1999), and adjust the eduation variables following Fitzenberger
et al. (2006). Our basi time-period will be one month. Other studies using the IAB-panel
study transitions at lower frequeny (see Gartner et al. (2009) and Bahmann (2005)). Using
a monthly frequeny allows us, among other things, to redue the time-aggregation bias.
Aggregate data are taken from the statisti oe ('Statistishe Bundesamt'). We use nominal
GDP and onvert it to real GDP by the CPI deator from the Bundesbank. We deate nominal
earnings in the IAB sample using again the same CPI deator. After 1991, we only observe
GDP for the unied Germany and we ontrol for the strutural break. Produtivity measures
are obtained by dividing through total employment or total hours worked, as is done by the
statistial oe. This measure is rather noisy and does not orrespond to the BLS produtivity
measure for the US who use a more disaggregate proedure, but still suers from aggregation
problems highlighted when disussing earnings below. Further details are relegated to the
appendix.
3.2.1 Basi Properties
The stylized labor market fats for Germany are highlighted in table 3.1 and refer to all workers.
In the appendix, we give the ows separated by sex and eduation. For a better omparison
we also present the orresponding US statistis in table 3.2.
We nd ylial patterns aross the two ountries that are similar along many dimensions. In
partiular, we nd for Germany that while aggregate output is approximately as ylial as
in the US, aggregate unemployment rates and vaany rates
8
are more volatile in Germany.
Firing rates (EU) are highly ounterylial. Jobnding rates (UE) are proylial in both
ountries but are onsiderably more orrelated with the yle in the US than in Germany.
9
Quitting rates, dened as on the job transitions to a new establishment, are highly proylial
7
We ontrol for transitions into part-time or from part-time to full-time. We mainly report aggregate
statistis. All transitions into dierent sublasses are available upon request.
8
Our vaany measure is fairly rude given that it inludes only open positions reported to the Bundesagentur
fuer Arbeit. Most job oers will go through internal rm markets as well as newspaper adds et., so neither the
sale nor the volatility should be over-interpreted. However, the orrelation struture aross the two ountries
is almost idential as well as the broad piture that vaany are substantially more volatile than output.
9
It is important to notie that the orrelation struture in almost all labor market variables is onsiderably
more pronouned when we look at a broad aggregate measure, GDP per apita, instead of a produtivity
measure like output per person or per hour. Produtivity measured as output per employed or per hour will
be a problemati onept in our framework when viewed, within the model, as an exogenous TFP shok.
Produtivity will suer from the same omposition eets Haefke et al. (2007) highlight for wages and whih
we will extensively disuss below. However, for Germany due to the reuniation the bias might be partiularly
severe, and the HP-lter is partiularly problemati. We will typially rely on a broader measure of eonomi
ativity like GDP per apita, whih seems less aeted.
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Table 3.1: German GDP and produtivity, employment, and labor market ows Jan1980− Sep2004
Mean Std Rel. Std Corr (GDP) Corr (GDP p. Emp.) Autoorr
GDP 0.024 1 1 0.7809 0.9533
GDP per Emp. 0.0164 0.6836 0.7809 1 0.9246
GDP per Hour 0.0187 0.7808 0.7979 0.9534 0.9608
U-rate (oial) 0.0837 0.1808 7.535 −0.7629 −0.4448 0.9794
Vaanies 0.3337 13.9 0.818 0.5556 0.9777
IAB median earnings 0.0168 0.6997 0.8447 0.6764 0.8605
IAB U-rate 0.0758 0.1694 7.059 −0.7222 −0.3231 0.9734
IAB E-rate 0.9242 0.0119 0.4969 0.6409 0.1319 0.9728
Firm exit 0.0239 0.0549 2.288 0.4719 0.2262 0.7532
Empl. exit 0.0152 0.0382 1.592 −0.4284 −0.2031 0.5096
EU 0.0053 0.1479 6.163 −0.8043 −0.501 0.9
EN 0.01 0.0633 2.637 0.5493 0.4008 0.7789
UE 0.0622 0.1034 4.31 0.4157 0.0728 0.7894
UN 0.0488 0.1024 4.268 0.4672 0.5309 0.7978
NE* 0.0649∗ 0.178 7.418 0.326 −0.0558 0.8511
NU* 0.0234∗ 0.1596 6.651 −0.2098 −0.1126 0.8984
Quits 0.0086 0.158 6.585 0.6528 0.327 0.9189
Notes: All data are in logs and are HP-ltered with λ = 100, 000. GDP data is nominal GDP per apita from
the statisti oe deated by the CPI, taken from the Bundesbank. Employment and total hours worked are
also taken from the statistis oe. IAB data are quarterly averages of monthly data. All IAB data are authors'
alulations. Firm Exit is dened as the sum of EU+EN+Quits. Employment Exit is dened as EU+EN. Quits
are dened as job-job transitions between two onseutive dates and a hange in the rm ounter as dened
in the IAB-data. The star at the non-employment ows indiate that the denominator, that is the state of
non-employed workers is measured with problems given that we do not have the orresponding universe of
searhing non-employed. We partially ontrol for this by dropping (early)-retired and only look at workers that
eventually will return to the labor market in our sample period. The (log)-volatility measures might be less
aeted by the problem.
in Germany. For the US, we do not have equivalent data, but the analysis in Nagypal (2005)
suggests that this also holds for the US. Separation rates from the rm's perspetive (the sum
of quits, EN, and EU) are proylial implying that the behavior of quits and separations into
non-employment dominate the behavior of rings. Given that both rates have ounterating
orrelation signs overall separation is rather aylial. We lak a preise ounterpart of this
variable for the US, given that we do not observe quits on the job diretly. Employment exit
rates (the sum of EU and EN) are ounterylial both in the US and in Germany. Employment
to non-employment rates are proylial in both ountries and are mirroring the behavior of
quits on the job, suggesting that, if anything, they reet quitting behavior. Median earnings
obtained from the IAB data are highly proylial.
There are two fundamental dierenes aross the two ountries. First, average transition rates
in Germany are substantially lower than in the US. The average jobnding rate in Germany is
smaller by a fator of 5 and the ring rate by a fator of 4. Seond, ring rates are roughly 2.3
times as volatile in Germany as in the US. Relative to GDP ring rates are 2.5 times and the
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Table 3.2: US GDP and produtivity, employment, and labor market ows Jan1980− Sep2004
Mean Std Rel. Std Corr (GDP) Corr (GDP p. Emp.) Autoorr
GDP 0.0263 1 1 0.4443 0.9309
GDP per Emp. 0.0140 0.5307 0.4443 1 0.8487
GDP per hour 0.0142 0.5385 0.1448 0.8883 0.8769
Earnings (BLS) 0.0177 0.6739 0.4231 0.6182 0.9427
U-rate 0.0626 0.1505 5.7224 −0.8904 −0.0272 0.9579
E-rate 0.0143 0.5420 0.8580 −0.0035 0.9576
Vaanies 0.2044 7.7719 0.8457 0.0553 0.9629
Empl. exit 0.0477 0.0372 1.4156 −0.2438 −0.1192 0.3425
EU 0.0203 0.0653 2.4818 −0.7166 −0.3759 0.5083
EN 0.0274 0.0458 1.7413 0.4420 0.2583 0.4418
UE 0.3069 0.1123 4.2705 0.8152 −0.0715 0.8943
UN 0.2658 0.0911 3.4629 0.7276 −0.0477 0.8756
NE 0.0424 0.0592 2.2512 0.6277 0.2285 0.5752
NU 0.0357 0.0713 2.7114 −0.5544 −0.1496 0.6997
Notes: US output data are taken from the NIPA and are deated by the GDP deator, produtivity and
unemployment rate data are taken from the BLS, vaany postings are taken measured by the Help wanted
index, and the labor market transition probabilities are taken from Shimer (2005). All data are in logs and are
HP-ltererd with λ = 100, 000.
unemployment rate 1.2 times as volatile but hiring rates are equally volatile. These dierenes
translate into the nding of the next setion that German unemployment volatility is mainly
driven by variations in rings, explaining between 60 − 70% of the unemployment volatility
while in the US unemployment volatility is dominated by the behavior of hirings and rings
aount only for 30− 40%. We will now make this statement quantitatively preise.
3.2.2 Unemployment volatility deomposition
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2009) analyze the ontribution of job in- and outow rates to the
utuations in unemployment for UK, Frane, and Spain. Fujita and Ramey (2007) do an
analysis for the US. The analysis in both papers is based on a rst-order approximation around
trend unemployment but the detrending methods and the onsidered labor market ows dier.
The analysis in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2009) is based on a rst dierene lter allowing
for four aggregate transition rates whereas Fujita and Ramey (2007) use the HP-Filter and a
two state deomposition. Fujita and Ramey show that the rst dierene lter is typially very
sensitive to high-frequeny utuations. To address the importane of rings and jobndings in
explaining unemployment volatility, we extend the methodology proposed in Fujita and Ramey
(2007) but allow for a three states with six transition rates. We desribe briey the deompo-
sition in Fujita and Ramey (2007) and our extension. An extensive sensitivity analysis with
respet to dierent methods, time periods, and group seletion an be found in the appendix.
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To derive the ontribution rates we taken an approximation around trend unemployment
ut ≈
ΠEU,t
ΠEU,t +ΠUE,t
log
(
ut
u¯t
)
= (1− u¯t) log
(
ΠUE,t
Π¯UE,t
)
− (1− u¯t) log
(
ΠEU,t
Π¯EU,t
)
+ ǫt
dut = dUEt + dEUt + ǫt
where ΠEU,t denotes the ring probability while ΠUE,t is the hiring probability and a bar denotes
the trend omponent of the respetive variable. log (ut/u¯t) measures the relative deviation of
the unemployment rate from its trend. Fujita and Ramey (2007) show that the variane of
ln(ut/u¯t) an then be deomposed suh that 1 = βπue + βπeu + βǫ where βx =
cov(dut,dΠx)
var(dut)
.
The deomposition allows us to obtain two separate omponents (and an error term) for the
importane of the respetive series in explaining the ylial variation of the unemployment
rate. Using an equivalent steady state approximation for the three state ase and dening
weights α := Π¯NU
Π¯NE+Π¯NU
and λij := (1 − u¯)
Π¯ij
Π¯u
, as well as the (weighted) average of separation
and hiring rates Π¯u := Π¯EU +
Π¯NU
Π¯NE+Π¯NU
Π¯EN and Π¯e := Π¯UE +
Π¯UN
Π¯NE+Π¯NU
Π¯NE , we obtain an
extended deomposition
log
(ut
u¯
)
= log
(
ΠEU,t
Π¯EU
)
λEU − log
(
ΠUE,t
Π¯UE
)
λUE
+ log
(
ΠEN,t
Π¯EN
)
αλEN − log
(
ΠNE,t
Π¯NE
)
(1− α)(λUE + λUN − λEU)
+ log
(
ΠNU,t
Π¯NU
)
α(λEU + λEN − λUE)− log
(
ΠUN,t
Π¯UN
)
(1− α)λUN + εt
dut = dEUt + dUEt + dENt + dNEt + dNUt + dUNt + εt
Using again βx =
cov(dut,dΠx)
var(dut)
a similar ovariane deomposition as in Fujita and Ramey (2007)
of the form 1 =
∑n
i=1 βi+εt applies.
10
Table 3.3 summarizes our nding based on the two-state
and three state deomposition.
The way of detrending is not innoent for many datasets given that the steady state approxi-
mation is not neessarily very aurate during ertain time periods. However, for Germany our
results are not driven by the detrending method used. We obtain the same deomposition with
10
The formula is similar to the rst dierene lter obtained in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2009), though they
essentially lump the non-employment rates dENt+ dUNt and the orresponding inow rate into dNEt+ dNUt
together. In fat the non-employment ows are hard to interpret in their deomposition. It is important to
notie that the deomposition does not rely on knowing the state of non-employed workers, whih is not available
for Germany but only the (gross) ows are needed. A derivation is available upon request.
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Table 3.3: Unemployment deomposition
Country Data EU UE NE EN NU UN ε
Germany
IAB 0.6073 0.3898 0.0030
IAB 0.4186 0.2498 0.2020 −0.0470 0.0678 0.1122 −0.0020
US
Shimer 0.3260 0.6763 −0.0022
Fujita/Ramey 0.3837 0.6185 −0.0022
Shimer 0.2013 0.4855 0.0884 −0.0378 0.1039 0.1516 0.0072
Notes: Data is HP-ltered (λ = 100, 000) for the period 1980q1− 2004q4. For Germany the transition rates are
for all male and female workers. The US data is obtained from Shimer (2005) and Fujita and Ramey (2007)
a rst dierene lter.
11
Based on a two state deomposition the ontribution of ring rates aount, depending on the
sample periods used, for 60−70% of the volatility while in the US it aounts for 30−40%. The
robust nding, using a three state deomposition, indiates that German ring rates ontribute
twie as muh as jobnding rates to the unemployment volatility while in the US the opposite
is true. Firing and jobnding rates taken together aount in both ountries for around 70% of
the unemployment volatility possibly justifying the fous on a two-state deomposition. The
left panel of gure 3.1 visualizes the tight onnetion of rings und unemployment in Germany
by plotting the HP-ltered ring rate against the ylial omponent of the unemployment rate.
It is evident that rings lead the unemployment rate by one quarter but is otherwise almost
perfetly orrelated with the unemployment rate. The right panel shows the tight onnetion
between quits on the job and hirings, suggesting a ommon mathing tehnology.
So far, we have analyzed aggregate worker ows, however, the aggregate piture masks impor-
tant dierenes in the harateristis of workers with respet to observable harateristis, in
partiular tenure on the job. We now turn to a disussion of these disaggregated fats.
3.2.3 Disaggregation of rings, quits, and jobndings by tenure
The analysis of aggregate ows between employment, unemployment, and non-employment ab-
strated from heterogeneity within these ows and their omposition. In the following analysis,
we fous on one speial dimension of heterogeneity by distinguishing labor market ows by the
duration in the previous labor market state. For simpliity, we all this duration from now
on tenure. We break the analysis further down and distinguish labor market ows also by sex
and eduation. The analysis shows that tenure is not only a widely unexplored dimension of
heterogeneity but also of primary importane when it omes to understanding labor market
11
The appendix provides a sensitivity hek with respet to the rst dierene lter of Petrongolo and Pis-
sarides (2009) and also gives the results for dierent eduation groups, dierent sample periods and separated
by sex.
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Figure 3.1: Labor market yliality
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Notes: Left Panel: The blue solid line reports the HP-ltered ring rate. The red dotted line reports the
HP-ltered unemployment rate. Right Panel: The blue solid line reports the HP-ltered quitting rate. The red
dotted line reports the HP-ltered jobnding rate.
ows.
To doument the important role of tenure for hiring, ring, and quitting rates, we onstrut
four tenure ells and assign labor market ows to one of the ells aording to the time spent
in the initial state of the labor market ow. For transitions out of employment we only ount
the time with the urrent employer. In 1975, we do not observe tenure of a partiular worker,
and therefore, we start in 1980 to overome the trunation problem. Given that our maximum
tenure lass is ve years and above, we an assign from 1980 on the transition to the orret
tenure ell.
Table 3.4 reports the basi statistis for ring, quitting, and jobnding rates disaggregated to
the tenure ells. The table highlights the strong impat of tenure on mean transition rates.
The ring risk drops by an order of magnitude from 1.8% for low tenured workers to 0.15% for
high tenured workers. The quitting probability ollapses by the same order of magnitude from
1.8% for low tenured workers to 0.36% for high tenured workers. The jobnding probability
shows the same pattern dereasing from 9.3% for short unemployment spells to only 2.0% for
long unemployment spells.
The relative share in table 3.4 measures the part of the transitions that originates from the
partiular tenure ell. It shows the same pattern aross tenure ells as the transition rates. We
see that 70% of all rings and 57% of all quits fall into the lass of workers having tenure of
less than 2 years.12 For jobndings, we get that over 85% of all jobndings arue to persons
12
We do a sensitivity analysis with respet to very short spells in the appendix to rule out high frequeny
noise of unstable jobs. The results show that most jobs survive beyond the threshold of 6 month and results
are robust.
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Table 3.4: Tenure on the job
Quits < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0183 0.0110 0.0079 0.0036 0.0081
std 0.1193 0.1575 0.1749 0.1481 0.1620
rel. share 0.4165 0.1504 0.2175 0.2156
rel. earnings 0.9018 0.9308 0.9248 0.9197
orr (GDP) 0.5595 0.5568 0.6053 0.5149 0.6345
orr (Produtivity) 0.2545 0.3261 0.3104 0.3580 0.3312
Firings < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0176 0.0066 0.0035 0.0015 0.0054
std 0.1936 0.1726 0.2283 0.2302 0.1500
rel. share 0.5860 0.1344 0.1454 0.1341
rel. earnings 0.8549 0.8208 0.8046 0.8125
orr (GDP) -0.7727 -0.7308 -0.7195 -0.5574 -0.7616
orr (Produtivity) -0.4650 -0.4644 -0.4213 -0.2546 -0.4739
Jobndings < 180 days 180 − 365 days 365− 730 days > 730 days overall days
mean 0.0934 0.0431 0.0301 0.0204 0.0614
std 0.1156 0.1122 0.1370 0.1730 0.1019
rel. share 0.7137 0.1480 0.0821 0.0562
orr (GDP) 0.3442 0.0444 0.4166 0.4970 0.3919
orr (Produtivity) 0.0532 -0.1251 0.1757 0.1249 0.0485
Notes: The data is for full-time employed males and females for the period Jan1980− Sep2004. The olumns
ontain the bounds of the dierent tenure groups. The tenure groups are formed for the labor market state
before the transition and are given in days.
All statistis are omputed onditional on being in the respetive labor market state and tenure group. mean
is the average transition probability of the respetive labor market transition. std is the relative deviation of
the transition rate over time. rel. share is the average share of transitions falling in this tenure group relative
to all transitions. rel. earnings are the average relative earnings of all persons with a transition relative to
the average earnings in the urrent labor market and tenure group. orr are the respetive orrelations of the
transition rate with GDP per apita respetively per employed as our business yle measures.
that have been unemployed for less that one year, however, the major share of persons nd a
job already within six month (71%).
When it omes to ylial utuations, we see that the orrelation and the standard deviation
are similar aross tenure ells for all transitions.
Finally, to learn more about the job quality of destruted jobs, we look at the median earnings
ratio of destruted to ontinued jobs (relative earnings). Our data shows that destruted jobs
ome from the lower end of the distribution. The disount is 15− 20% for jobs destruted due
to rings and 7− 10% for jobs destruted due to quits.
We interpret this result as giving support to math heterogeneity in the labor market. We think
of the following situation: A rm posts an open position and an unemployed worker looks for
open positions. They meet but realize immediately that the worker does not t the new job but
sine the alternative for the rm would be to leave the position open and for the worker to stay
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unemployed, they bargain and share the small surplus of the math. This onstitutes what we
all a bad math, and the worker will be searhing for a new job somewhere else hoping that
the new task will better math her skills suh that a good math an be formed. Furthermore,
the rm is more likely to re the worker beause the surplus of the math is small. Taken
together, this kind of math heterogeneity explains the higher destrution rates of low tenured
jobs and the earnings disount on these jobs relative to the peer group of ontinued mathes.
Although the data does not rule out other mehanisms to generate the observed pattern, we
opt for math heterogeneity in our model beause we nd it to be most onvining yet tratable
enough to inorporate it into a business yle model.
Of ourse, the above measures might be aeted by other omposition eets. In the appendix,
we report the same statistis for males and females and ontrol for dierent eduation levels.
Although the general pattern remains unhanged, some results are worthwhile to mention.
First, jobnding is substantially lower for low skilled ompared to medium and high skilled
workers. Seond, dierenes in unemployment rates aross medium and high-skilled workers
are driven mainly by dierenes in average ring rates, not by dierenes in the jobnding rates.
The earnings disount, expressed relative to the peer tenure-eduation group, is partiularly
large for high skilled workers.
3.2.4 Earnings
In a reent survey artile Pissarides (2009) disusses the empirial evidene on wage rigidity for
the US and Europe. He onludes that the available evidene suggests a stronger o-movement
of wages with the business yle in Europe than in the US. We provide strong support for this
laim for Germany, arguing that at least rigid earnings
13
are not at the root of the ross-ountry
dierenes highlighted above.
Table 3.1 shows that German median earnings are tightly onneted to aggregate produtivity
measures. However, the yliality of aggregate statistis an be substantially biased due to
omposition eets in the labor fore as highlighted in Solon et al. (1994) and extensively
disussed in Haefke et al. (2007).
Several approahes have been proposed to ontrol for this omposition bias. Solon et al. (1994)
use a group seletion proedure to x the group of individuals to avoid hanges in the ompo-
sition over time. The long panel dimension and the high quality of our inome data allows us
13
The IAB data, although superior to many other data sets for labor market transitions has the disadvantage
of laking information on hours worked. It only ontains information on the employment status (full-time,
part-time, marginal employment) of an individual. However, this limitation is not severe beause hours worked
per person employed does not vary muh with the yle. Other studies for the US have provided evidene
that earnings and wage yliality are quantitatively lose (see Haefke et al. (2007)). We will therefore in the
following repeatedly refer to studies that onsidered wages instead of earnings.
82
to do the same, however, with a substantially larger ross-setion. We identify in our dataset
ongoing job relations that do not only exist on a year-to-year basis but over the whole sample
period. The large ross-setion of our dataset allows us to fous on this partiular homogeneous
subpanel of workers, namely workers who had a job in 1975 and were ontinuously full-time
employed until 2004 at the same rm. That is, for this non-representative group, we ensure that
no quit and no ring happened during their entire work experiene nor any non-employment
spell.
14
For this group we only have earning information at annual frequeny, and in ontrast
to part of the business yle literature, we have to move to annual frequeny. However, the
annual frequeny might atually be the more natural frequeny given that bonus and speial
payments are typially not paid out quarterly. Given that, at least in models with risk-neutral
agents, the preise timing of the payment is indetermined, we believe that an annual frequeny
oers some advantages over a quarterly analysis. Although the group of ontinuously employed
workers is highly seletive, it allows us to examine the earnings dynamis of very stable jobs.
The seletion proedure addresses therefore also onerns regarding job quality over the yle
raised by Gertler and Triagari (2005).
Starting with Bils (1985) researhers have estimated individual wage growth equations using
rst dierenes along the panel dimension to ontrol for individual spei xed eets. The
approah might be restritive if only a short panel dimension is available. In partiular, last
earnings of unemployed workers might not exist or are unobserved. For quitting workers this
problem does not exist. Our long panel dimension allows us to keep trak of last earnings of
unemployed workers whih we use as a proxy for unobserved earnings in the regressions. We
onstrut a sample omprising all spells with ertain labor market transitions, e.g. quits. For
this sample we regress individual earnings growth on the partiular labor market event on several
individual ontrol variables and the growth of the respetive business yle statisti. The labor
market events are grouped by years and individual ontrols are a fourth order polynomial in
potential labor market experiene, dummies for sex, three eduation groups, and for foreigners.
We also inlude a time-trend. Aggregating at annual frequeny allows us to abstrat from
adjusting for seasonality in the data. We run ordinary least squares (OLS) and least absolute
deviations (LAD) regressions to hek the sensitivity of our results with respet to outliers.
Although, the panel dimension of our dataset allows us to overome missing pre-employment
earnings for jobnder, there might still be onern regarding this approah. To overome
potential onerns, we follow Haefke et al. (2007) who propose a wage index onstrution.
They propose to ontrol for observable harateristis like age, sex, eduation, and experiene
and to fous on the behavior of the residual. We follow their proedure and onstrut earnings
14
The group still onsists of approximately 6, 126 workers and is therefore large enough to provide reasonable
estimates.
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indies for jobnder, quitter, persons who stayed at the same rm throughout the year (stayer),
and for the group of ontinuously employed workers desribed above. We plot the yliality of
the earnings index together with our business yle measure in gure 3.2. Table 3.5 summarizes
the estimation results. The details of the estimation proedures and an extensive sensitivity
hek an be found in the appendix.
Figure 3.2: Earnings index yliality
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Notes: Earnings index (blue dotted-line) yliality (1st dierene lter) for full-time workers (male and female),
business yle measure GDP per employed (red line). Time period is Jan1980− Sep2004.
Table 3.5: Earnings elastiity
Quitter Jobnder Stayer Cont. employed
Index 0.5909 0.6328 0.6651 0.7440
(Std. error) (0.1353) (0.1945) (0.1502) (0.1702)
Growth 0.3302 0.8089 0.6714 0.6214
(Std. error) (0.1264) (0.2493) (0.1400) (0.1629)
Correlation 0.5764 0.4651 0.5860 0.5811
Notes: Annual earnings yliality for full-time employed workers (male and female, all eduation groups).
Index refers to the earnings index using the rst dierene lter. Correlation refers to the orrelation oeient
of the earnings index and the business yle measure. Growth refers to the estimation in rst dierene using
OLS. The business yle measure is GDP per employed.
We see that earnings and produtivity are tightly onneted. For ontinuously employed the
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orrelation between the two series is around 0.6 and the elastiity estimate is beteen 0.62−0.74.
This nding is robust for all other groups and aross methods. Jobnder and quitter have an
elastiity of 0.6 when we look at the earnings index. Using individual growth rates we nd a
higher elastiity of 0.8 for jobnder, and a lower elastiity for quitter, likely due to outliers.
Using an LAD robustness hek supports this view. There, we nd an elastiity of around
0.6. The appendix provides detailed estimates for dierent eduation groups, sex, sample
periods, and ltering methods all onrming that the earnings elastiity on produtivity (or
other aggregate measures) is between 0.6− 0.8.
3.3 Model
The empirial analysis has highlighted important features of the German labor market. Most
importantly, (i) the ylial variation in the ring rate, (ii) the importane of job-to-job tran-
sitions, and (iii) the heterogeneity of transition probabilities aross tenure lasses. To aount
for these empirial observations, we present a stylized searh model featuring (i) endogenous
rings, (ii) a basi searh on the job mehanism, and (iii) we allow for type dierenes to
apture heterogeneity in math quality. The model is simple enough to work out the basi
mehanisms in losed form, yet rih enough to apture the essene of labor market utuations
over the business yle.
Setup : Time is disrete. There is a measure of size one of workers in soiety. Workers and
rms are risk-neutral. Workers an be employed in two types of jobs z ∈ [g, b], good or bad, or
are unemployed. At the beginning of eah period, the aggregate state of the eonomy is given
by the triple (a, lb, lg) = s ∈ S = A × L × L. The rst element is the aggregate exogenous
produtivity state a ∈ A = R following a Markov proess. The seond and third omponent
lz ∈ L = [0, 1] denote the measure of workers that are employed in a good respetively bad job.
Letting u denote the measure of unemployed, we have the aounting identity lg + lb + u = 1.
When rms open a position they randomly draw a job type. With probability πg the new job
is good and with probability πb = 1 − πg it is bad. At the beginning of the period, workers
who are urrently in a math relation of a partiular type bargain jointly and eiently about
the wage and the separation deision for next period. If the bargaining is suessful, they
produe output aording to the linear prodution tehnology yz = ABz where the aggregate
tehnology A is assumed to evolve exogenously and ommon to all mathes. The individual
types are dierentiated by the assumption that Bg > Bb.
15
The deision to searh on the job is taken as exogenous and random, reeting idiosynrati
15
We normalize suh that
Bg+Bb
2 = 1.
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utility attahed to the partiular math. However, the probability of reeiving an oer is still
endogenous and related to the aggregate mathing funtion.
16
At the end of the period, after
prodution has taken plae, workers in bad mathes might deide to searh for a dierent job.
We assume that they searh with exogenous probability πs and reeive an outside oer from a
ompeting rm with endogenous probability πee. They aept outside job oers for sure, given
that they will obtain an expeted wage gain. We assume that workers in good mathes do not
searh for new jobs beause their expeted wage gain is zero.
17
If, at the end of the period, the worker has deided not to searh or has not reeived an oer,
the rm reeives an idiosynrati ost shok ǫi, where ǫi is an i.i.d. random shok logistially
distributed with mean zero and variane
π2
3
ψ2z . The rm has to pay the osts only if it wishes
to ontinue the prodution proess. The osts are sunk after the urrent period and will not be
relevant for any future deision. The assumption of a logisti distribution allows us to obtain
losed form solutions and is done for onveniene (see Jung (2008) for details). Let ω¯ denote
the threshold for the ontinuation osts. The threshold level will be part of the bargaining set
and will be eiently bargained about by workers and rms. All mathes with ost realizations
above the threshold will deide to dissolve the math. If the math is dissolved, the rm has to
pay a ring tax τ to the government18 and the worker beomes unemployed. An unemployed
worker searhes for a job and is mathed in a mathing market governed by a standard Cobb-
Douglas mathing funtion. Unemployed workers are mathed with probability πue and beome
employed, with probability (1 − πue) they remain unemployed and keep on searhing. While
unemployed they reeive unemployment benets b < 1.
Firm's surplus: Consider a worker-rm pair at the beginning of the period. The rm disounts
the future, as does the agent, with a onstant disount fator β. For given wages wz : S → R
and ut-o strategies ω¯ : S → R the rm's surplus follows the reursive formulation
J(S,Bz) = ABz − wz(S) + (1− πee(S)πs)
(
(1− πeu,z(S))βE [J(S,Bz)]− πeu,z(S)τ +Ψz(S)
)
16
It is straightforward to make the searh deision also a disrete hoie and endogenous. Though it helps in
making aggregate quits more volatile, we deided to keep it exogenous in this version for simpliity. An older
working paper version had an endogenous searh deision, also modeled as a disrete hoie. The qualitative
results are unaeted, but the derivations beome more omplex without adding new insights.
17
Again, this assumption an be relaxed onsiderably without hanging the main mehanism. See Menzio
and Shi (2009) for a riher model along these lines.
18
Note that τ is expressed as a ring tax, or a reorganization ost and does not inlude severane payments. In
our framework, severane payments are eiently bargained away and would have no eets on the equilibrium
outomes. The government transfers all inome lump sum bak to the worker, so under risk-neutrality, there is
no need to speify formally governmental behavior.
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The ring probability πeu,z : S → R and the option value19 Ψz : S → R follow diretly from
the assumption of a logistially distributed random variable
Ψz(S) = −ψz
(
(1− πeu,z(S)) log(1− πeu,z(S)) + πeu,z(S) log(πeu,z(S))
)
πeu,z(S) =
(
1 + exp
(
ω¯(S)
ψz
))−1
The quitting probability is given by πee(S)πs and is zero in the ase of a good math (z = g).
Worker's surplus: The value ows of the dierent types of employed workers Ve,z : S → R
and unemployed workers Vu : S → R are given by
Ve,b(S) = wb(S) + πeu,bβE [Vu(S ′)]
+ (1− πeu,b)
(
(1− πee(S)πs)βE [Ve,b(S ′)] + πee(S)πs
(∑
z
πzβE [Ve,z(S ′)]
))
Ve,g(S) = wg + (1− πeu,g(S))βE [Ve,g(S ′)] + πeu,gβE [Vu(S ′)]
Vu(S) = b+ πue(S)
(∑
z
πzβE [Ve,z(S ′)]
)
+ (1− πue(S))βE [Vu(S ′)]
and the worker's surplus beomes
∆z = Ve,z(S)− Vu(S)
Mathing: New mathes are formed by a standard Cobb-Douglas mathing tehnology that
links the measure of searhing workers to the measure of vaanies v. The measure of searhing
workers is the sum of unemployed workers and the fration of workers searhing on the job. We
denote the resulting mathes by m and κ denotes a saling parameter of the mathing funtion.
m = κv1−̺(u+ πslb)̺
Labor market tightness is given as the ratio of vaanies to searhing workers x := v
u+πslb
. The
19
The termΨz aptures the option value of having the hoie to ontinue the math and is always positive. The
reason is that although the idiosynrati shok has an unonditional mean of zero the manager only ontinues if
the ontinuation value is positive. The payo resembles the payo prole of an option and is therefore inreasing
in the variane ψ of the shok.
87
probability of a searhing worker to nd a new job is
πue =
m
u+ πslb
= κx1−̺
and the probability that a rm lls its vaany is given by
πve =
m
v
= κx−̺
Free entry: To determine the number of vaanies posted, we impose a standard free entry
ondition. In equilibrium, the ost to post a vaany κ must equal the expeted prots of a
math
κ = πve
∑
z
πzβE [Jz(S ′, Bz)]
Bargaining: We assume standard Nash-bargaining jointly over wages and separation deisions.
The outome of the bargaining proess is haraterized by
(wz, ω¯) ∈ argmax
wz ,ω¯
µ log (∆z,t) + (1− µ) log(Jz)
where µ denotes the bargaining power of the worker. First order onditions deliver
ω¯(S) = βE [∆z(S ′) + Jz(S ′)] + τ
µ
1− µ
=
∆z(S)
Jz(S)
Law of Motion: The law of motion for the state variables is given by
l′g = lg(1− πeu,g) + lbπsπeeπg + uπueπg
l′b = lb(1− πeu,b − πsπeeπg) + uπueπg
u′ = u(1− πue) + lgπeu,g + lb(1− πsπee)πeu,b
Tehnology evolves exogenously aording to
A = exp(a)
a′ = ρa + η′
where ρ denotes the autoorrelation oeient.
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3.3.1 Basi Results
To understand the basi mehanisms, we onsider rst the speial ase of homogenous types,
i.e. πg = 0. With homogeneous mathes searh on the job does not deliver a wage gain. If
we set πs = 0, the model nests the standard model without searh on the job. All hoies in
the model are then funtions of the total surplus H := J + ∆. Proposition 1 summarizes the
properties of the basi model up to a rst order approximation around the deterministi steady
state. We use x¯ to denote the steady state of variable x and use xˆ to denote the deviation from
the steady state, i.e. xˆ := x− x¯.
Proposition 1. Up to a rst order approximation, the dynamis of the model are only funtions
of the business yle shok a
Hˆ ≈ σHa πˆeu ≈ σeua xˆ ≈ σxa πˆue ≈ σuea wˆ ≈ σwa
and oeients are given by
Surplus:
σH =
(
1− βρ(1− π¯ue − π¯eu + πsπ¯ueπ¯eu) + π¯ueβρ
(
µ− ̺
̺
)
+ πsπ¯ueβρ
(
1− µ
̺
+
1− ̺
̺
ψ
log(1− π¯eu)
H¯
))−1
(3.1)
Firing:
σeu
π¯eu
= −(1− π¯eu)
ρβ
ψ
σH (3.2)
Tightness:
σx
x¯
=
ρ
̺
σH
H¯
(3.3)
Jobnding:
σue
π¯ue
= (1− ̺)
σx
x¯
(3.4)
Wage setting:
σw = µσH
(
1− βρ(1− π¯ue − π¯eu + πsπ¯ueπ¯eu)
+ βρπ¯ue(1− πsπ¯eu)
1− ̺
̺
− π¯eu(1− π¯eu)(1− πsπ¯ue)β
H¯
ψ
)
(3.5)
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Volatility of the unemployment rate:
var(uˆ) =
z22
1− z21
1 + ρz1
1− ρz1
var(a) (3.6)
z1 = 1− π¯ue − π¯eu + πsπ¯ueπ¯eu
z2 = σeu(1− πsπ¯ue)(1− u¯)− σue(πsπ¯eu + u¯(1− πsπ¯eu))
Beveridge urve:
Cov(vˆ, uˆ)
v¯u¯
=
(
σx
x¯
ρ(1− z21)
z2(1 + ρz1)
+
1− πs
u¯(1− πs) + πs
)
var(uˆ)
u¯
(3.7)
The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted. As the labelling suggests, the absolute
values of the oeients oinide with the standard deviation of the respetive variable relative
to the standard deviation of the produtivity proess. Throughout the paper, we fous on
standard deviations of log rates rather than on the standard deviations of absolute rates, and
to ease the exposition, we use σ˜x to denote the log standard deviation of variable x, i.e. we
dene
σ˜x :=
σx
x¯
3.3.2 Disussion
Proposition 1 provides analyti expressions for the ring and hiring volatility as well as the
implied expressions for the unemployment rate volatility and the Beveridge urve. This allows
us to disuss the eets of observed ross-ountry dierenes on dierenes in labor market
volatilities and the impliations for labor market institutions. Within the model, we apture
labor market institutions by six parameters summarizing in a redued form important dier-
enes aross ountries. (i) The bargaining power µ aptures the inuene of unions in the
wage setting proess, (ii) vaany posting osts κ relate to rigidities in the rm entry proess,
(iii) ring restritions τ are used as a summary measure of employment protetion, (iv) the
ontat rate πs parameterizes the willingness of searhing on the job, (v) the outside option
b diretly relates to the ompetitiveness of the labor market, and (vi) the idiosynrati rm
shok variane ψ measures wage ompression by parameterizing the number of workers living
around the ut-o value.
Firing Volatility
Formula (3.2) provides an expression for the ring volatility. To simplify the analysis, we
drop quantitatively negligile terms and set 1 − π¯eu ≈ 1, π¯euπs ≈ 0, and βρ ≈ 1. Using this
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simpliation, we derive the following expression
σ˜Gereu
σ˜USeu
=
ψUS
ψGer
σGerH
σUSH
=
ψUS
ψGer
̺π¯USeu + (µ
US + πs(1− µ
US))π¯USue
̺π¯Gereu + (µ
Ger + πs(1− µGer))π¯Gerue
(3.8)
We see that if we ignore searh on the job (πs = 0) and assume that both ountries fae the same
idiosynrati produtivity shok proesses (ψUS = ψGer), then the ountries an not operate at
the eieny point of the Hosios ondition (̺ = µ) beause this would imply
σ˜Gereu
σ˜USeu
=
π¯USeu + π¯
US
ue
π¯Gereu + π¯
Ger
ue
≈ 5 > 2.5
However, equation (3.8) makes transparent that the dierenes in average transition rates map
into substantial dierenes in ring volatilities aross ountries. The intuition for this result is
simple: Consider a positive business yle shok in both ountries. The same shok inreases
the surplus of an employed worker in Germany more than for her US ounterpart (σGerH > σ
US
H ).
To see this, look at a urrently unemployed worker. In Germany, it takes her muh longer to
nd a new job, and she partiipates therefore later from the booming onditions. This implies a
stronger inrease of the value of having a job in Germany than in the US, and the total surplus
of a math inreases also more in Germany. In return, rings deline more in Germany and we
get a higher ring rate volatility. This argument is generi for most simple searh and mathing
frameworks and it establishes the inverse relationship between transition rates and volatilities
that we doument empirially in setion 3.2.
In fat, lower hiring and ring rates alone would generate too muh ring volatility and it must
be the ase that either the bargaining power in Germany is higher (µGer > µUS) to dampen the
surplus reation or the idiosynrati shok variane in the US is lower (ψGer > ψUS). A higher
bargaining power has some empirial support
20
while explanations relying on a shok variane
is unattrative. In our model, the idiosynrati shok variane would map into ross-setional
wage inequality. Reent ountry studies by Fuhs-Shündeln et al. (2009) and Heathote et
al. (2009) for the US and Germany provide ross-ountry omparable inequality measures that
show that the US wage inequality exeeds German inequality by far.
20
The OECD Employment database (see www.oed.org for details) reports a union density, i.e. the share
of workers aliated to a trade union, for Germany of 35% in 1975 and 22% in 2004, whereas for the US the
respetive numbers are as low as 22% in 1975 and only 12% in 2004.
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Hiring Volatility
Using equation (3.4) and 1− πeu ≈ 1, we an derive the following expression
σ˜Gerue
σ˜Gerue
=
ψGer
ψUS
H¯US
H¯Ger
σ˜Gereu
σ˜USeu
If we plug in the expression for the relationship between σ˜Gereu and σ˜
US
eu , we see that mathing
the ross ountry dierenes requires
H¯Ger
H¯US
≈ 2.5
ψGer
ψUS
Hene, to explain ross ountry dierenes we either need a larger steady state surplus in
Germany (H¯Ger > H¯US) or lower idiosynrati volatilities in Germany (ψGer < ψUS). A higher
surplus in Germany would, eteris paribus, lead to the puzzling observation that one should
expet higher mean jobnding rates in Germany given that jobnding rates are proportional
to the surplus (π¯ue ∝ H¯). Looking at the data, we see that the average jobnding rates in
Germany are lower by a fator of 5. Hene, a lower idiosynrati shok variane, i.e. higher
wage ompression, in Germany is likely the more relevant hannel to align the model with
the data. Empirially, the higher idiosynrati shok variane for the US reeives support as
disussed above.
Note that we still need a small surplus for newly hired workers to math the hiring rate volatility.
Neither of the newly introdued features alters the basi problem along this dimension. In
partiular, the surplus equation (3.1) shows that a model with endogenous rings generates an
idential surplus response as a model with exogenous rings up to a rst order approximation.
Unemployment volatility
Equation (3.6) delivers a model-based losed form approximation of the unemployment volatility
whih is exlusively based on the linearization of the unemployment ow equation around the
steady state. The formula has the property shared by many simple searh frameworks that
the volatility of hirings and rings are only funtions of the produtivity state and perfetly
negative orrelated.
21
Furthermore, all empirial ounterparts of the variables in this equation
an be diretly read o from tables 3.1 and 3.2 in setion 3.2. We use this fat to identify
the main drivers behind unemployment volatility by onduting a series of four omparative
statis experiments. The rst three experiments fous on the eet of hirings and rings, and the
fourth experiment examines the eet of on the job searh on the unemployment volatility. This
21
This property holds in muh more general irumstanes and is haraterized formally in Menzio and Shi
(2009) who use a substantially riher model of direted searh on the job.
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analysis omplements and extends the empirial deomposition of the unemployment volatility
in setion 3.2.2.
Table 3.6: Unemployment volatility in the benhmark model
π¯eu π¯ue σ˜eu σ˜ue πsπ¯ee u¯ σ˜u s˜u 1− σ˜u/s˜u
Germany 0.0053 0.062 −6.20 4.30 0 0.079 8.60 7.06 −22%
US 0.020 0.31 −2.48 4.27 0 0.062 6.18 5.72 −8%
Notes: The table reports in olumns 1− 5 the data equivalents to the respetive model variables, and olumn 6
gives the model predition for the mean unemployment rate. Column 7 reports the relative standard deviation
of the unemployment rate to the standard deviation of the produtivity proess in the model (σ˜u). Column 8
reports the empirial ounterpart of this number (s˜u). The last olumn gives the residual unexplained volatility
of the model relative to the data. We use an autoorrelation oeient of ρ = 0.975 in line with our estimates.
Before turning to our experiments, we hek the validity of the approximation. In table 3.6,
we ompare the model's predition for the unemployment volatility to its empirial ounter-
part from tables 3.1 and 3.2. Although the model generates slightly too muh unemployment
volatility ompared to the data, the t is quite aurate. Hene, the model aptures the main
mehanisms behind the unemployment volatility in the data. We take this model as our benh-
mark to see how muh of the benhmark volatility an be attributed to the dierent soures.
We summarize the ndings of the experiments in table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Model-based unemployment deomposition experiments
π¯eu π¯ue σ˜eu σ˜ue πsπ¯ee u¯ σ˜u σ˜
∗
u 1− σ˜u/σ˜
∗
u
Experiment 1: Role of separations
Germany 0.0053 0.062 0 4.30 0 0.079 3.40 8.60 60%
US 0.02 0.31 0 4.27 0 0.062 3.90 6.18 37%
Experiment 2: Role of means
Germany 0.02 0.31 −6.20 4.08 0 0.062 10.03 8.60 −17%
US 0.0053 0.062 −2.48 4.27 0 0.079 5.33 6.18 14%
Experiment 3: Role of standard deviations
Germany 0.0053 0.062 −2.48 4.27 0 0.079 5.33 8.60 38%
US 0.020 0.31 −6.20 4.30 0 0.062 9.96 6.18 −61%
Experiment 4: Role of quits
Germany 0.0053 0.062 −6.20 4.30 0.01 0.079 9.01 8.60 −5%
US 0.02 0.31 −2.48 4.27 0.01 0.062 6.76 6.18 −9%
US 0.02 0.31 −2.48 4.27 0.02 0.062 7.32 6.18 −18%
Notes: The table reports in olumns 1− 5 the data equivalents to the respetive model variables, and olumn 6
gives the model predition for the mean unemployment rate. Column 7 reports the relative standard deviation
of the unemployment rate to the standard deviation of the produtivity proess after the omparative statis
experiment (σ˜u). Column 8 reports the equivalent of this number for the benhmark model (σ˜
∗
u). The last
olumn gives the residual unexplained volatility in the model relative to benhmark model.
In experiment 1, we reprodue within the model the empirial thought experiment by
Shimer (2005). We set ring volatilities to zero and ompare the predited unemployment
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volatilities of the model with onstant ring rates to our benhmark model. The results align
very well with our empirial estimates from setion 3.2.2. We nd that for Germany rings
are more important than hirings, and that quantitatively ring volatility explains around 60%
of the unonditional standard deviation of the unemployment rate. For the US, we nd that
the ring volatility aounts for 37% of the benhmark unemployment volatility, a result that
again aligns well with the empirial ontribution rates derived before.
In experiment 2, we ask how muh of the unemployment volatility an be attributed to dier-
enes in mean hiring and ring rates but we keep volatilities onstant and only exhange the
US and German mean rates. We see that the impat of the dierenes in the mean rates is
around 15% in absolute value, and hene, rather small.
In experiment 3, we perform the same experiment for hiring and ring volatilities. This time,
we hold mean rates onstant and fous on the eet of dierenes in volatilities. We see that
the sole impat of dierenes in volatilities is very large. For Germany, the model generates an
unemployment volatility that falls 38% short of the benhmark eonomy, whereas for the US
the unemployment volatility is 61% too high ompared to the benhmark model.
Experiments 2 and 3 taken together doument that ountries might dier substantially in
their transition rates, but as long as the volatilities are similar, the aggregate volatility will be
similar. It is important to reall that during these experiments we kept the volatilities onstant
while hanging the means. However, we showed before that as soon as we impose equilibrium
restritions, this eteris paribus assumption would learly be violated.
Finally, experiment 4 examines how muh the introdution of on the job searh hanges the
unemployment volatility. For Germany, we use an average quit rate of 1%, in line with our
empirial estimate. We nd that the ontribution of quits is very small, leading to a 5% higher
unemployment volatility ompared to the benhmark model. For the US, we lak an exat
empirial ounterpart for the quit rate, however, the impat might be onsiderably higher (18%
inrease) if we are willing to assume a monthly quitting probability of 2% whih is in line
with some estimates from the literature (see Nagypal (2005)). In our simulation experiments,
we found that this eet enhanes the ability of the model in generating more unemployment
volatility, in line with ndings of Menzio and Shi (2009), but it is quantitatively small.
Beveridge urve
Searh on the job plays an important role (in both ountries) in explaining within the model the
Beveridge urve. With searh on the job there are, as Equation (3.7) shows, two ounterating
fores at work. The rst term aptures the negative ovariane between unemployment and
produtivity (notiing that z2 < 0). The seond positive term aptures the eet that in a re-
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ession many workers lose their jobs and inrease the pool of searhing workers. The inrease in
the searh pool makes it relatively heap for rms to nd new workers given that their mathing
probability inreases. They start to post more vaanies in times of high unemployment rates,
induing a positive orrelation between vaanies and unemployment. This eet might well
dominate and destroy the Beveridge urve. Searh on the job an mitigate the problem. In the
limit, if all workers are searhing (πs = 1), the positive term disappears ompletely. We nd
that, quantitatively, searh on the job indeed restores the Beveridge urve.
22
We showed how dierenes in mean transition rates and labor market institutions interat in
explaining the observed ross-ountry dierenes in volatilities. In the next step, we alibrate
our model inluding math heterogeneity and study the impliations of the observed dierenes
on the transmission of business yle shoks to the labor market.
3.4 Calibration
Our basi time period is one month and we aggregate to quarterly rates when simulating the
model. We target for both ountries a disount rate of annualized 4% and set the mathing
elastiity to the linearity point (̺ = 1
2
) in line with reent estimates by Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001).
Means: There are three dierenes in the average rates aross ountries we want to math.
These are the average jobnding rates that dier by a fator of 5, the average ring rates that
dier by a fator of 4, and the average quit rates that dier by a fator of 2. This imposes the
following ross-ountry restritions
π¯USue
π¯Gerue
≈ 5
π¯USeu
π¯Gereu
≈ 4
πUSs π¯
US
ee
πGers π¯
Ger
ee
≈ 2
Standard deviations: There are two fats about the seond moments aross ountries we
want to math. These are the standard deviation of the ring rate and the jobnding rate.
Relative to the business yle, the standard deviation of rings dier by a fator of 2.5 but
hirings are equally volatile aross ountries.
σ˜Gereu
σ˜USeu
≈ 2.5
σ˜Gerue
σ˜USue
≈ 1
Wage elastiity: Finally, we want our model to be onsistent with our estimates on the wage
22
See Ramey (2008) for a similar nding.
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elastiities. We fous on a wage elastiity of σ˜w = 0.8 for both ountries. This number is in
line with our upper bound estimates for Germany and the estimate of Haefke et al. (2007) for
jobnder in the US.
23
A ommon elastiity estimate implies that our ndings will not be driven
by dierenes in wage rigidity but an be traed to institutional dierenes.
The introdution of heterogenous types does not alter the main mehanisms outlined above.
As explained in the empirial analysis, we target the dierenes in the mean ring rates aross
tenure groups as a proxy for math heterogeneity to pin down the additional parameters. For
the US, we lak a preise empirial ounterpart for the eet of tenure, however, results in
Menzio and Shi (2009) suggest that a similar pattern as observed for Germany also holds for
the US. In table 3.8, we summarize our numerial results and our alibration strategy, whih
is otherwise standard given the targets outlined above.
Table 3.8: Calibration
Parameter
heterogeneous types homogeneous types
Target (Ger,US) Soure
Germany US Germany US
β 0.997 0.997 Annual real rate of 4%
κ 0.198 0.198 Normalization
̺ 0.5 0.5 Mathing elastiity Petronglo
ρ 0.975 0.975 Kalman estimates Solow Residual
Bb 0.975 1
Quit premium 5% Data
Bg 1.025 Normalization
πg 0.12 0.03 0 π¯eu,b = (0.017, 0.04) Data
πs 0.58 0.14 0.128 0.065 Mean quits (0.008, 0.02) Data
ψb 0.61 0.73 0.80 0.90
π¯eu = (0.005, 0.02) Data
ψg 1.64 1.76 π¯eu,g = (0.002, 0.002) Data
κ 0.23 0.03 0.27 0.05 π¯ue = (0.0622, 0.3069) Data
τ 2.3 2.0 3.0 2.9 Rel. Std πeu see table 3.7
b 0.96 0.93 0.95 0.94 Rel. Std πue see table 3.7
µ 0.68 0.47 0.63 0.38 Wage elastiity (0.8, 0.8) Data
Notes: This table douments our hosen parameters. We allow six parameters to dier aross ountries to target
the six dierenes identied in the main text. In the ase of heterogenous agents, we allow for dierenes in πg
and ψ to additionally target the dierenes aross tenure groups using information for Germany.
3.4.1 Results
There exist an equilibrium that mathes jointly all targets in both ountries. The model
demands a small surplus from opening a position, implying a very high outside option b.24
Yet, due to searh on the job and the time it takes to nd a good job, the average surplus
23
It turns out, quantitatively, that the partiular number hosen has almost no bearing on the results. With
the exeption that it has to be smaller one, of ourse.
24
Hall and Milgrom (2007) provide a rational by reinterpreting the outside option.
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in the soiety is substantial, and amounts to roughly 60% of annual inome in Germany and
40% of annual inome in the US. The surplus of a bad job is small and amounts to roughly
one monthly inome. An important dierene aross ountries lies in the substantially higher
bargaining power (µGer > µUS) and in the osts to open a position (κGer > κUS). Firing osts
are alibrated to be slightly higher in Germany (τGer > τUS). The exogenous searh rate must
be muh higher in Germany given that Germans have to searh onsiderably more often to nd
a better job due to the lower ontat rates (πGerS > π
US
S ). Finally, idiosynrati produtivity
risk is found to be higher in the US (ψUS > ψGer).
Given that we used up the two volatilities in our alibration and therefore lost an important
metri of suess, we evaluate the performane of the model by studying its preditive power.
To this end, we estimate for both ountries the underlying TFP proess using a Kalman lter
on GDP growth. We feed the estimated proess into the model and predit all endogenous
variables applying an HP-lter (λ = 100, 000) to the resulting time-series.25 Figures 3.3 and
3.4 graphially illustrates the suess of the model. Table 3.9 reports the standard deviations of
the estimated series as well as the orrelation between predited and atual values as a measure
of t.
26
Table 3.9: Summary Statistis
Germany US
Name Std (Data) Std (Model) Corr Std (Data) Std (Model) Corr
URate 0.18 0.198 0.87 0.150 0.16 0.89
Produtivity 0.016 0.014 0.47 0.014 0.02 0.48
Wage inome 0.015 0.011 0.78 0.018∗ 0.017∗ 0.29∗
Quits (NE)* 0.20 0.10 0.60 0.059∗ 0.127∗ 0.48∗
Vaanies* 0.33 0.16∗ 0.46∗ 0.20 0.17 0.80
alibrated moments
Firings 0.15 0.15 0.71 0.06 0.06 0.71
Jobnding 0.10 0.10 0.59 0.11 0.11 0.72
Notes: The table reports summary statistis for all endogenous variables predited by the model and ompares
them to the data. Corr refers to the orrelation between the atual and the predited data. The star indiates
that for quits in the US we do not have orresponding data and proxy by the NE ows (see Nagypal (2005)).
However, the proxy might apture very distint phenomena and should be interpreted with are. Calibrated
moments are in bold.
The model reprodues the time series pattern of the unemployment rate almost perfetly and
aptures ring dynamis very well in both ountries. German median earnings obtained from
the mirodata are also tted almost perfetly, while the model fails to math the BLS earnings
25
When applying a Bandpass-lter, the ndings are very similar.
26
We only report results for the heterogenous agent ase, though the basi t of the model is not muh aeted
when foussing on the homogenous agent ase.
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Figure 3.3: Predition for Germany
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Notes: The gure plots the model preditions (red dotted lines) and the data (blue solid line). The predition
is based on a tehnology proess obtained from a Kalman lter on GDP growth. Model and data are in logs
and are HP-ltered with λ = 100, 000. Earnings for Germany refer to median earnings obtained from the miro-
data. Vaanies are open position obtained from the Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit and do not orrespondent to
the universe of all open positions.
series. Given that the aggregate earnings series for the US is not very reliable and faes the
same omposition eets as disussed in setion 3.2.4, it is not lear whether the mismath is
exlusively a model problem or partly a data problem as well. The model aptures the orre-
lation struture of vaanies, quits, and jobnding rates well but underestimates the volatility
for the vaany proxy in Germany. The data on open positions for Germany does only apture
a small universe of all open positions, so learly the model and data are measuring dierent
things. The quit orrelation is aptured well, but the standard deviation is o onsiderably.
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Figure 3.4: Predition for the US
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Notes: The gure plots the model preditions (red dotted lines) and the data (blue solid line). The predition
is based on a tehnology proess obtained from a Kalman lter on GDP growth. Model and data are in logs
and are HP-ltered with λ = 100, 000. Earnings for the US are from the Bureau of Labor statistis. Labor
market transitions are taken from Shimer (2005).
An easy x would be a proylial searh probability whih would be the outome of almost all
models based on endogenous searh eort. The orrelation between vaanies and unemploy-
ment for the US is −0.8 in the model, showing that quits on the job indeed help reovering the
Beveridge urve. For Germany, we do slightly worse given that the orrelation is −0.6, but we
still reprodue the negative Beveridge urve relation fairly well.
The model is driven by one ontemporaneous shok hitting the demand for labor while the data
likely requires a riher shok struture to apture some of the autoorrelated deviations and
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measurement error. However, the basi model driven by one shok seems to apture the main
fores in the labor market fairly well. Furthermore, the simple and stylized model an reonile
labor market dynamis aross ountries relying only on dierenes in institutional parameters.
3.4.2 Transmission of shoks
We have demonstrated that our model reprodues the right maro-elastiities with respet to
aggregate shoks for important labor market dimensions. In this setion, we use the model to
inform us about the transmission of business yle shoks into the labor market. In partiular,
we examine how the German labor market reats to business yle shoks ompared to the US
market. As Figure 3.5 makes lear, the impulse-response funtions for a large shok (−5%) are
substantially dierent aross ountries.
Figure 3.5: Impulse response funtions
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Notes: The gure plots the impulse response funtions for the US (red dotted lines) and Germany (blue solid
line). Good type and bad type employed refer to the measure of good and bad mathes.
The model predits, on impat, a stronger inrease in unemployment rates measured in perent-
age deviation from the respetive long-run rates in Germany. The dierenes are not generated
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by dierenes in the reation of wages. Despite the lower bargaining power in the US the
wage reation was targeted to be the same aross the two ountries, and is onrmed in gure
3.5(e). The dierene is also not due to the hiring margin, given that the job-nding rate
reats very similar (see gure 3.5(d)). The assumption of heterogenous job types does not drive
the results either, in fat, we obtain the same piture for the aggregate rates when foussing
on the homogenous agent ase. The omposition eets do not have a strong impat on the
aggregate reation, but interesting dierenes an be stated. At our alibrated parameters,
more bad mathes will be destroyed in Germany ompared to the US. Over time (roughly after
two years) there will be more workers in bad jobs ompared to the long-run steady state in
Germany. These workers will over time move into good jobs. However, this proess takes time
and the number of good jobs will be below the long-run average for a substantial amount of
time. Correspondingly, there might be onsiderable risk involved for good workers when being
red, loosing a substantial fration of their surplus during the periods of unemployment and
searh for a good job.
Figure 3.6: Resaled impulse response funtions
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Notes: Right panel: Impulse response funtions for unemployment rates in the US (red dotted lines) and
Germany (blue solid line) resaled to math the initial shok. The shok magnitude for the US is 5% and for
Germany 3.72%. Left panel: HP-ltered perentage deviation of the atual data. The red dotted line are the
US, the blue solid line is Germany.
In fat, to have a similar response on impat the shok would have to be only 3.72% in Germany,
implying an impat that is approximately 30% larger in Germany. The right panel of gure
3.6 shows the re-saled impulse response funtion, where we sale the German shok suh that
both ountries fae the same peak unemployment rate. In the left panel of gure 3.6, we plot
the behavior of the atual unemployment rate in Germany and the US after the large oil prie
shok at the beginning of the eighties.
The plots show that the striking dierene aross ountries is the dierenes in the persistene of
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the shok. Aording to our model the US will reover fairly quikly, while Germany will likely
suer muh longer. After 20 quarters (or ve years) we see that the German unemployment
rate will still be 25% away from its long-run average while the US is only 12% away. When we
ompare the model to the data, we observe the same pattern. Although Germany ame from
onsiderably lower unemployment level, it appears to be the ase that the shok showed muh
more persistene in Germany while it leveled o muh more quikly in the US.
This experiment in our realistially alibrated model shows that shoks an be the driver of
substantially higher unemployment rates for a long time but that the reason for the persistene
is not the shok by itself but the interplay with the more rigid labor market institutions. It
is therefore the oexistene of low transition rates, high volatilities, and long persistene that
makes rigid labor markets so vulnerable to business yle shoks.
3.5 Conlusion
In this paper we doument that the German and the US labor market share many similarities
in their dynamis over the business yle. We nd that many of the stylized fats for the US
as stated in Shimer (2005) do also hold for Germany, however, two ruial dierenes arise:
(i) lower average transition rates and (ii) a higher ring volatility that onstitutes the major
driving fore behind unemployment volatility.
We show that these dierenes aross ountry matter in a quantitative sense. Shoks in Ger-
many are onsiderably amplied (+30%) and are substantially more persistent than in the US
(+25% after ve years). The volatility dierenes are not rooted in dierent wage reations
aross ountry. If anything, the earnings elastiity in Germany is at least as high as in the US.
Instead we nd that dierenes in labor market institutions leading to lower average transition
rates in Germany are responsible for the large ampliation of business yle shoks. Viewed
through the lens of a searh and mathing framework, no mean-variane trade-o between
higher unemployment rates on the one hand and lower business yle volatility on the other
hand exists. This raises fear for the future given the large shok urrently hitting the labor
market in both ountries. The relatively modest eet on unemployment rates we witnessed
so far in Germany might partly be due to a reation of poliy, substantially subsidizing layos
and preventing a boost in rings. Whether this poliy reation is indeed an optimal hoie will
be studied in our future researh.
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Appendix
C.1 Data
C.1.1 Data desription
The data is taken from the IAB regional les that over the period January 1975 to Deember
2004. The data onsists of employment reords of workers that have at least for one day been
employed in a job under mandatory soial seurity. The dataset omprises a 2% representative
subsample of workers drawn from these reords. One an individual has been put into the
sample, the full employment history of this individual during the sampling period is observed.
The employment history onsists of employment spells that are subjet to mandatory soial
seurity and unemployment spells where soial seurity benets have been paid. The sample
does therefore not ontain spells in publi servie (Beamte), self-employment, and periods of
non-employment. We desribe below in detail how we ontrol for these periods by onstruting
artial spells. Still, the data overs about 80% of the German workfore.
C.1.2 Sampling period and sample seletion
Due to measurement problems in unemployment during the years 1977 and 1978 we use the
rst 5 years (1975− 1979) only as a pre-sample and start our main analysis in 1980.
In a rst step sample seletion, we drop all individuals where the East-West information is
missing (2, 787 individuals dropped) or information regarding the urrent job27 (14, 490 indi-
viduals dropped). Furthermore, we drop homeworkers ('Heimarbeiter') from the sample (7, 315
individuals dropped). This results in a dropping rate of 1.81% for the whole sample, and leaves
us with a sample of employment histories for 1, 336, 357 individuals. After the German reuni-
ation the data ontains employment histories with spells that are loated in East Germany.
Sine the East German labor market was subjet to additional regulations and restruturing
after the reuniation, we exlude in a seond step all persons with employment spells in the
27
stib information missing.
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East from our sample. This leaves us with a nal sample of 1, 087, 555 employment reords.
From these reords we drop all marginal employment spells to avoid mismeasurement beause
marginal employment spells are only reported for the last ve years of the sample period.
C.1.3 Constrution of monthly employment histories
The employment history is given as a olletion of employment spells on a daily basis. A new
spell an either our due to administrative reasons of the soial seurity system or hanges
within a given rm, due to a quit to a new rm, the begin of an unemployment or a non-
employment spell. Regularly, individuals have periods of parallel employment in the sample.
This is reported as multiple spells. For every spell, we observe whether it is a full-time, part-
time, or marginal employment.
If persons have parallel spells in their employment history, we onsider only what we all primary
spells. The idea is to onsider the employment spell that generates the most inome and oupies
the most working time of an individual. To identify the primary spell, we apply a hierarhial
seletion proedure. If a person is at the same time full-time and part-time employed, we
label him or her as full-time employed and drop the part-time spells, if a person has two part-
time employments, we follow the ordering in the dataset that applies a hierarhial ordering
based on inome and part-time status over parallel spells, nally, if a person has employment
and unemployment spells at the same time, we label the employment spells as primary to be
onsistent with the proedure in the next step of determining the employment status.
28
Our basi time-period will be one month. We adopt the ILO timing onvention to measure the
employment status of a person in a given month. For eah month we determine the Monday
of the seond week in the month and take the week starting from this Monday as our referene
week. We look at all spells that overlap with this week. If only one spell overlaps, then this spell
determines the labor market status. If several spells overlap, we use a hierarhial ordering of
spells where a full-time employment spell dominates part-time spells and any employment spell
beats unemployment or non-employment spells. From this lassiation of monthly employment
states, we onstrut time-series at monthly frequeny. By traking the employment histories
through time, we an generate additional labor market statistis like tenure on the urrent job
and an onstrut the sample of ontinuously employed workers. To hek whether a person
stays with the same employer, we use the establishment number of the employment spells. A
transition of a person between establishments but within the same rm is then also ounted as
a quit. The denition of who is ounted as unemployed follows from the ontent of the dataset.
28
This problem only arises with marginal employment and an therefore be disregarded for the analysis in
this paper.
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A person is unemployed if she reeives unemployment benets or other benets on the basis of
the Soial Seurity Code III ('Sozialgestzbuh III'). We an not follow the ILO denition that
is based on interview questions on job searh beause this is unobservable in our sample.
We label inative employment that is reported in the dataset as non-employment. These spells
are periods of sustained employment relationships but that are urrently inative, i.e. the
worker does not work and no inome is paid. Examples for these periods are maternity leave,
long periods of illness, sabbatials. We onstrut additional non-employment spells as residual
spells in the dataset. The additional spells are inluded if a person is not observed in the
sample for some time period between two spells. To deal with persons entering the sample or
dropping out of the sample, we introdue additional labor market states that we label labor
market entry and retirement. The labor market entry state is an artiial state that we add
before the rst employment state. The retirement state is an artiial state at the end of the
labor market history. We assign it to persons that are of age 55 or older when they have their
last observed spell. The retirement state is by onstrution an absorbing state. Persons that are
below 55 and have no future spells in the sample are labeled as other employment and are no
longer onsidered after the transition into this non-employment state, i.e. they do not generate
transitions out of non-employment. Persons that are below 55 but have future spells are labelled
as out of the labor fore. The labor market entry, the reported spells of inativity, and the out of
the labor fore spells onstitute the pool from whih all non-employment transitions originate.
Table C.10 gives an overview over the dierent non-employment states in our analysis
Table C.10: Desription of non-employment states
status denition
retirement age ≥ 55, no further spells
other employment age < 55, no further spells
labor market entry before 1st spell of labor market history
out of the labor fore age < 55, further spells
inative in data
C.1.4 Measurement error
For variables regarding the job status, the inome paid, or the duration of the job the data
ontains virtually no measurement error beause it is taken from the soial seurity and un-
employment reords that are used to determine soial seurity ontributions and benets. The
personal harateristis that we observe with every spell like year of birth, eduation, indus-
try, and loation of the employer may, however, ontain measurement error. Fitzenberger et
al. (2006) point out that the eduation variable may be subjet to higher measurement error
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and provide imputation and orretion rules for this variable. We adopt their imputation and
orretion proedure and determine the highest attained eduation level of an individual over
the employment history to group persons into eduation lasses.
C.1.5 Earnings
The inome reported at one spell is the average daily inome of an individual during the
employment spell
29
. We do not observe hours worked but observe whether the person is full-
time, part-time, or from 1999 on in marginal employment. We use inome of the primary spell
for the analysis in this paper.
C.1.6 Imputation and orretion for strutural breaks
Inome in the sample is top-ensored at the upper ontribution limit ('Beitragsbemessungs-
grenze') of the German soial seurity system, and bottom ensored at the marginal employ-
ment ontribution level ('Geringfuegigkeitsgrenze'). For some of steps of the analysis we need
an unensored inome distribution. For these steps we impute inome above and below the two
ensoring points using the method proposed in Gartner (2005). The imputation uses a en-
sored regression together with the log-normality assumption for inome to impute the ensored
observations. For details see Gartner (2005).
Starting 1984 the inome data also inludes overtime and bonus payments. We orret for this
strutural break using the method proposed in Fitznberger (1999). His proedure leaves the
median and all observations below the median unhanged and orrets inome observations
only above the median. The approah is based on measuring the exess growth of the upper
inome quantiles between 1983 and 1984. For details see Fitznberger (1999).
C.1.7 Aggregate data
Aggregate data are taken from the statisti oe ('Statistishe Bundesamt'). We use nominal
GDP and onvert it to real GDP by the CPI deator from the Bundesbank. We deate nominal
inome in the sample using the same CPI deator. Produtivity measures are obtained by
dividing through total employment or total hours worked, as is done by the statistial oe.
This measure is rather noisy and does not orrespond to the BLS produtivity measure for
the US that uses a more disaggregate proedure, but still suers from aggregation problems
highlighted when disussing the ylial properties of inome. After 1991, we only observe GDP
29
The working period is not adjust for weekends or holidays.
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for the unied Germany. We use the X-12 ARIMA method to align the series in the fourth
quarter of the year 1991 to avoid jumping behavior of the series.
C.1.8 Seasonal adjustment
All data that is generated based on our own alulations is seasonally adjusted at monthy
frequeny using the X-12 ARIMA method. We also perform the default outlier orretion
implemented in X-12 ARIMA.
C.2 Sensitivity
C.2.1 Transitions by eduation and sex for all workers
Table C.11: Labor market ows Jan1980− Sep2004 for workers by sex
Mean Std Rel. Std Corr (GDP) Corr (GDP p. Emp.) Autoorr
Males
Firm exit 0.0236 0.0561 2.34 0.3245 0.1559 0.6724
Empl. exit 0.0148 0.0517 2.154 −0.5201 −0.2935 0.6238
EU 0.0056 0.1812 7.553 −0.8073 −0.5159 0.9034
EN 0.0092 0.0743 3.095 0.5293 0.371 0.7894
UE 0.0679 0.1172 4.883 0.3615 0.0558 0.7273
UN 0.0444 0.1138 4.742 0.4964 0.5952 0.7937
NE* 0.0784 0.1762 7.342 0.3535 0.0081 0.8115
NU* 0.033 0.1552 6.468 −0.3826 −0.2136 0.8782
Quits 0.0087 0.1589 6.622 0.6118 0.3306 0.8931
Females
Firm exit 0.0243 0.0595 2.478 0.6099 0.3027 0.8287
Empl. exit 0.0158 0.0339 1.412 −0.0571 0.0899 0.3581
EU 0.0048 0.1024 4.266 −0.7474 −0.4361 0.8356
EN 0.011 0.0588 2.451 0.5065 0.4059 0.6953
UE 0.0542 0.1051 4.381 0.5897 0.2254 0.8364
UN 0.0556 0.0935 3.898 0.2948 0.3222 0.6992
NE* 0.0551 0.1846 7.694 0.2917 −0.1165 0.8724
NU* 0.0163 0.177 7.377 0.0147 0.0142 0.8845
Quits 0.0085 0.1601 6.671 0.6877 0.3126 0.9352
Notes: All data are in logs and are HP-lterer with λ = 100, 000. The rates are quarterly averages of monthly
data. Firm exit is dened as the sum of EU+EN+Quits. Employment exit is dened as EU+EN. Quits are
dened as job-job transitions between two onseutive dates and a hange in the rm ounter as dened in the
IAB-data. All IAB-rates are authors' alulations. The star at the non-employment ows indiate that the
denominator, that is the state of non-employed workers is measured with problems given that we do not have
the orresponding universe of searhing non-employed. We partially ontrol for this by dropping early retired
and only look at workers that eventually will return to the labor market in our sample period. The log volatility
measures might be less aeted by the problem.
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Table C.12: Labor market ows Jan1980− Sep2004 for workers by eduation
Mean Std Rel. Std Corr (GDP) Corr (GDP p. Emp.) Autoorr
Low eduation
Firm exit 0.0245 0.0761 3.172 0.3526 0.2753 0.7477
Empl. exit 0.0191 0.0692 2.884 0.0635 0.1612 0.7223
EU 0.0053 0.136 5.668 −0.5839 −0.2139 0.8261
EN 0.0138 0.0894 3.727 0.397 0.2962 0.7887
UE 0.034 0.1474 6.144 0.4107 0.1008 0.7695
UN 0.0524 0.1195 4.98 0.2481 0.4766 0.7164
NE* 0.0824 0.2267 9.449 0.3888 0.0036 0.8912
NU* 0.0325 0.1838 7.66 0.0781 0.1788 0.8856
Quits 0.0054 0.1963 8.181 0.5502 0.3009 0.8743
Medium eduation
Firm exit 0.0236 0.0521 2.173 0.4796 0.1997 0.75
Empl. exit 0.0147 0.0379 1.581 −0.5814 −0.3431 0.5495
EU 0.0054 0.1578 6.576 −0.8261 −0.538 0.9073
EN 0.0093 0.0617 2.57 0.6093 0.4296 0.7736
UE 0.0684 0.1012 4.219 0.4295 0.0814 0.7709
UN 0.0475 0.1049 4.37 0.515 0.5321 0.7967
NE 0.0637 0.1674 6.977 0.374 −0.0221 0.8495
NU 0.0248 0.157 6.545 −0.2729 −0.1626 0.8907
Quits 0.0089 0.1569 6.54 0.6681 0.3309 0.9165
High eduation
Firm exit 0.0262 0.0921 3.839 0.3217 0.2251 0.7204
Empl. exit 0.0154 0.0892 3.718 0.019 0.1454 0.4976
EU 0.004 0.1236 5.153 −0.527 −0.2329 0.7488
EN 0.0114 0.1266 5.274 0.1753 0.1889 0.5525
UE 0.0664 0.1201 5.006 0.5075 0.172 0.8066
UN 0.0544 0.0895 3.729 0.2258 0.279 0.5942
NE 0.0538 0.1917 7.99 0.1019 −0.1795 0.7512
NU 0.0105 0.1868 7.783 −0.1652 −0.1582 0.7272
Quits 0.0108 0.1438 5.992 0.5027 0.2486 0.8784
Notes: All data are in logs and are HP-lterer with λ = 100, 000. The rates are quarterly averages of monthly
data. Firm exit is dened as the sum of EU+EN+Quits. Employment exit is dened as EU+EN. Quits are
dened as job-job transitions between two onseutive dates and a hange in the rm ounter as dened in
the IAB-data. All IAB-rates are authors alulations. The star at the non-employment ows indiate that the
denominator, that is the state of non-employed workers is measured with problems given that we do not have
the orresponding universe of searhing non-employed. We partially ontrol for this by dropping early retired
and only look at workers that eventually will return to the labor market in our sample period. The log volatility
measures might be less aeted by the problem.
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C.2.2 Unemployment deomposition
We perform the unemployment deomposition for dierent subgroups. We use the deomposi-
tion based on the HP-Filter (λ = 100, 000)
Table C.13: Unemployment deomposition for dierent subgroups
Sample Data EU UE NE EN NU UN ε
Men
IAB 0.6391 0.3580 0.0029
IAB 0.4517 0.2545 0.1707 −0.0433 0.0833 0.0851 −0.0010
Women
IAB 0.4831 0.5137 0.0032
IAB 0.3261 0.2854 0.2573 −0.0460 0.0359 0.1449 −0.0037
Low eduation
IAB 0.4740 0.5244 0.0016
IAB 0.2806 0.2719 0.3174 −0.0362 0.0810 0.0868 −0.0015
Medium eduation
IAB 0.6340 0.3627 0.0033
IAB 0.4438 0.2422 0.1822 −0.0472 0.0720 0.1093 −0.0024
High eduation
IAB 0.5165 0.4830 0.0030
IAB 0.3682 0.2652 0.2142 −0.0166 0.0654 0.1028 0.0008
Notes: Contribution of labor market transitions to unemployment utuations. Data is HP-ltered (λ =
100, 000) for the period 1980q1− 2004q3. For Germany the transition rates are for all male and female workers.
The US data is obtained from Shimer and Fujita/Ramey.
We perform the deomposition of unemployment utuations based on a rst dierene lter
as derived in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2009). The rst dierene lter for the ase inluding
non-employment does not allow to separate the ontributions of EN and NU ows and the
ontribution of UN and NE ows. The olumns are therefore reordered in this table. We report
the deomposition using the HP-lter (λ = 100, 000) as given in the main text for omparison.
Table C.14: Unemployment deomposition for dierent lters
Country Data EU UE EN NU UN NE ε
Germany
IAB (∆) 0.6353 0.3647 0.0000
IAB (∆) 0.3610 0.2131 0.2625 0.1634 −0.0000
IAB (HP) 0.4186 0.2498 −0.0469 0.0677 0.1122 0.2020 −0.0020
US
Shimer (∆) 0.6434 0.3566 −0.0000
Fujita/Ramey (∆) 0.5174 0.4826 −0.0000
Shimer (∆) 0.4010 0.3054 0.1207 0.1729 −0.0000
Shimer (HP) 0.2013 0.4855 −0.0378 0.1039 0.1516 0.0884 0.0072
Notes: Contribution of labor market transitions to unemployment utuations. Data is detrended by a rst
dierene lter (∆) for the period 1980q1 − 2004q3. The row labelled (HP ) ontains the numbers for the
deomposition using the HP-lter (λ = 100, 000). For Germany the transition rates are for all male and female
workers. The US data is obtained from Shimer and Fujita/Ramey.
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Table C.15: Unemployment deomposition for the period 1977− 2004
Country Data EU UE NE EN NU UN ε
Germany
IAB 0.6600 0.3371 0.0029
IAB 0.4486 0.2014 0.1323 −0.0481 0.1423 0.1238 −0.0004
US
Shimer 0.3677 0.6361 −0.0038
Fujita/Ramey 0.4054 0.5986 −0.0040
Shimer 0.2316 0.4702 0.0853 −0.0403 0.0957 0.1499 0.0076
Notes: Contribution of labor market transitions to unemployment utuations. Data is HP-ltered (λ =
100, 000) for the period 1977q1− 2004q3. For Germany the transition rates are for all male and female workers.
The US data is obtained from Shimer and Fujita/Ramey.
Table C.16: Unemployment deomposition before and after the German reuniation
Period Data EU UE NE EN NU UN ε
1980q1− 1991q4
IAB 0.6188 0.3766 0.0046
IAB 0.4585 0.2403 0.2080 −0.0796 −0.0309 0.2066 −0.0029
1992q1− 2004q4
IAB 0.5855 0.4116 0.0029
IAB 0.3678 0.2374 0.1862 −0.0362 0.1825 0.0586 0.0036
Notes: Contribution of labor market transitions to unemployment utuations before and after the German
reuniation. Data is HP-ltered (λ = 100, 000). The transition rates are for all male and female workers.
Table C.17: Unemployment deomposition for full-time employed workers
Sample Data EU UE NE EN NU UN ε
Full-time
IAB 0.6073 0.3898 0.0030
IAB 0.4181 0.2494 0.2018 −0.0469 0.0677 0.1120 −0.0020
Notes: Contribution of labor market transitions to unemployment utuations if only full-time employment is
onsidered. Data is HP-ltered (λ = 100, 000). The transition rates are for male and female workers.
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C.2.3 Earnings
Figure C.7: Earnings yliality and GDP per apita
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Notes: Earnings index yliality (1st dierene lter) for full-time workers (male and female), business yle
measure GDP per apita. Time period is Jan1980− Sep2004.
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Table C.18: Earnings yliality using GDP per apita
Quitter Jobnder Stayer Cont. employed
Index 0.4841 0.6231 0.5414 0.6436
std error (0.0854) (0.1163) (0.0943) (0.1006)
Correlation 0.6874 0.6668 0.6982 0.7358
Growth 0.4588 0.8160 0.6759 0.6491
std error (0.0534) (0.1297) (0.0817) (0.0918)
Notes: Annual earnings yliality for full-time employed workers (male and female, all eduation groups). Index
refers to the earnings index using the rst dierene lter. Correlation refers to the orrelation oeient of the
earnings index and the business yle measure. Growth refers to the estimation in rst dierene using OLS.
standard errors are lustered by time periods. The business yle measure is GDP per apita. Time period is
Jan1980− Sep2004.
Table C.19: Earnings yliality for the period 1977− 2004
Quitter Jobnder Stayer Cont. employed
Index 0.6091 0.6111 0.7221 0.7478
std error (0.1336) (0.2060) (0.1304) (0.1497)
Correlation 0.5620 0.4045 0.6398 0.6005
Growth 0.3292 0.7854 0.8036 0.6858
std error (0.1104) (0.2251) (0.1342) (0.1373)
Notes: Annual earnings yliality for full-time employed workers (male and female, all eduation groups).
Index refers to the earnings index using the rst dierene lter. Correlation refers to the orrelation oeient
of the earnings index and the business yle measure. Growth refers to the estimation in rst dierene using
OLS. The business yle measure is GDP per employed. Time period is Jan1977− Sep2004.
Table C.20: Earnings yliality (HP ltered)
Quitter Jobnder Stayer Cont. employed
Index(p.cap.) 0.5420 0.6101 0.5387 0.6416
std error (0.0819) (0.1147) (0.0878) (0.0911)
Correlation 0.8036 0.7357 0.7878 0.8264
Index(p.empl.) 0.7454 0.7244 0.6100 0.6633
std error (0.1686) (0.2369) (0.1956) (0.2259)
Correlation 0.6700 0.5295 0.5452 0.5221
Notes: Annual earnings yliality for full-time employed workers (male and female, all eduation groups).
Index p.ap. refers to the earnings index using the HP-lter (λ = 100, 000) and GDP per apita as business
yle measure and Index p.empl. refers to the earnings index using the HP-lter (λ = 100, 000) and GDP per
employed as business yle measure. Correlation refers to the orrelation oeient of the earnings index and
the business yle measure. Time period is Jan1980− Sep2004.
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Figure C.8: Earnings yliality (HP ltered) and GDP per employed
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Notes: Earnings index yliality (HP lter, λ = 100, 000) for full-time workers (male and female), business
yle measure GDP per employed. Time period is Jan1980− Sep2004.
Figure C.9: Earnings yliality (HP ltered) and GDP per apita
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Notes: Earnings index yliality (HP lter, λ = 100, 000) for full-time workers (male and female), business
yle measure GDP per apita. Time period is Jan1980− Sep2004.
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Table C.21: Earnings yliality (LAD estimation)
Quitter Jobnder Stayer Cont. employed
Growth(p.cap.) 0.5181 0.6455 0.5895 0.5702
std error (0.0633) (0.1452) (0.0870) (0.1097)
Growth(p.empl.) 0.4870 0.6751 0.6389 0.6056
std error (0.1263) (0.2446) (0.1613) (0.1840)
Notes: Annual earnings yliality for full-time employed workers (male and female, all eduation groups).
Growth p.ap. refers to the estimation in rst dierene using a LAD regression and GDP per apita as
business yle measure. Growth p.empl. refers to the estimation in rst dierene using a LAD regression
and GDP per employed as business yle measure. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 repetitions and
lustered by time periods. Time period is Jan1980− Sep2004.
Table C.22: Earnings yliality for full-time employed workers
Quitter Jobnder
Growth(p.cap.) 0.5277 0.7709
std error (0.0604) (0.0928)
Growth(p.empl.) 0.3875 0.7164
std error (0.1394) (0.2125)
Notes: Annual earnings yliality for full-time employed workers (male and female, all eduation groups).
Sample is restrited to unemployed that are unemployed less than 360 days and employed that are employed
for at least 180 days.Growth p.ap. refers to the estimation in rst dierene using OLS and GDP per apita as
business yle measure. Growth p.empl. refers to the estimation in rst dierene using a OLS and GDP per
employed as business yle measure. Standard errors are lustered by time periods. Time period is Jan1980−
Sep2004.
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C.2.4 Tenure
The table reports tenure transition rates for EN ows. The NE transition rates are not reported
beause of mismeasurement of the number of non-employmed workers.
Table C.23: Tenure statistis for non-employment ows
EN < 365 days 365− 730 days 730− 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0194 0.0058 0.0041 0.0018 0.0060
std 0.0996 0.1291 0.1511 0.2302 0.1334
rel. share 0.5959 0.1073 0.1539 0.1429
rel. earnings 0.7224 0.7724 0.7769 0.8125
orr (per apita) 0.2003 0.2022 0.2588 0.4464
orr (per empl.) −0.4650 −0.4644 −0.4213 −0.2546 −0.4739
av. obs. 1, 202 218 312 286 2, 017
Notes: Tenure statistis for non-employment ows (out of the labor fore state) for the period Jan1980−Sep2004.
The olumns ontain the bounds of the dierent tenure groups. The tenure groups are formed for the labor
market state before the transition and are given in days. All statistis are omputed onditional on being in
the respetive labor market state and tenure group. mean is the average transition probability of the respetive
labor market transition. std is the relative deviation of the transition rate over time. rel. share is the average
share of transitions falling in this tenure group relative to all transitions. rel. earnings are the average relative
earnings of all persons with a transition relative to the average earnings in the urrent labor market and tenure
group. orr are the respetive orrelations of the transition rate with GDP per apita respetively per employed
as our business yle measures. av. obs are the average number of transitions per month from the respetive
labor market and tenure group.
Table C.24: Sensitivity of the relative share with respet to short spells
Jobndings Quits
0 0.7137 0.148 0.0821 0.0562 0 0.4165 0.1504 0.2175 0.2156
15 0.6791 0.1658 0.092 0.0631 60 0.3432 0.1694 0.245 0.2424
30 0.6447 0.1838 0.1018 0.0696 90 0.3041 0.1796 0.2596 0.2567
100 0.2985 0.181 0.2617 0.2587
120 0.274 0.1874 0.2709 0.2677
Firings
0 0.586 0.1344 0.1454 0.1341
60 0.5257 0.154 0.1667 0.1537
90 0.4887 0.1661 0.1796 0.1657
100 0.4823 0.1681 0.1819 0.1677
120 0.4609 0.1751 0.1894 0.1746
Notes: The rst olumn ontains the minimum tenure in days in the initial state for the transition to be ounted.
The next four olumns ontain the share of transitions in the respetive tenure lass given the restrition. The
rst row ontains the benhmark ase without seletion that is reported in the main part of the paper.
115
Table C.25: Transition rates between labor market states for full-time employed workers (males and females,
Jan1980− Sep2004)
Low skilled
Quits < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0126 0.0067 0.0043 0.0024 0.0048
std 0.1915 0.2428 0.2436 0.1976 0.1997
rel. share 0.4204 0.1227 0.1642 0.2927
rel. earnings 0.8849 0.8689 0.9012 0.9217
orr (per apita) 0.3803 0.2687 0.4351 0.2804 0.5170
orr (per empl.) 0.1286 0.2192 0.2383 0.2870 0.3142
av. obs. 72.9433 21.2435 28.0935 49.4463 171.7266
Jobndings < 180 days 180 − 365 days 365 − 730 days > 730 days overall days
mean 0.0557 0.0258 0.0175 0.0093 0.0335
std 0.1684 0.1836 0.2076 0.3042 0.1466
rel. share 0.6719 0.1616 0.0991 0.0674
orr (per apita) 0.2697 0.3168 0.3168 0.4203 0.3734
orr (per empl.) -0.0185 0.0745 0.0857 0.1339 0.0477
av. obs. 129.0431 30.7276 18.6991 12.8358 191.3055
Firings < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0207 0.0081 0.0035 0.0020 0.0057
std 0.1763 0.2121 0.2828 0.2815 0.1418
rel. share 0.5651 0.1205 0.1114 0.2030
rel. earnings 0.9297 0.8349 0.8345 0.8568
orr (per apita) -0.6787 -0.5440 -0.5159 -0.3415 -0.5588
orr (per empl.) -0.3776 -0.2961 -0.2626 -0.0555 -0.2500
av. obs. 115.9110 25.0279 24.0253 42.4594 207.4235
Medium skilled
Quits < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0193 0.0112 0.0079 0.0037 0.0083
std 0.1214 0.1581 0.1750 0.1476 0.1612
rel. share 0.4238 0.1476 0.2137 0.2150
rel. earnings 0.9068 0.9244 0.9045 0.9002
orr (per apita) 0.5802 0.5916 0.6284 0.5321 0.6474
orr (per empl.) 0.2666 0.3502 0.3290 0.3634 0.3330
av. obs. 938.8651 327.4333 469.2897 471.4502 2207.0383
Jobndings < 180 days 180 − 365 days 365 − 730 days > 730 days overall days
mean 0.1009 0.0464 0.0325 0.0234 0.0674
std 0.1111 0.1098 0.1384 0.1792 0.0992
rel. share 0.7224 0.1451 0.0782 0.0543
orr (per apita) 0.3694 -0.0064 0.4245 0.4965 0.4053
orr (per empl.) 0.0773 -0.1551 0.1915 0.1141 0.0572
av. obs. 1197.9836 243.3641 131.5879 89.4922 1662.4279
Firings < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0187 0.0068 0.0037 0.0015 0.0057
std 0.2015 0.1837 0.2367 0.2308 0.1598
rel. share 0.5947 0.1315 0.1466 0.1272
rel. earnings 0.8736 0.8394 0.8134 0.8196
orr (per apita) -0.7845 -0.7386 -0.7437 -0.6018 -0.7830
orr (per empl.) -0.4778 -0.4745 -0.4526 -0.3034 -0.5066
av. obs. 879.9904 194.8828 220.8215 190.2625 1485.9571
High skilled
Quits < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0161 0.0125 0.0103 0.0051 0.0100
std 0.1070 0.1753 0.1664 0.1857 0.1432
rel. share 0.3651 0.1845 0.2666 0.1838
rel. earnings 0.8356 0.9298 0.9516 0.9592
orr (per apita) 0.3295 0.3083 0.3868 0.3862 0.4722
orr (per empl.) 0.1879 0.1406 0.1694 0.1981 0.2280
av. obs. 125.1352 65.1689 93.2625 65.7016 349.2682
Jobndings < 180 days 180 − 365 days 365 − 730 days > 730 days overall days
mean 0.0896 0.0501 0.0414 0.0368 0.0661
std 0.1268 0.1473 0.1881 0.3145 0.1194
rel. share 0.6664 0.1636 0.1056 0.0644
orr (per apita) 0.4534 0.1301 0.2985 0.2938 0.4783
orr (per empl.) 0.1538 -0.0125 0.1278 0.1930 0.1536
av. obs. 94.1415 23.5517 15.4566 9.6481 142.7979
Firings < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0084 0.0046 0.0026 0.0010 0.0036
std 0.1743 0.1796 0.2375 0.2588 0.1252
rel. share 0.5236 0.1907 0.1867 0.0991
rel. earnings 0.7190 0.7218 0.7013 0.7567
orr (per apita) -0.5051 -0.2938 -0.4658 -0.2228 -0.4523
orr (per empl.) -0.2119 -0.1883 -0.2304 0.0583 -0.1883
av. obs. 62.2201 23.4874 22.9498 12.5574 121.2147
Notes: The data is for full-time employed males and females for the period Jan1980− Sep2004. The olumns
ontain the bounds of the dierent tenure groups. The tenure groups are formed for the labor market state
before the transition and are given in days. All statistis are omputed onditional on being in the respetive
labor market state and tenure group. mean is the average transition probability of the respetive labor market
transition. std is the relative deviation of the transition rate over time. rel. share is the average share of
transitions falling in this tenure group relative to all transitions. rel. earnings are the average relative earnings
of all persons with a transition relative to the average earnings in the urrent labor market and tenure group.
orr are the respetive orrelations of the transition rate with GDP per apita respetively per employed as our
business yle measures. av. obs are the average number of transitions per month from the respetive labor
market and tenure group.
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Table C.26: Transition rates between labor market states for full-time employed workers (males, Jan1980 −
Sep2004)
Low skilled
Quits < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0139 0.0075 0.0048 0.0026 0.0052
std 0.2230 0.2662 0.2868 0.2192 0.2153
rel. share 0.4326 0.1202 0.1554 0.2918
rel. earnings 0.8627 0.8543 0.9018 0.9221
orr (per apita) 0.4247 0.2761 0.4030 0.2111 0.5237
orr (per empl.) 0.1791 0.2280 0.1978 0.2778 0.3490
av. obs. 47.8621 13.2773 16.9000 31.1387 109.1781
Jobndings < 180 days 180 − 365 days 365 − 730 days > 730 days overall days
mean 0.0649 0.0295 0.0199 0.0091 0.0383
std 0.1882 0.2355 0.2805 0.3561 0.1661
rel. share 0.6829 0.1516 0.1000 0.0655
orr (per apita) 0.2663 0.3124 0.2151 0.2457 0.3633
orr (per empl.) 0.0185 0.0609 0.0248 0.0207 0.0839
av. obs. 81.1979 17.8317 11.7300 7.8381 118.5978
Firings < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0232 0.0087 0.0036 0.0018 0.0060
std 0.2073 0.2910 0.3765 0.3563 0.1703
rel. share 0.6016 0.1166 0.0974 0.1844
rel. earnings 0.8874 0.8218 0.8465 0.8935
orr (per apita) -0.6882 -0.5508 -0.4234 -0.3514 -0.5984
orr (per empl.) -0.4304 -0.3177 -0.1980 -0.0745 -0.2793
av. obs. 75.9306 15.0722 12.9324 23.4219 127.3572
Medium skilled
Quits < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0208 0.0118 0.0079 0.0037 0.0085
std 0.1277 0.1580 0.1721 0.1471 0.1624
rel. share 0.4341 0.1418 0.1966 0.2274
rel. earnings 0.8915 0.9170 0.9127 0.8974
orr (per apita) 0.5791 0.5484 0.5665 0.4810 0.6018
orr (per empl.) 0.2781 0.3503 0.3167 0.3645 0.3256
av. obs. 647.1872 211.5719 290.4672 334.5967 1483.8230
Jobndings < 180 days 180 − 365 days 365 − 730 days > 730 days overall days
mean 0.1108 0.0495 0.0321 0.0219 0.0718
std 0.1306 0.1373 0.1658 0.1872 0.1111
rel. share 0.7372 0.1356 0.0752 0.0520
orr (per apita) 0.3058 -0.0359 0.3567 0.4378 0.3410
orr (per empl.) 0.0518 -0.1899 0.0922 0.0681 0.0219
av. obs. 815.0900 151.7632 83.8491 56.4856 1107.1878
Firings < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0212 0.0072 0.0038 0.0014 0.0060
std 0.2211 0.3863 0.2747 0.2844 0.1877
rel. share 0.6192 0.1238 0.1345 0.1225
rel. earnings 0.8590 0.8435 0.8277 0.8458
orr (per apita) -0.7940 -0.3993 -0.7192 -0.5472 -0.7833
orr (per empl.) -0.5095 -0.2512 -0.4274 -0.2547 -0.5107
av. obs. 638.3019 127.5673 141.2551 127.5865 1034.7107
High skilled
Quits < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0159 0.0128 0.0106 0.0052 0.0098
std 0.1123 0.1799 0.1600 0.1913 0.1392
rel. share 0.3342 0.1815 0.2753 0.2089
rel. earnings 0.8508 0.9325 0.9434 0.9787
orr (per apita) 0.1991 0.1808 0.3211 0.3557 0.3917
orr (per empl.) 0.1275 0.0630 0.1551 0.1953 0.1910
av. obs. 84.7555 47.5185 71.0302 55.1714 258.4756
Jobndings < 180 days 180 − 365 days 365 − 730 days > 730 days overall days
mean 0.0888 0.0483 0.0392 0.0324 0.0631
std 0.1495 0.1948 0.2171 0.3761 0.1323
rel. share 0.6627 0.1611 0.1115 0.0647
orr (per apita) 0.3735 -0.0115 0.2979 0.2346 0.3769
orr (per empl.) 0.0640 -0.0862 0.1272 0.1934 0.0510
av. obs. 53.5241 13.2736 9.3044 5.5077 81.6099
Firings < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0075 0.0039 0.0023 0.0009 0.0030
std 0.2034 0.2056 0.2443 0.3211 0.1525
rel. share 0.5127 0.1793 0.1947 0.1133
rel. earnings 0.7093 0.7202 0.7029 0.8008
orr (per apita) -0.4846 -0.2830 -0.3987 -0.2396 -0.4338
orr (per empl.) -0.1894 -0.1144 -0.1618 0.0362 -0.1365
av. obs. 38.7696 14.1463 15.4448 9.3647 77.7254
Notes: The data is for full-time employed males for the period Jan1980− Sep2004. The olumns ontain the
bounds of the dierent tenure groups. The tenure groups are formed for the labor market state before the
transition and are given in days. All statistis are omputed onditional on being in the respetive labor market
state and tenure group. mean is the average transition probability of the respetive labor market transition.
std is the relative deviation of the transition rate over time. rel. share is the average share of transitions falling
in this tenure group relative to all transitions. rel. earnings are the average relative earnings of all persons
with a transition relative to the average earnings in the urrent labor market and tenure group. orr are the
respetive orrelations of the transition rate with GDP per apita respetively per employed as our business
yle measures. av. obs are the average number of transitions per month from the respetive labor market and
tenure group.
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Table C.27: Transition rates between labor market states for full-time employed workers (females, Jan1980−
Sep2004)
Low skilled
Quits < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0107 0.0057 0.0039 0.0022 0.0042
std 0.1949 0.2655 0.2885 0.2900 0.2055
rel. share 0.4014 0.1285 0.1802 0.2899
rel. earnings 0.8930 0.8506 0.8737 0.9028
orr (per apita) 0.1991 0.1295 0.3606 0.1867 0.4182
orr (per empl.) -0.0023 0.0641 0.1960 0.1664 0.2088
av. obs. 25.3265 7.9807 11.3525 18.3500 63.0097
Jobndings < 180 days 180 − 365 days 365 − 730 days > 730 days overall days
mean 0.0449 0.0222 0.0149 0.0095 0.0281
std 0.1709 0.1942 0.2791 0.4515 0.1548
rel. share 0.6561 0.1770 0.0965 0.0704
orr (per apita) 0.3515 0.2352 0.3170 0.3653 0.4123
orr (per empl.) 0.0183 0.0934 0.1340 0.1583 0.0570
av. obs. 48.3157 12.9190 6.9710 4.9977 73.2033
Firings < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0175 0.0073 0.0035 0.0021 0.0053
std 0.1629 0.2253 0.2794 0.2450 0.1211
rel. share 0.5124 0.1260 0.1309 0.2307
rel. earnings 0.9668 0.8552 0.8356 0.8552
orr (per apita) -0.5042 -0.2932 -0.4202 -0.2790 -0.3822
orr (per empl.) -0.2191 -0.1159 -0.2179 -0.0456 -0.1681
av. obs. 40.3859 9.9306 11.1931 19.1049 80.6144
Medium skilled
Quits < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0167 0.0102 0.0078 0.0036 0.0081
std 0.1163 0.1701 0.1879 0.1674 0.1673
rel. share 0.4033 0.1591 0.2500 0.1876
rel. earnings 0.9145 0.8986 0.8612 0.8651
orr (per apita) 0.5771 0.6228 0.6710 0.5760 0.7008
orr (per empl.) 0.2204 0.3345 0.3129 0.3307 0.3266
av. obs. 291.4141 115.1827 178.2881 134.6110 719.4960
Jobndings < 180 days 180 − 365 days 365 − 730 days > 730 days overall days
mean 0.0847 0.0421 0.0331 0.0268 0.0598
std 0.1039 0.1041 0.1352 0.2025 0.1002
rel. share 0.6937 0.1641 0.0838 0.0584
orr (per apita) 0.6008 0.1807 0.4064 0.5198 0.5895
orr (per empl.) 0.2369 0.0628 0.3134 0.2044 0.2252
av. obs. 384.7245 91.7228 47.7336 33.0633 557.2441
Firings < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0142 0.0061 0.0034 0.0017 0.0051
std 0.1565 0.1479 0.1903 0.1505 0.1079
rel. share 0.5383 0.1491 0.1738 0.1388
rel. earnings 0.8704 0.8024 0.7703 0.7456
orr (per apita) -0.7070 -0.6740 -0.7305 -0.6986 -0.7345
orr (per empl.) -0.3471 -0.4101 -0.4497 -0.4517 -0.4614
av. obs. 241.6299 67.2226 79.0972 62.7242 450.6738
High skilled
Quits < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0165 0.0117 0.0095 0.0046 0.0107
std 0.1420 0.2098 0.2537 0.2998 0.1742
rel. share 0.4611 0.1936 0.2402 0.1051
rel. earnings 0.8632 0.9171 0.9504 0.8436
orr (per apita) 0.4274 0.5563 0.4946 0.3078 0.5874
orr (per empl.) 0.2204 0.3195 0.2462 0.1641 0.2764
av. obs. 40.0849 17.8844 22.5298 10.5418 91.0409
Jobndings < 180 days 180 − 365 days 365 − 730 days > 730 days overall days
mean 0.0907 0.0528 0.0453 0.0487 0.0707
std 0.1353 0.1999 0.2507 0.6424 0.1278
rel. share 0.6726 0.1663 0.0973 0.0637
orr (per apita) 0.4734 0.2526 0.0969 0.1539 0.5210
orr (per empl.) 0.2738 0.1177 0.0325 0.0811 0.2913
av. obs. 40.5999 10.2701 6.1552 4.1436 61.1688
Firings < 365 days 365 − 730 days 730 − 1825 days > 1825 days overall days
mean 0.0103 0.0065 0.0034 0.0015 0.0055
std 0.1733 0.2257 0.2826 0.3652 0.1306
rel. share 0.5454 0.2121 0.1720 0.0705
rel. earnings 0.8114 0.8240 0.7712 0.6307
orr (per apita) -0.4134 -0.2501 -0.4152 -0.0378 -0.3596
orr (per empl.) -0.2082 -0.2540 -0.2747 0.0312 -0.2780
av. obs. 23.5057 9.3485 7.5014 3.1862 43.5418
Notes: The data is for full-time employed females for the period Jan1980 − Sep2004. The olumns ontain
the bounds of the dierent tenure groups. The tenure groups are formed for the labor market state before the
transition and are given in days. All statistis are omputed onditional on being in the respetive labor market
state and tenure group. mean is the average transition probability of the respetive labor market transition.
std is the relative deviation of the transition rate over time. rel. share is the average share of transitions falling
in this tenure group relative to all transitions. rel. earnings are the average relative earnings of all persons
with a transition relative to the average earnings in the urrent labor market and tenure group. orr are the
respetive orrelations of the transition rate with GDP per apita respetively per employed as our business
yle measures. av. obs are the average number of transitions per month from the respetive labor market and
tenure group.
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C.3 Unemployment deomposition
HP lter, Fujita and Ramey (2007)
Denote the unemployment rate in period t by ut and denote by u¯t the Hp-ltered trend om-
ponent of the unemployment rate. Following Shimer (2005) the unemployment rate and the
trend unemployment rate an be approximated by
ut =
st
st + ft
u¯t =
s¯t
s¯t + f¯t
where st is the job separation hazard rate and ft is the job nding hazard rate from the
ontinuous time setting. These rates oinide with the probabilities for small values of st and
ft, and again, s¯t and f¯t denote their trend ounterparts obtained from the HP-lter.
We rearrange terms to get
(1− ut)st − utft = 0 (1− u¯t)s¯t − u¯tf¯t = 0
We linearize around the trend equation and get
(1− ut)st − utft = (1− u¯t)s¯t − u¯tf¯t − (s¯t + f¯t)(ut − u¯t) + (1− u¯t)(st − s¯t)− u¯t(ft − f¯t)
using the log linearization xt−x¯
x¯
≈ log
(
xt
x¯
)
, we get
(1− ut)st − utft − (1− u¯t)s¯t + u¯tf¯t =
−(s¯t + f¯t)u¯t log
(
ut
u¯t
)
+ (1− u¯t)s¯t log
(
st
s¯t
)
− u¯tf¯t log
(
ft
f¯t
)
(1− ut)st − utft − (1− u¯t)s¯t + u¯tf¯t
s¯t + f¯t
=
−u¯t log
(
ut
u¯t
)
+ (1− u¯t)u¯t log
(
st
s¯t
)
− u¯t(1− u¯t) log
(
ft
f¯t
)
(1− ut)st − utft − (1− u¯t)s¯t + u¯tf¯t
s¯t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:−εt
= − log
(
ut
u¯t
)
+ (1− u¯t) log
(
st
s¯t
)
− (1− u¯t) log
(
ft
f¯t
)
log
(
ut
u¯t
)
= (1− u¯t) log
(
st
s¯t
)
− (1− u¯t) log
(
ft
f¯t
)
+ εt
a similar expression an be derived using a rst dierene lter as we will show below.
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We dene
dut := log
(
ut
u¯t
)
dst := (1− u¯t) log
(
st
s¯t
)
dft := −(1− u¯t) log
(
ft
f¯t
)
If we use these denitions the expression above an be ompatly written as
dut = dst + dft + εt
We apply the variane operator to both sides of this equation and obtain
var(dut) = var(dst) + var(dft) + var(εt) + 2cov(dst, dft) + 2cov(dst, εt) + 2cov(dft, εt)
Denote by µj the mean of all variables j = {u, f, s, ε}. We an now derive the following result
dut = dst + dft + εt
(dut − µu)(djt − µj) = (djt − µj)dst + (djt − µj)dft + (djt − µj)εt − (djt − µj)µu
(dut − µu)(djt − µj) = (djt − µj)dst + (djt − µj)dft + (djt − µj)εt − (djt − µj)(µs + µf + µε)
(dut − µu)(djt − µj) = (djt − µj)(dst − µs) + (djt − µj)(dft − µf) + (djt − µj)(εt − µε)
Taking expetations on both sides yields
cov(dut, djt) = cov(djt, dst) + cov(djt, dft) + cov(djt, εt)
If we use this relationship for j = {f, s, ε}, we obtain
cov(dut, dst) + cov(dut, dft) + cov(dut, εt) = var(dst) + var(dft) + var(εt)
+2cov(dst, dft) + 2cov(dst, εt) + 2cov(dft, εt)
Plugging this bak into the expression for var(dut) yields
var(dut) = cov(dut, dst) + cov(dut, dft) + cov(dut, εt)
Deviding by var(dut) yields the Fujita and Ramey deomposition formula
cov(dut, dst)
var(dut)
+
cov(dut, dft)
var(dut)
+
cov(dut, εt)
var(dut)
= βs + βf + βe = 1
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1st dierene lter, Petrongolo and Pissardides (2009)
Again, we use the approximation formula by Shimer (2005) to desribe unemployment and
rearrange terms to get
ut =
st
st + ft
ut−1 =
st−1
st−1 + ft−1
Subtrat the two equations from eah other and add the zero term ut(ft−1+st−1)−ut(ft−1+st−1)
to get
(1− ut)st − utft − (1− ut−1)st−1 + ut−1ft−1 + ut(ft−1 + st−1)− ut(ft−1 + st−1) = 0
ut−1(ft−1 + st−1)− ut(ft−1 + st−1) + (1− ut)st − utft − (1− ut)st−1 + utft−1 = 0
(ut−1 − ut)(ft−1 + st−1) + (1− ut)st − (1− ut)st−1 − utft + utft−1 = 0
−∆ut(ft−1 + st−1) + (1− ut)∆st − ut∆ft = 0
(1− ut)
st−1
ft−1 + st−1
∆st
st−1
− ut
ft−1
ft−1 + st−1
∆ft
ft−1
= ∆ut
(1− ut)ut−1
∆st
st−1
− ut(1− ut−1)
∆ft
ft−1
= ∆ut
We dene
dst := ∆ut dst := (1− ut)ut−1
∆st
st−1
dft := −ut(1− ut−1)
∆ft
ft−1
and the deomposition an be ompatly written as before as
dst + dft = dut
If we use the unemployment rate from the data for the deomposition, then the deomposition
formula has to be augmented by an extra error term as in the ase for the HP lter. How-
ever, if we use the unemployment rate onstruted using Shimer's formula there will be no
approximation error and the deomposition is exat suh that all variations an be attributed
to separations and jobndings from the deomposition formula.
1st dierene lter, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2009)
Denote the three states by E (employment), U (unemployment), and N (non-employment),
and denote by Πij,t the transition probability from state i to state j in period t. The steady
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state ow ondition is
ΠEU,tEt +ΠNU,tNt = (ΠUE,t +ΠUN,t)Ut
ΠUE,tUt +ΠNE,tNt = (ΠEU,t +ΠEN,t)Et
Substitution Nt out of the ow equations and rearranging terms yields
ut =
Ut
Ut + Et
=
ΠEU,t +
ΠNU,t
ΠNE,t+ΠNU,t
ΠEN,t
ΠUE,t +ΠEU,t +
ΠNE,t
ΠNE,t+ΠNU,t
ΠUN,t +
ΠNU,t
ΠNE,t+ΠNU,t
ΠEN,t
Dene sˆt and fˆt
sˆt := ΠEU,t +
ΠNU,t
ΠNE,t +ΠNU,t
ΠEN,t fˆt := ΠUE,t +
ΠNE,t
ΠNE,t +ΠNU,t
ΠUN,t
going through the same steps as for the two states ase yields
∆ut = (1− ut)ut−1
∆sˆt
sˆt−1
− ut(1− ut−1)
∆fˆt
fˆt−1
Dene the omponents measuring the NU and UN ontributions
NU : ∆n1,t :=
ΠNU,t
ΠNE,t +ΠNU,t
ΠEN,t −
ΠNU,t−1
ΠNE,t−1 +ΠNU,t−1
ΠEN,t−1
UN : ∆n2,t :=
ΠNE,t
ΠNE,t +ΠNU,t
ΠUN,t −
ΠNE,t−1
ΠNE,t−1 +ΠNU,t−1
ΠUN,t−1
Rewrite the expression for ∆ut as follows
∆ut = (1− ut)ut−1
∆ΠEU,t
sˆt−1
− ut(1− ut−1)
∆ΠUE,t
fˆt−1
+ (1− ut)ut−1
∆n1,t
sˆt−1
− ut(1− ut−1)
∆n2,t
fˆt−1
dut = dst + dft + dn1,t + dn2,t
and the ontribution rates an be derived as for the two state ase
βs =
cov(dut, dst)
var(dut)
βf =
cov(dut, dft)
var(dut)
βn,1 =
cov(dut, dn1,t)
var(dut)
βn,2 =
cov(dut, dn2,t)
var(dut)
If we use the data unemployment rate instead of the onstruted one using the Shimer formula,
then there is also a ontribution fator βε originating from the approximation error.
Reognize that the deomposition is unaeted by a mismeasurement of the pool of non-
employmened. Although, the formula ontains the transition rates, the transition rates an
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be replae by ows that are measured orretly beause the level eet of the ows will anel
out.
HP lter
In this setion, we extend the Fujita and Ramey (2007) approah to a three state environment
as in the Petrongolo and Pissarides (2009) framework.
From the steady state ow equation, we an derive a steady state unemployment rate
ut =
ΠEU,tΠNE,t +ΠEU,tΠNU,t +ΠNU,tΠEN,t
ΠUE,tΠNE,t +ΠUE,tΠNU,t +ΠEU,tΠNE,t +ΠEU,tΠNU,t +ΠUN,tΠNE,t +ΠNU,tΠEN,t
u¯ =
Π¯EU Π¯NE + Π¯EUΠ¯NU + Π¯NU Π¯EN
Π¯UEΠ¯NE + Π¯UEΠ¯NU + Π¯EUΠ¯NE + Π¯EU Π¯NU + Π¯UN Π¯NE + Π¯NU Π¯EN
where again the seond expression ontains the trend omponents from the HP lter. To ease
notation, we dene
Ω := Π¯UEΠ¯NE + Π¯UEΠ¯NU + Π¯NEΠ¯UN + Π¯EUΠ¯NE + Π¯EU Π¯NU + Π¯NU Π¯EN
Rearranging terms yields
ut (ΠUE,tΠNE,t +ΠUE,tΠNU,t +ΠNE,tΠUN,t)
−(1− ut) (ΠEU,tΠNE,t +ΠEU,tΠNU,t +ΠNU,tΠEN,t) = 0
u¯
(
Π¯UEΠ¯NE + Π¯UEΠ¯NU + Π¯NEΠ¯UN
)
−(1− u¯)
(
Π¯EU Π¯NE + Π¯EU Π¯NU + Π¯NU Π¯EN
)
= 0
We linearized around the trend omponent
(ut − u¯)Ω + (ΠUE,t − Π¯UE)
(
Π¯NEu¯+ Π¯NU u¯
)
+ (ΠNE,t − Π¯NE)
(
Π¯UEu¯+ Π¯UN u¯− (1− u¯)Π¯EU
)
+ (ΠNU,t − Π¯NU)
(
Π¯UEu¯− (1− u¯)Π¯EU − (1− u¯)Π¯EN
)
+ (ΠUN,t − Π¯UN)
(
Π¯NEu¯
)
+ (ΠEU,t − Π¯EU)
(
−(1− u¯)Π¯NE − (1− u¯)Π¯NU
)
+ (ΠEN,t − Π¯EN)
(
−(1− u¯)Π¯NU
)
+ εˆt
= 0
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using log linearization yields
log
(ut
u¯
)
Ω+ Π¯UE log
(
ΠUE,t
Π¯UE
)(
Π¯NE + Π¯NU
)
+ Π¯NE log
(
ΠNE,t
Π¯NE
)(
Π¯UE + Π¯UN −
(1− u¯)
u¯
Π¯EU
)
+ Π¯NU log
(
ΠNU,t
Π¯NU
)(
Π¯UE −
(1− u¯)
u¯
Π¯EU −
(1− u¯)
u¯
Π¯EN
)
+ Π¯UN log
(
ΠUN,t
Π¯UN
)
Π¯NE
+ Π¯EU log
(
ΠEU,t
Π¯EU
)(
−
(1− u¯)
u¯
Π¯NE −
(1− u¯)
u¯
Π¯NU
)
+ Π¯EN log
(
ΠEN,t
Π¯EN
)(
−
(1− u¯)
u¯
Π¯NU
)
+
εˆt
u¯
= 0
We get the following deomposition
log
(ut
u¯
)
= − log
(
ΠUE,t
Π¯UE
)
Π¯UEΠ¯NE + Π¯UEΠ¯NU
Ω
− log
(
ΠNE,t
Π¯NE
)
Π¯NEΠ¯UE + Π¯NEΠ¯UN −
(1−u¯)
u¯
Π¯NEΠ¯EU
Ω
− log
(
ΠNU,t
Π¯NU
)
Π¯NU Π¯UE −
(1−u¯)
u¯
Π¯NU Π¯EU −
(1−u¯)
u¯
Π¯NU Π¯EN
Ω
− log
(
ΠUN,t
Π¯UN
)
Π¯UN Π¯NE
Ω
+ log
(
ΠEU,t
Π¯EU
)
(1− u¯)
u¯
Π¯EUΠ¯NE + Π¯EU Π¯NU
Ω
+ log
(
ΠEN,t
Π¯EN
)
(1− u¯)
u¯
Π¯EN Π¯NU
Ω
+ εt
and dene
Π¯u := Π¯EU +
Π¯NU
Π¯NE + Π¯NU
Π¯EN Π¯e := Π¯UE +
Π¯UN
Π¯NE + Π¯NU
Π¯NE
λEU := (1− u¯)
Π¯EU
Π¯u
λUE := (1− u¯)
Π¯UE
Π¯e
λEN := (1− u¯)
Π¯EN
Π¯u
λUN := (1− u¯)
Π¯UN
Π¯e
α :=
Π¯NU
Π¯NE + Π¯NU
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Using these denitions, we get
log
(ut
u¯
)
= log
(
ΠEU,t
Π¯EU
)
λEU − log
(
ΠUE,t
Π¯UE
)
λUE
+ log
(
ΠEN,t
Π¯EN
)
αλEN − log
(
ΠNE,t
Π¯NE
)
(1− α)(λUE + λUN − λEU)
+ log
(
ΠNU,t
Π¯NU
)
α(λEU + λEN − λUE)− log
(
ΠUN,t
Π¯UN
)
(1− α)λUN + εt
du = dEU + dUE + dEN + dNE + dNU + dUN + εt
The ovariane deomposition as for the ase of two variables generalizes to the ase of n
variables
du =
n∑
i=1
di
(du− µu)(dj − µj) =
(
n∑
i=1
di
)
(dj − µj)− µu(dj − µj)
(du− µu)(dj − µj) =
(
n∑
i=1
di
)
(dj − µj)−
(
n∑
i=1
µi
)
(dj − µj)
(du− µu)(dj − µj) =
(
n∑
i=1
(di− µi)
)
(dj − µj)
and we obtain the ovariane deomposition
cov(du, dj) =
n∑
i=1
cov(di, dj)
The generalized formula for the variane of the unemployment rate reads
var(du) =
n∑
i=1
var(di) +
n∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
cov(di, dj)
var(du) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
cov(di, dj)
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Plugging in the expression we just derived for
n∑
i=1
cov(di, dj) yields
var(du) =
n∑
i=1
cov(du, di)
1 =
n∑
i=1
cov(du, di)
var(du)
1 =
n∑
i=1
βi
126
Bibliography
[1℄ S. Rao Aiyagari. Uninsured idiosynrati risk and aggregate saving. The Quarterly Journal
of Eonomis, 109(3):659  684, 1994.
[2℄ Ronald Bahmann. Labour market dynamis in germany: Hirings, separations, and job-
to-job transitions over the business yle. Humboldt University: SFB Disussion Paper
2005-45, 2005.
[3℄ Mark Bils. Real wages over the business yle: Evidene from panel data. Journal of
Politial Eonomy, 93(4):666689, 1985.
[4℄ Oliver Blanhard and J Wolfers. The role of shoks and institutions in the rise of european
unemployment: The aggregate evidene. Eonomi Journal, 110:133, 2000.
[5℄ Rihard Blundell, Luigi Pistaferri, and Ian Preston. Consumption inequality and partial
insurane. Amerian Eonomi Review, 98(5):18871921, 2008.
[6℄ Christopher D. Carroll. Buer-stok saving and the life yle / permanent inome hypoth-
esis. Quarterly Journal of Eonomis, 112(1):155, 1997.
[7℄ Christopher D. Carroll. Theoretial foundations of buer stok saving. NBER Working
Paper No. 10867, Nov. 2004, 2004.
[8℄ Christopher D. Carroll. Preautionary saving and the marginal propensity to onsume out
of permanent inome. Journal of Monetary Eonomis, (56):780790, 2009.
[9℄ Christopher D. Carroll and Miles S. Kimball. On the onavity of the onsumption fun-
tion. Eonometria, 64(4):981  992, 1996.
[10℄ Christopher D. Carroll and Andrew A. Samwik. The nature of preautionary wealth.
Journal of Monetary Eonomis, 40(1):41  72, 1997.
[11℄ Wilbur John Coleman II. Equilibrium in a prodution eonomy with an inome tax.
Eonometria, 59(4):10911104, 1991.
127
[12℄ George M. Constantinides and Darrell Due. Asset priing with heterogeneous onsumers.
Journal of Politial Eonomy, 104(2):219  240, 1996.
[13℄ Thomas F. Cooley and Edward C. Presott. Eonomi growth and business yles. In
Thomas F. Cooley, editor, Frontiers of Business Cyle Researh, pages 1  38. Prineton
University Press, 1995.
[14℄ James Costain and Mihael Reiter. Business yles, unemployment insurane, and the
alibration of mathing models. Journal of Eonomi Dynamis and Control, 2005. forth-
oming.
[15℄ Patrik Cousot and Radhia Cousot. Construtive versions of tarski's xed point theorems.
Pai Journal of Mathematis, 82(1), 1979.
[16℄ Angus Deaton. Saving and liquidity onstraints. Eonometria, 59(5):12211248, 1991.
[17℄ Angus Deaton and Guy Laroque. On the behavior of ommodity pries. Review of Eo-
nomi Studies, 59(1):123, 1992.
[18℄ Wouter den Haan, Gary Ramey, and Joel Watson. Job destrution and propagation of
shoks. Amerian Eonomi Review, 90:482498, 2000.
[19℄ Darrell Due, John Geanakoplos, Andreu Mas-Colell, and Andy MLennan. Stationary
markov equilibria. Eonometria, 62:745  782, 1994.
[20℄ B. Fitzenberger, A. Osikominu, and R.Voelter. Imputation rules to improve the eduation
variable in the iab employment subsample. Shmollers Jahrbuh, 126(3):405436, 2006.
[21℄ Bernd Fitzenberger. Wages and Employment Aross Skill Groups: An Analysis for West
Germany. Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, 1999.
[22℄ Niola Fuhs-Shündeln, Dirk Krueger, and Mathias Sommer. Inequality trends for ger-
many in the last two deades: A tale of two ountries. Review of Eonomi Dynamis,
2009. forthoming.
[23℄ Shigeru Fujita and Garey Ramey. The yliality of separation and job nding rates.
International Eonomi Review, 2007. forthoming.
[24℄ Hermann Gartner. The imputation of wages above the ontribution limit with the german
iab employment sample. IAB Nuernberg, 2005.
[25℄ Hermann Gartner, Christian Merkl, and Thomas Rothe. They are even larger! more (on)
puzzling labor market volatilities. working paper, 2009.
128
[26℄ Mark Gertler and Antonella Trigari. Unemployment utuations with staggered nash wage
bargaining. mimeo; New York University, 2005.
[27℄ Edward J. Green. Individual level randomness in a nonatomi population. Working paper,
1994, 1994.
[28℄ Christian Haefke, Markus Sonntag, and Thijs van Rens. Wage rigidity and job reation.
working paper, 2007.
[29℄ Marus Hagedorn and Iourii Manovskii. The ylial behavior of equilibrium unemploy-
ment and vaanies revisited. Amerian Eonomi Review, 98(4):16921706, 2008.
[30℄ Robert E Hall. Employment utuations with equilibrium wage stikiness. Amerian
Eonomi Review, 95(1):5065, 2005.
[31℄ Robert E Hall. Soures and mehanisms of ylial utuations in the labor market. 2008.
Mimeo, Stanford University.
[32℄ Robert E Hall and Paul R Milgrom. The limited inuene of unemployment on the wage
bargain. Amerian Eonomi Review, 98(4):16531674, 2008.
[33℄ Jonathan Heathote, Fabrizio Perri, and Gianlua Violante. Unequal we stand: An empir-
ial analysis of eonomi inequality in the united states, 1967-2006. Review of Eonomi
Dynamis, 2009. forthoming.
[34℄ Jonathan Heathote, Kjetil Storesletten, and Giovanni L. Violante. Insurane and op-
portunities: A welfare analysis of labor market risk. Journal of Monetary Eonomis,
55(3):501525, 2008.
[35℄ Jonathan Heathote, Kjetil Storesletten, and Giovanni L. Violante. Consumption and
labor supply with partial insurane: An analytial framework. June 2009.
[36℄ John Heaton and Deborah J. Luas. Evaluating the eets of inomplete markets on risk
sharing and asset priing. Journal Politial Eonomy, 104(3):443  487, 1996.
[37℄ Mark Huggett. The risk-free rate in heterogeneous agent inomplete insurane eonomies.
Journal of Eonomi Dynamis and Control, 17(5-6):953969, 1993.
[38℄ Mark Huggett and Sandra Ospina. Aggregate preautionary savings: when is the third
derivative irrelevant? Journal of Monetary Eonomis, 48:373  396, 2001.
[39℄ Tullio Jappelli, Mario Padula, and Luigi Pistaferri. A diret test of the buer stok model
of saving. Journal of the European Eonomi Assoiation (forthoming).
129
[40℄ Kenneth L. Judd. Projetion methods for solving aggregate growth models. Journal of
Eonomi Theory, 58:410  452, 1992.
[41℄ Philip Jung. Optimal taxation and (female)-labor fore partiipation over the yle. mimeo,
2007.
[42℄ Greg Kaplan and Gianlua Violante. How muh onsumption insurane beyond self-
insurane? AEJ Maroeonomis, 2009 (forthoming).
[43℄ Stephen C. Kleene. Introdution to Metamathematis. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1952.
[44℄ Tom Krebs. Non-existene of reursive equilibria on ompat state spaes when markets
are inomplete. Journal of Eonomi Theory, 115:134  150, 2004.
[45℄ Tom Krebs. Job displaement risk and the ost of business yles. Amerian Eonomi
Review, 97(3):664  686, 2007.
[46℄ Dirk Krueger and Fabrizio Perri. Does inome inequality lead to onsumption inequality?
evidene and theory. Review of Eonomi Studies, 73(1):163  193.
[47℄ Per Krusell and Jr. Anthony A. Smith. Inome and wealth heterogeneity, portfolio hoie,
and equilibrium asset returns. Maroeonomi Dynamis, 1:387  422, 1997.
[48℄ Felix Kubler and Karl Shmedders. Inomplete markets, transitory shoks, and welfare.
Review of Eonomi Dynamis, 4:747  766, 2001.
[49℄ Sadatoshi Kumagai. An impliit funtion theorem: Comment. Journal of Optimization
Theory and Appliations, 31(2), 1980.
[50℄ Cuong Le Van and John Stahurski. Parametri ontinuity of stationary distributions.
Eonomi Theory, 33(2):333  348, 2007.
[51℄ David K. Levine and William R. Zame. Does market inompleteness matter? Eonomet-
ria, 70(5):1805  1839, 2002.
[52℄ Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent. Reursive Maroeonomi Theory. MIT Press,
2000.
[53℄ Robert E. Luas. Models of business yles. Basil Blakwell, 1987.
[54℄ Costas Meghir and Luigi Pistaferri. Inome variane dynamis and heterogeneity. Eono-
metria, 72(1):132, 2004.
130
[55℄ Guido Menzio and Shouyong Shi. Eient searh on the job. working paper, 2009.
[56℄ Sean Meyn and Rihard Tweedie. Markov Chains and Stohasti Stability. Springer Lon-
don, 1993.
[57℄ Jianjun Miao. Competitive equilibria of eonomies with a ontinuum of onsumers and
aggregate shoks. Journal of Eonomi Theory, 126:274  298, 2006.
[58℄ Eva Nagypal. Labor-market utuations and on-the-job searh. working paper, 2005.
[59℄ Fei Peng and William Siebert. Real wage yliality in germany and the uk: New results
using panel data. 2007, 2007.
[60℄ Barbara Petrongolo and Christopher A. Pissarides. Looking into the blak box: A survey
of the mathing funtion. Journal of Eonomi Literature, 2001(2):390431, 2001.
[61℄ Barbara Petrongolo and Christopher A. Pissarides. The ins and outs of european unem-
ployment. working paper, 2009.
[62℄ Christopher Pissarides. The unemployment volatility puzzle: Is wage stikiness the answer?
Eonometria, forthoming, 2009.
[63℄ Mihael Pries. Worker heterogeneity and labor market volatility in mathing models.
Review of Eonomi Dynamis, 11(3):664678, July 2008.
[64℄ Guillaume Rabault. When do borrowing onstraints bind? some new results on the inome
utualtion problem. Journal of Eonomi Dynamis and Control, 26:217245, 2002.
[65℄ Garey Ramey. Exogenous vs. endogenous separation. working paper, 2008.
[66℄ Pontus Rendahl. Inequality onstraints in reursive eonomies. EUI Working Paper 2006/6.
[67℄ Leena Rudanko. Labor market dynamis under long-term wage ontrating. Journal of
Monetary Eonomis, forthoming, 2009.
[68℄ Robert Shimer. The ylial behavior of equilibrium unemployment, vaanies, and wages:
Evidene and theory. Amerian Eonomi Review, 95(1):2549, 2005.
[69℄ Gary Solon, Robert Barsky, and Jonathan A. Parker. Measuring the yliality of real
wages: How important is omposition bias? Quarterly Journal of Eonomis, 109(1):125,
1994.
131
[70℄ Nany L. Stokey and Robert E. Luas with Edward C. Presott. Reursive Methods in
Eonomi Dynamis. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1989.
[71℄ Kjetil Storesletten, Christopher I. Telmer, and Amir Yaron. Asset priing with idiosyn-
rati risk and overlapping generations. January 2007.
[72℄ Alfred Tarski. A lattie-theoretial xpoint theorem and its appliations. Pai Journal
of Mathematis, 5:285309, 1955.
[73℄ Chris I. Telmer. Asset priing puzzles and inomplete markets. The Journal of Finane,
48(5):1803  1832, 1993.
[74℄ Marelo Veraierto. Firing ost and business yle utuations. International eonomi
Review, 49(1):139, 2008.
[75℄ Eberhard Zeidler. Nonlinear Funtional Analysis and its Appliations I, Fixed-Point The-
orems. Springer, 1986.
132
Lebenslauf
Persönlihe Daten
Nikolas Moritz Kuhn
geboren 1980
Ausbildung
09/2006  heute wissenshftliher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für Makroökonomie und
Wirtshaftspolitik, Prof. Tom Krebs, Ph.D.
10/2005  heute Doktorand am Center for Dotoral Studies in Eonomis (CDSE)
der Universität Mannheim
09/2003  06/2004 Studium der Volkswirtshaftslehre an der University of California,
Los Angeles (Ph.D. Program)
10/2000  09/2005 Studium der Volkswirtshaftslehre an der Universität Mannheim
(Abshluÿ Diplom Volkswirt)
06/2000 Abitur am Niolas-Kistner-Gymnasium Mosbah
Mannheim, den 08.02.2010
133
Eidesstattlihe Erklärung
Hiermit erkläre ih, die vorliegende Dissertation selbständig angefertigt und mih keiner anderen
als der in ihr angegebenen Hilfsmittel bedient zu haben. Insbesondere sind sämtlihe Zitate aus
anderen Quellen als solhe gekennzeihnet und mit Quellenangaben versehen. Alle Arbeiten
mit Koautoren wurden ausdrüklih als solhe gekennzeihnet.
Mannheim, den 08.02.2010
Nikolas Moritz Kuhn
134
